Messiah v. Duncan

• Citation: 435 F.3d 186
• Decision Date: 19 January 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 04-5311 PR.
• Parties: Kassan Supreme MESSIAH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Phillip DUNCAN, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

435 F.3d 186

Kassan Supreme MESSIAH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Phillip DUNCAN, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents-Appellees.

Docket No. 04-5311 PR.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: October 19, 2005.

Decided: January 19, 2006.

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Randall D. Unger, Bayside, NY, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Joseph M. Latino, Assistant District Attorney (Jeanine Pirro, District Attorney of Westchester County, Richard E. Weill, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Diane E. Selker, Assistant District Attorney, on the brief), Westchester County District Attorney's Office, White Plains, NY, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: JACOBS, CABRANES and SACK, Circuit Judges.

Judge JACOBS concurs in a separate opinion.

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge.

We consider here whether a trial court must make particularized findings in order to render a proper ruling on a challenge to the peremptory strike of a jury panelist brought pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We hold that a trial court can fulfill its duty to rule at the so-called "step three" of the Batson framework by expressing a clear intention to uphold or reject a strike after listening to the challenge, the race-neutral explanation and the arguments of the parties.

Petitioner Kassan Supreme Messiah appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Richard Conway Casey, Judge) dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Messiah, who was convicted of several crimes, including murder, contends that the state trial court failed to rule on his Batson challenge to a peremptory strike the prosecutor exercised against a particular jury panelist. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Messiah argues in the alternative that if the trial court did render a ruling on the striking of that panelist, the ruling was not supported by the record. Messiah also maintains that the trial court's rulings with respect to two other Batson challenges he asserted were not supported by the record.

For the reasons set forth below, we find Messiah's claims to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of Messiah's petition.

BACKGROUND

On September 20, 1994, insurance agent Dennis Grasso was shot and killed in his Dobbs Ferry, New York office. In connection with that homicide, former professional boxer Kassan Supreme Messiah was indicted on two counts of murder in the second degree and one count each of robbery in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree.

Messiah was tried by a jury in New York Supreme Court, Westchester County. On May 9, 1995, the jury convicted him on all counts. Messiah subsequently was sentenced principally to an indeterminate term of thirty-seven and a half years to life imprisonment, which he is currently serving. This appeal concerns Messiah's claims that certain peremptory strikes the prosecutor exercised against prospective jurors during voir dire were racially motivated.

I. Voir Dire

In the first panel of jurors examined, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory strike against John Woodbury, a social behavior counselor at a school for the deaf who had spent fourteen years teaching "young deaf men how to socially behave in society, independent living skills." Tr. of Voir Dire ("Tr."), Apr. 13, 1995, at 58. Woodbury's wife worked for a law firm involved in the practice of all types of law. When asked whether the firm's practice included criminal law, Woodbury responded, "I would assume. We don't talk about it." Id. at 59.

The prosecutor eliminated Woodbury among the first set of peremptory strikes; the following colloquy ensued:

THE COURT: Three by consent. Preempts by the People.

MR. NEARY [prosecutor]: Two, three and four, eight and ten.

THE COURT: Is that it?

MR. ASLAKSEN [defense counsel]: Judge, I do have a motion with regard to number two [Woodbury].

. . . .

THE COURT: What do you want to say then?

MR. ASLAKSEN: I want to find out what the nonracial motivation is for the exercise of the peremptory challenge.

THE COURT: He wants to know why you are challenging number two.

MR. NEARY: Social work background, I think it would make him sympathetic to the defendant. His wife works for a law firm.

MR. ASLAKSEN: I would note, your Honor, for the record that he's the only black juror on the panel.

THE COURT: You can stop that nonsense. That's not true. Stop that. That is not true. He and number thirteen.

MR. ASLAKSEN: I was just going to say other than Mr. Smith, number thirteen, who is going to be excused by consent.

THE COURT: Anything else you wish to add?

MR. ASLAKSEN: Our striking?

THE COURT: With reference to these. That's five, five by the People.

Id. at 77-78. Before the second round of jury selection, defense counsel objected to the composition of the panel because it purportedly contained an inadequate representation of racial or ethnic minorities.¹ Id. at 85-87. Jury selection was thereafter adjourned for the weekend.

When jury selection continued the following Monday, defense counsel again objected to the composition of the panel on the ground that "I could only see one person of color in that panel in the last row and there was in the first row another individual who I could not tell whether he was a person of color or not." Tr., April 17, 1995, at 48. The prosecutor disagreed with defense counsel's characterization of the panel, insisting that "I saw more than two people of color." Id. at 49. The prosecutor then went on to discuss the composition of the panel and elaborated further on his reasons for striking Woodbury:

I excused one black male Mr. Woodbury on the basis of the fact that he was a behavioral scientist [sic] who worked with deaf children. He indicated also and I felt that fact indicated to me that he might be sympathetic to someone in a defendant's situation. He also indicated to me that his wife worked in a law office and he indicated that he had never spoken [to] his wife about her employment which I found hard to believe and also the fact that while counsel for defense and myself were considering our challenges during that period of time I observed him what appeared to be laughing and joking with a juror next to him Mr. Chicirelli and the record should reflect I excused both of those gentlemen on the basis I thought their laughing and joking was inappropriate given the seriousness of the charge.

Id. Defense counsel disputed that Woodbury and Chicirelli had been laughing and emphasized the importance to the defendant of "get[ting] some more people on the panel that would be people of color so as to be able to protect this defendant's rights." Id. at 50.

During a later round of jury selection, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory strike against panelist John Rodgers. The discussion concerning that strike occurred, in relevant part, as follows:

MR. ASLAKSEN: Number one, Your Honor, I do want to ask the Court with regard to the last black juror who was peremptorily eliminated.

THE COURT: You?

MR. ASLAKSEN: That the People eliminated.

THE COURT: Who are you talking about?

MR. ASLAKSEN: Mr. Rodgers.

THE COURT: What about him?

MR. ASLAKSEN: He was a man of color.

MR. NEARY: I'm not aware of that.

THE COURT: Let him talk.

MR. ASLAKSEN: I wanted to ask the Court that we have the reason for the prosecution for the exercise of the peremptory challenge.

THE COURT: You've been saying that from the beginning and it's not a true statement. Do you wish to comment, Mr. Neary?

MR. NEARY: Other than I'm not aware that this gentleman is a man of color. I'm not aware from looking at him.

THE COURT: Whether he is or isn't, would you care to put a reason.

MR. NEARY: He's an investment banker in New York City. I saw him reading the newspaper during the course of the voir dire. Maybe it was stock quotations. He also expressed an interest in boxing above that of the average sports fan and, frankly, given the fact there are more jurors I think that are more qualified on the panel that's why I exercised a peremptory challenge.

MR. GIAMBOI [defense counsel]: It has to be specifically stated that it's obvious that the man is a man of color.

THE COURT: I've heard more about color from you people than we've had in the last year.

MR. GIAMBOI: With all due respect, I think it's most important in this case because of the nature and because of certain factors in the case that the Court be made aware of these objections that we draw. We don't do it arbitrarily.

THE COURT: All I can tell you is I look at Mr. Messiah here and I can see. So far I haven't seen anything unusual. I don't know what it is that you are referring to. If you have something to tell me, tell me. So far you've kept me in the dark.

MR. GIAMBOI: I told you in the past we honestly believe this man to be innocent.

THE COURT: What does that have to do.

MR. GIAMBOI: It's important he be judged by his peers. One of his peers would be a man of color on that jury.

THE COURT: You've had your say. You've had [your] say. The ruling stands.

Tr., Apr. 19, 1995, at 193-95.

Later in the selection process, the prosecutor exercised another peremptory strike against panelist Calvin Whitfield and defense counsel objected. Id. at 196-97. Without direction from the Court, the prosecutor immediately responded as follows:

MR. NEARY: This particular juror was excused by the People on the basis of the fact that he apparently has an arrest in 1986 for obstructing governmental administration in Mount Vernon which he told us about and he plead [sic] guilty to disorderly conduct. He told us at the side bar he has four relatives currently in state prison. For those reasons I don't think he could be...