Metlock v. Pfister, 15 C 6157

• Decision Date: 03 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15 C 6157,15 C 6157
• Parties: MANUEL METLOCK, Petitioner, v. RANDY PFISTER, Warden, Stateville Correctional Center, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

MANUEL METLOCK, Petitioner, v. RANDY PFISTER, Warden, Stateville Correctional Center,¹ Respondent.

No. 15 C 6157

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

May 3, 2016

Judge James B. Zagel

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Manuel Metlock is serving a 50-year sentence for felony murder. Metlock now challenges his state-court conviction by filing a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "Petition"). For the reasons stated below, I am denying the Petition and declining to issue a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

Metlock was convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County of felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery for his role in a shooting that injured Relando Clark and killed Loroxon Brown. Metlock was sentenced to a prison term of fifty years. See People v. Metlock, No. 1-04-3268 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). Metlock appealed, arguing that:

(1) the trial court erred in denying the defense request for a jury instruction on self-defense;

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on attempted theft;(3) the trial court violated his right to present a defense by allowing the State to dismiss intentional and knowing murder charges, thereby preventing him from presenting a defense of self-defense or from arguing that he was guilty only of second degree murder;

(4) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by making unfairly prejudicial comments during closing and rebuttal arguments; and

(5) he was denied a fair trial when the State was allowed to introduce evidence about Yakeeta Little's statement to police, her statement to a prosecutor, and her grand jury testimony.

The state appellate court affirmed, determining that it would not address the second claim because it was better left for postconviction proceedings at which Petitioner could make a record about his role in the decisions regarding jury instructions.

Metlock's ensuing petition for leave to appeal ("PLA") to the Illinois Supreme Court presented two issues:

(1) the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense by allowing the State to dismiss the intentional and knowing murder charges, thereby preventing him from presenting a defense of self-defense or arguing that he was guilty only of second degree murder; and

(2) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by making unfairly prejudicial comments during closing and rebuttal arguments.

The Illinois Supreme Court denied the PLA on May 31, 2007. Metlock did not seek a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.

On October 9, 2007, Metlock filed a pro se postconviction petition, which claimed that:

(1) his due process and equal protection rights were violated because he was tried in violation of the Speedy Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5);

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for:

(a) failing to demand a speedy trial even though petitioner told him repeatedly to do so,

(b) coercing Metlock into not speaking up to demand a speedy trial himself,

(c) failing to investigate Brown's cell phone records,

(d) failing to investigate and present evidence at trial about the large amount of money and drugs on Brown's person,

(e) failing to cross-examine State witness Cortez Brown, Clark, and Metlock to uncover favorable evidence,

(f) failing to request a jury instruction on attempted theft as a lesser-included offense of attempted armed robbery, and

(g) failing to interview or call Manuel Donegan and Terry Metlock as witnesses at trial;

(3) appellate counsel was ineffective for:

(a) failing to argue that Metlock's speedy trial right was violated, and

(b) failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to demand a speedy trial;

(4) his due process and equal protection rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence of his guilt of felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery;

(5) his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated because the prosecution knowingly used the perjured testimony of Little before the grand jury and by Little and Clark at trial and argued facts during closing arguments that it knew to be false; and

(6) his rights to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection were violated because the indictment did not list the elements of the offense or name the victim of the attempted armed robbery.

Metlock's postconviction counsel later filed a supplemental petition that asserted the following additional claims:

(1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's misdescription of testimony during closing argument related to the attempted armed robbery and for omitting the claim from the posttrial motion; and

(2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the misdescriptions during closing argument.

The trial court dismissed the postconviction petition. People v. Metlock, No. 01 CR 2948 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 2012)).

On appeal, Metlock filed a counseled brief that only reasserted his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on attempted theft. Metlock later filed a pro se motion for leave to file a supplemental brief; the appellate court denied his motion because counsel had already filed an opening brief on his behalf. People v. Metlock, No. 1-12-1874 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)). The unfiled supplemental brief contained the following proposed claims:

(1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that

(a) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's misdescription of testimony during closing argument,

(b) the indictment was deficient because it did not list the elements of the offense or name the victim of the attempted armed robbery,

(c) there was insufficient evidence of Metlock's guilt for felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery,

(d) the prosecution knowingly used the perjured testimony of Little before the grand jury and at trial, and

(e) Metlock's speedy trial rights were violated;

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) object to the prosecutor's misdescription during closing argument, and

(b) demand a speedy trial;

(3) the indictment was deficient because it did not list the elements of the offense or name the victim of the attempted armed robbery;

(4) Metlock's due process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence of his guilt of felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery;

(5) the prosecution knowingly used the perjured testimony of Little before the grand jury and at trial; and

(6) Metlock's speedy trial rights were violated.

Addressing the claim in the counseled brief, the state appellate court affirmed, holding that neither Strickland prong was shown regarding trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on attempted theft because the instruction was not available as a matter of law. People v. Metlock, No. 1-12-1874 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)).

Metlock filed a pro se PLA; counsel filed a motion to withdraw it so Metlock could file a petition for rehearing in the appellate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court granted that motion. People v. Metlock, No. 118442 (Ill. 2014)). Metlock's subsequent postconviction appeal PLA asserted several claims:

(1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

(a) request a jury instruction on attempted theft,

(b) object to, or note in the posttrial motion, the prosecution's misdescription of testimony during closing argument,

(c) object to the indictment's failure to list the elements of the offense or name the victim of the attempted armed robbery, and

(d) demand a speedy trial; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that

(a) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's misdescription of testimony during closing argument,

(b) the indictment failed to list the elements of the offense or name the victim of the attempted armed robbery,

(c) there was insufficient evidence of felony murder, and

(d) the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony before the grand jury and at trial;

(3) the prosecution misdescribed testimony during closing argument;

(4) Metlock's due process and equal protection rights were violated because the indictment failed to name the elements of the offense or the victim of the attempted armed robbery;

(5) there was insufficient evidence of felony murder;

(6) the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony before the grand jury and at trial;

(7) Metlock's due process and equal protection rights were violated because he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and

(8) the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition in contradiction with the direct appeal appellate order, which held that attempted theft was an available jury instruction in this case.

On May 27, 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the PLA.

Metlock's present habeas corpus petition raises several claims:

(1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that

(a) there was insufficient evidence of felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery; and (b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's misdescription of testimony during closing argument;

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for

(a) failing to object to the prosecution's misdescription of testimony during closing argument;

(b) failing to demand a speedy trial;

(c) coercing petitioner to not assert his speedy trial rights; and

(d) not requesting a jury instruction on attempted theft;

(3) Metlock's due process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence of felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery; and

(4) Metlock's due process rights were violated because the indictment failed to list the elements of the offense or name the victim of the attempted armed robbery.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") allows a district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody...