Messmore v. Roth

• Decision Date: 02 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 75128,75128
• Citation: Messmore v. Roth, 366 S.E.2d 318, 185 Ga.App. 862 (Ga. App. 1988)
• Parties: MESSMORE et al. v. ROTH.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 318

366 S.E.2d 318

185 Ga.App. 862

MESSMORE et al. v. ROTH.

No. 75128.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 2, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1988.

Certiorari Denied April 7, 1988.

C. James Jessee, Jr., Atlanta, for appellants.

Michael E. McLaughlin, for appellee.

SOGNIER, Judge.

Lynette Roth brought suit against Jasper and Janet Messmore seeking recovery of actual and punitive damages for the Messmores' alleged conversion of household goods left by Roth in the Messmore home. The Messmores answered and counterclaimed for sums owed by Roth under a lease agreement, as well as for other sums. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Roth on the main claim in the amount of $11,667, and in favor of the Messmores on their counterclaim in the amount of $500. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and following denial of their motions for judgment n.o.v. or, alternatively, for a new trial, the Messmores appeal.

The record reveals that appellee, who had known appellant Janet Messmore in Wisconsin, arranged with appellants upon moving to the Atlanta area to share their home and pay them a fixed sum for rent and a contribution to other household expenses. Appellee moved her furniture and other personal belongings into the house, and subsequently purchased other household items. These were left by appellee in the house when, after a return visit to Wisconsin in the company of appellant Janet Messmore, appellee decided not to return to Atlanta. Although appellee eventually reclaimed a portion of her belongings, she claimed some of the personal property was either damaged or retained by appellants, despite appellee's attempts at retrieval.

1. Appellants contend the trial court erred by permitting appellee to prove the value of her personal property solely through evidence of purchase price. An opinion of value based on purchase price alone is insufficient and has no probative value. See, e.g., Adams Refrigerated Express v. Ingol, 176 Ga.App. 457, 458(1), 336 S.E.2d 289 (1985). However, in the case sub judice appellee also testified to the date of purchase new and the condition of the property immediately prior to its loss or destruction. This provided a sufficient basis from which the jury could determine the value of the property. Braner v. Southern Trust Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 117, 120-121(3), 335 S.E.2d 547 (1985). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by permitting appellee to prove the value of her property in this manner.

2. Appellants maintain that because they asserted several claims against appellee, their retention of appellee's property was rightful under a common law possessory lien and thus the trial court erred both by failing to grant their motion for a directed verdict on this issue, and by charging the jury concerning tortious deprivation of property.

Historically, common law liens were either particular or general. Particular liens arose in certain trades and businesses which were compelled to accept employment from the general public and thus ran the risk of not being paid for their services. Thus innkeepers and common carriers, for instance, if not paid for their services, could retain their customers' belongings. Particular liens attached only to the property involved in the transaction. General liens were created only by express agreement or by custom and usage in certain businesses and professions, such as attorneys, bankers, factors, and insurance brokers. The general lien extended not only to the property involved in the transaction, but to all property of the client or customer, for the satisfaction of an account.

Contrary to appellants' argument, Kollock v. Jackson, 5 Ga. 153 (1848), which dealt with a factor's lien on cotton, and W.C. Caye & Co. v. Milledgeville Banking Co., 91 Ga.App. 664, 86 S.E.2d 717 (1955), concerning a bank's right to set-off monies owed it by a depositor before paying out the depositor's funds in a garnishment action, are distinguishable because both Kollock and Caye involved factual situations in which general liens had been well recognized at common law. We have found no case in which a common law lien attached in a situation such as that created by the facts here. Even assuming a portion of appellants' claim against appellee was for rent, a landlord's right to distrain for rent must be exercised through the use of legal process rather than by simple retention of the tenant's household goods. See OCGA § 44-7-70 et seq. We thus conclude that appellants had no common law lien giving them a right to retain appellee's property. Since appellants had no common law possessory lien, the trial court did not err by failing to grant appellants' motion for a directed verdict on this issue or by charging the jury regarding tortious deprivation of property.

3. Having held in Division 2 that appellants had no common law possessory lien, we find no merit in appellants' enumeration alleging error in the trial court's denial of their motion for a directed verdict as to the issue of punitive damages and find the trial court properly submitted to the jury the issue of whether appellants' retention of appellee's property was such as to warrant the award of additional damages.

4. Appellants assert the trial court erred by excluding testimony from appellee's former employer, which was offered by appellants to impeach appellee through evidence of general bad character. "[A]ny witness, other than an accused, may be discredited by evidence of bad character (OCGA § 24-9-84 ...) ... [Cit.]" Beasley v. State, 168 Ga.App. 255, 256, 308 S.E.2d 560 (1983). This applies in civil, as well as in criminal cases. See, e.g., Ballenger Corp. v. Dresco etc. Contractors, 156 Ga.App. 425, 437-438(4), 274 S.E.2d 786 (1980). Contrary to appellee's argument, Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Green, 169 Ga.App. 211, 312 S.E.2d 196 (1983), does not dictate a different result. That case stated the rule in Georgia with regard to the admissibility of evidence of general good character, which is that the same is not admissible in civil cases except "where a party's character is a material issue under the pleadings in the case, [cit.], or where a party is accused of threatening to commit a crime. [Cit.]" Id. at 212, 312 S.E.2d 196. This is a restatement of the principle embodied in OCGA § 24-2-2, that "[t]he general character of the parties and especially their conduct in other transactions are irrelevant matter unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or proper the investigation of such conduct."

However, the Georgia Code also provides that "[a] witness may be impeached by evidence as to his general bad character." OCGA § 24-9-84. "The impeaching witness should first be questioned as to his knowledge of the general character of the witness, next as to what that character is, and lastly he may be asked if from that character he would believe him on his oath." OCGA § 24-9-84. It is permissible to impeach through testimony of bad character by one who is familiar with the witness' reputation in the workplace. See Bennett v. George, 105 Ga.App. 527, 533-534(12), 125 S.E.2d 122 (1962).

In the case at bar, the proper foundation was laid by appellants' counsel for the introduction of such impeaching testimony from Gloria Lester, the proprietor of a beauty shop and appellee's former employer. Lester was asked whether she was acquainted with appellee's general character and reputation in the community; she replied that she was, through her hairdressers, and that appellee's reputation was "not good." Appellee...