Mesta v. Franke
Decision Date | 26 March 2014 |
Docket Number | A148979.,CV101065 |
Citation | 261 Or.App. 759,322 P.3d 1136 |
Parties | Luis Armando MESTA, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Steve FRANKE, Superintendent, Two Rivers Correctional Institution, Defendant–Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Rankin Johnson, IV, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Erin Galli and Chilton & Galli, LLC.
Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.
Before ARMSTRONG, Presiding Judge, and NAKAMOTO, Judge, and EGAN, Judge.
Petitioner appeals a general judgment that denied him post-conviction relief. In 2007, petitioner was convicted on four counts of first-degree sexual abuse following a jury trial at which a doctor testified that he had diagnosed sexual abuse in three of the five alleged child victims. Petitioner appealed to this court; his appellate counsel argued that admitting those diagnoses was error because they amounted to improper comments on the truthfulness of the child witnesses. We affirmed petitioner's conviction; the Supreme Court subsequently denied review. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting, among other things, that his appellate counselwas constitutionally inadequate for failing to raise an argument that the admission of the doctor's diagnoses of sexual abuse violated OEC 403. Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel should have raised that issue in this court after the Supreme Court accepted the petition for review in State v. Southard, 347 Or. 127, 218 P.3d 104 (2009). We affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner was charged with six counts of first-degree sexual abuse and two counts of sodomy. One of the sexual abuse counts and the two sodomy counts were dismissed, and petitioner was tried by a jury on the remaining five sexual-abuse counts. The state alleged that petitioner touched the breasts of five children, S, C, T, H, and A, while working as a receptionist at a children's health clinic. All five of the children testified at trial.
During the state's case, it sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Oddo, a pediatrician and the director of the Jackson County Children's Advocacy Center. Petitioner objected to Oddo's testimony.1 Following an offer of proof outside the jury's presence, the trial court overruled petitioner's objection and allowed Oddo to testify.
Oddo began by stating that he had extensive experience in child sexual abuse cases and that he had conducted interviews and examinations of approximately 1,500 to 1,800 children over a seven-year period. He also stated that he had attended national conferences specializing in child abuse and that he was responsible for training others to diagnose sexual abuse. Oddo testified that he had interviewed S, C, T, H, and A for the purpose of evaluating whether they had been sexually abused. Oddo outlined the procedure he generally followed in assessing a sexual abuse claim. He explained that he began by interviewing each child's parent or caregiver; he would then interview the child to gather his or her “history” in order “to find out what has happened to them to figure out what I'm go[ing to] do with them when I'm done examining them and taking the history.” Finally, Oddo would perform a “head to toe” physical exam, which ordinarily included an inspection of the child's genitalia and rectal area for signs of sexual abuse.
S reported to Oddo that there had been an incident at petitioner's place of employment. With respect to the results of S's physical exam, Oddo stated that “[S] had a normal exam in regards to sexual abuse.” The state then asked Oddo whether he had been able to make a diagnosis of S. He replied,
The state next asked Oddo about C, who had refused to allow him to perform an examination of her genitalia or rectal area. When asked whether he was able to make a diagnosis with respect to C, Oddo replied,
When asked about T, Oddo stated that he obtained “the same background information” from her as he had from S. He then stated that “[s]he had a normal physical exam.” The state then asked whether he had been able to make a diagnosis of T; he replied, “She was sexually abused.”
With respect to H, Oddo stated that he had performed an examination of her pursuant to the same procedures described above. Oddo noted that H reported an incident of abuse that took place many months before the other alleged incidents. The state asked Oddo whether the delay in H's reporting “play[ed] into [his] diagnosis in any way.” He replied that such a delay was not “worrisome” and stated “[t]hat's the most common thing we see that they do.” Aside from the reference to a “diagnosis” in the above-quoted question, the state did not directly ask Oddo whether he had diagnosed H as having been sexually abused.
Similarly, Oddo stated that he had performed an examination of A and that A had reported an incident of abuse at petitioner's workplace. Oddo was not asked to provide a diagnosis for A.
After he had outlined his examinations of the children, the state asked Oddo whether he had experience with children fabricating incidents of sexual abuse:
“There are cases where, due to a caregiver wanting to get back at someone [,] or custody disputes, where a child could potentially be coached into a false disclosure of sexual abuse. We see those as well.
On redirect examination, Oddo explained why he found the children's reports credible in this particular case:
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...Id . at 326 n. 5, 313 P.3d 1128 (emphasis added).We employed similar reasoning in a slightly different posture in Mesta v. Franke , 261 Or. App. 759, 322 P.3d 1136 (2014). In Mesta , we held that the petitioner's appellate counsel was not "constitutionally inadequate for failing to raise an......
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...233, 236, 844 P.2d 192 (1992) (attorney was not ineffective for failing to raise issue when law was unsettled); Mesta v. Franke , 261 Or.App. 759, 782–83, 322 P.3d 1136 (2014) (attorney was not ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in law). However, the Supreme Court has already rej......
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