Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 27 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. A13A2304.,A13A2304.
• Citation: 757 S.E.2d 228,326 Ga. App. 631
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. THOMPSON.

326 Ga.App. 631

757 S.E.2d 228

METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY

v.THOMPSON.

No. A13A2304.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 27, 2014.

Frank Taylor Putney, Jr., for Appellant.

Cummings & Middlebrooks, William Marion Cummings II, Atlanta, for Appellee.

MILLER, Judge.

In this case, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (“MARTA”) unilaterally reduced Kathy Thompson's temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits to temporary partial disability (“TPD”) benefits after MARTA no longer allowed her to work with restrictions in its transitional program.Thompson filed a workers' compensation claim, and an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) agreed that MARTA was not allowed to consider the period Thompson actually worked with restrictions for purposes of OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2).MARTA appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appellate Division of the Board of Workers' Compensation(the “Board”), which affirmed.MARTA then appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed.Pursuant to our grant of its application for discretionary review, MARTA contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to apply the proper standard of review, (2) by affirming the ALJ's interpretation of OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2), and (3) in affirming the award of attorney fees.We conclude that the Board's interpretation of OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2) was consistent with the statute's purpose, and as a result, we affirm the Board's ruling that MARTA improperly reduced Thompson's benefits.We also affirm the award of attorney fees to Thompson because there is evidence to show that MARTA acted without reasonable grounds when it limited Thompson from continuing to work in the transitional program and then unilaterally reduced her benefits.

In the absence of legal error, the factual findings of the Board must be affirmed by the superior court and by the Court of Appeals when supported by any evidence in the administrative record.Erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on erroneous theories of law, however, are subject to the de novo standard of review.

(Punctuation and citation omitted.)Strickland v. Crossmark, Inc.,298 Ga.App. 568, 569, 680 S.E.2d 606(2009).

The parties stipulated to the following relevant facts.Thompson suffered a work-related injury on December 16, 2009.MARTA accepted the injury as compensable and began paying TTD benefits to Thompson.On April 7, 2010, Thompson's treating physician released her to return to light-duty work.Based upon the light-duty work release, MARTA served Thompson with a Form WC–104, pursuant to Board Rule 104, on May 28, 2010.In its WC–104 notice, MARTA informed Thompson that her TTD benefits would be converted to TPD benefits on April 7, 2011 unless she returned to work at an earlier date.

On June 24, 2010, Thompson began working in MARTA's transitional program on light duty, and MARTA suspended Thompson's TTD benefits as a result.Thompson continued to work in the transitional program for one year, at which point she was not allowed to remain in the program.Following her participation in the transitional program, Thompson was unable to return to regular-duty work and, therefore, stopped working.Thereafter, on June 27, 2011, MARTA recommenced paying her TTD benefits.On October 30, 2011, MARTA suspended Thompson's TTD benefits and began paying her TPD benefits, using a WC–2 based upon the prior WC–104.

Thompson then filed a workers' compensation claim, requesting that her full TTD benefits be reinstated.MARTA disagreed, arguing that under OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2), it could unilaterally suspend TTD benefits because Thompson was not working and it had been determined that she was capable of performing light-duty work for 52 consecutive weeks.After a hearing, an administrative law judge ALJ ruled that MARTA was not authorized to include the time Thompson worked in the transitional program in determining when it could unilaterally convert her TTD benefits to TPD benefits.Consequently, the ALJ ordered MARTA to make up the difference between the TPD benefits it had paid and the TTD benefits it owed.The ALJ further ordered MARTA to pay a fine for late payment and to pay Thompson's attorney fees.MARTA appealed the award to the Appellate Division of the Board, which affirmed.MARTA then appealed to the superior court, which likewise affirmed.MARTA now seeks review here.

1.MARTA first contends that the superior court erred by concluding that it was “constrained” to apply the “any evidence” standard of review without addressing the legal issues presented.MARTA's claim lacks merit.

It is true that, like this Court, the superior court must affirm the Board's findings of fact if any evidence supports them and it reviews legal questions under the de novo standard of review.SeeStrickland,supra, 298 Ga.App. at 569, 680 S.E.2d 606.We presume that the trial court knows the law and faithfully performs its duties.MXenergy Inc. v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm.,310 Ga.App. 630, 633(1), 714 S.E.2d 132(2011).

In its order, while the superior court stated that its review was circumscribed by the “any evidence” standard for factual determinations, it also stated that the Board's decision would be set aside, if among other things, that decision was contrary to law.The superior court determined that, after consideration of the parties' arguments and a thorough review of the record, MARTA had not presented any basis for setting aside the decision of the Board.There is no evidence in the record affirmatively showing that the superior court applied the wrong standard of review, and we will not presume error.SeeMXenergy,supra, 310 Ga.App. at 633(1), 714 S.E.2d 132(no error presumed simply because trial court's order did not contain the words “de novo review”).

2.MARTA contends that the superior court erred in affirming the ALJ's interpretation of OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2).Specifically, MARTA argues that it could unilaterally reduce Thompson's TTD benefits to TPD benefits because she was not working at the time of the reduction and it had been determined that she was capable of performing some work for 52 consecutive weeks.We disagree.

“The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with enforcing or administering its provisions is to be given great weight and deference, unless contrary to law.”(Punctuation and footnote omitted.)City of Atlanta v. Sumlin,258 Ga.App. 643, 645(1), 574 S.E.2d 827(2002).Additionally, the workers' compensation statutory scheme is a humanitarian measure that should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.SeeCity of Waycross v. Holmes,272 Ga. 488, 489, 532 S.E.2d 90(2000).

OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2) allows an employer to unilaterally reduce an employee's TTD benefits to TPD benefits once the treating physician releases the employee to work with limitations or restrictions.“In order to avail itself of the opportunity to unilaterally convert an employee from temporary total disability to temporary partial disability, MARTA was required to strictly comply with OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2).”(Citation omitted.)Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Bridges,276 Ga.App. 220, 224(1), 623 S.E.2d 1(2005).

OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2) pertinently provides:

When an injury is not catastrophic, as defined in subsection (g) of Code Section 34–9–200.1, and the employee is not working, the [B]oard shall determine that a change in condition for the better has occurred and the employee shall be entitled to the payment of benefits for partial disability in accordance with Code Section 34–9–262 if it is determined that the employee has been capable of performing work with limitations or restrictions for 52 consecutive weeks.Within 60 days of the employee's release to return to work with restrictions or limitations, the employer shall provide notice to the employee on a form provided by the [B]oard that will inform the employee that he or she has been released to work with limitations or restrictions, will include an explanation of the limitations or restrictions, and will inform the employee of the general terms of this Code section....Whenever an employer seeks to convert an employee from benefits for total disability to benefits for partial disability as provided in this paragraph, such employer may convert the benefits unilaterally by filing a form indicating the reason for the conversion as prescribed by rule of the [B]oard.

The primary question presented in this case is whether MARTA could count the one-year period Thompson was working in MARTA's transitional program for the purpose of establishing that “the employee has been capable of performing work with limitations or restrictions for 52 consecutive weeks” under OCGA § 34–9–104(a)(2).The answer is no.

An employer cannot include the period of time an employee works with...