Messer v. Mamches
| Decision Date | 10 April 1947 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1653-M. |
| Citation | 71 F. Supp. 197 |
| Parties | MESSER v. MAMCHES et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Rasco & Esslinger, of Miami Beach, Fla., for plaintiff.
Price & Price, of Miami, Fla., for defendants.
Samuel Paul Messer brought this action against Maurice Mamches and Ethel Mamches, defendants, seeking to recover treble damages and attorney's fee for an alleged overcharge in rent for housing accommodation known as "the furnished front house" at 621 Lennox Avenue, Miami Beach, Dade County, Florida.
In their answer defendants set up several defenses, among them being the defense that the housing accommodation in question was leased for use and consumption in the course of trade and business and was not for consumption other than in the course of trade and business. Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss on this ground. When the case came on for trial the court first restricted the trial to this issue to determine whether plaintiff had the right under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 50 U.S. C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq., to maintain this action.
The evidence shows that under date of February 15, 1946, the parties executed a lease covering the above premises for a term commencing the 4th of February, 1946 and expiring on the 5th of May, 1947. The premises were leased furnished by plaintiff to be operated as a rooming house and the lease contained numerous covenants and restrictions as to its operation as such. By the lease plaintiff was authorized to make certain alterations of the premises so as to increase its rooming capacity. He was allowed to convert a screened porch into two bedrooms and the sun room into a bedroom by installing temporary screens and partitions.
Immediately upon the execution of the lease plaintiff secured from the State Hotel Commission and from the City of Miami Beach licenses to operate the property as a rooming house, containing nine rooms. On February 5, 1946 plaintiff registered with the Office of Price Administration maximum rents for the nine rooms to be offered for rent. It is noted that this registration was filed with the Office of Price Administration by plaintiff before the lease covering the premises had been executed or licenses secured to operate the property as a rooming house.
A sketch of the floor plans introduced in evidence indicates that the dwelling when used as a residence consisted of a living room, sun room, screened porch, dining room and kitchen on the first floor and four bedrooms and three baths on the second floor. The sketch and the evidence shows that the sun room was made into a bedroom, the screened porch was made into two bedrooms and plaintiff registered the dining room and living room as bedrooms with the State, City and Office of Price Administration. The sketch shows that a bath was installed in the corner of the kitchen, but the evidence does not show when this bath was installed.
The registration filed by plaintiff with the Office of Price Administration included the nine bedrooms enumerated above. Plaintiff registered these rooms at a daily rate for one person from $10 to $15 and correspondingly higher rates for two and three persons. The rooms were also registered at a weekly rate for one person from $60 to $100 and at correspondingly higher rates for two and three persons. Monthly rates were also shown for one person from $200 to $350 and correspondingly higher rates for two and three persons.
The Office of Price Administration reduced the rental charged by defendants to plaintiff to a seasonal basis, varying from a low of $75 per month for the months of June, July, August, September and October to a high of $350 per month for the month of February. The sum...
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Young v. Margiotta
...the incidental use for storage purposes would not take them out of the act. See Ison v. Baker, D.C., 66 F.Supp. 645, 650; Messer v. Mamches, D.C., 71 F.Supp. 197. That the plaintiff did not himself occupy the premises but used them only as a living place for his employees would not prevent ......
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Bray v. Peck
...to the furniture but we look through the form to the substance of the transaction. Ison v. Baker, D.C., 66 F.Supp. 645, 650; Messer v. Mamches, D.C., 71 F.Supp. 197, and Burns v. Donohue, D.C., 79 F.Supp. We point out also that apparently the court below in its findings referred only to the......
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Jones v. Chennault
...use, then the transaction was in the course of trade or business, with no consequent statutory right of action in plaintiff. Messer v. Mamches, D.C., 71 F.Supp. 197. In Hall v. Palmer, 54 Mich. 270, 20 N.W. 49, 50, this court, in denying to the plaintiff recovery of expenses incurred under ......