Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v. Ichthus Cmty. Trust, s. S15A1021

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: BENHAM, Justice.
• Citation: 780 S.E.2d 311,298 Ga. 221
• Parties: METRO ATLANTA TASK FORCE FOR THE HOMELESS, INC. v. ICHTHUS COMMUNITY TRUST et al. Central Atlanta Progress et al. v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al. Premium Funding Solutions, LLC v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al. Emanuel Fialkow v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al. Central Atlanta Progress et al. v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al. Premium Funding Solutions, LLC v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al. Emanuel Fialkow v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v. Ichthus Community Trust et al. Ichthus Community Trust et al. v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc.
• Docket Number: S15A1028,S15X1031.,S15A1027,S15A1029,S15X1022,S15X1024,S15X1023,Nos. S15A1021,S15X1030,s. S15A1021
• Decision Date: 23 November 2015

298 Ga. 221
780 S.E.2d 311

METRO ATLANTA TASK FORCE FOR THE HOMELESS, INC.
v.
ICHTHUS COMMUNITY TRUST et al.

Central Atlanta Progress et al.
v.
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al.

Premium Funding Solutions, LLC
v.
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al.

Emanuel Fialkow
v.
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al.

Central Atlanta Progress et al.
v.
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al.

Premium Funding Solutions, LLC
v.
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al.

Emanuel Fialkow
v.
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. et al.

Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc.
v.
Ichthus Community Trust et al.

Ichthus Community Trust et al.
v.
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc.

Nos. S15A1021
S15X1022
S15X1023
S15X1024
S15A1027
S15A1028
S15A1029
S15X1030
S15X1031.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 23, 2015.

780 S.E.2d 315

Robert G. Brazier, Steven Gordon Hall, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, Atlanta, for appellant.

Eric L. Shapiro, Eric L. Shapiro, P.C., Jason Daniel Hergenroether, Matthew Glenn Moffett, Gray Rust St. Amand Moffett & Brieske LLP, Douglas Lee Clayton, Lynn M. Roberson, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, LLP, Gary Daniel Knopf, Stephen W. Riddell, Troutman Sanders LLP, David Jon Maher, The Law Office of David J. Maher, LLC, Atlanta, for appellee.

Jonathan Robert Poole, Frank B. Strickland, Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP, Atlanta, for other party.

BENHAM, Justice.

298 Ga. 221

These matters come to us from our grant of applications for interlocutory review. At issue are two lower court orders: an order lifting a stay and allowing for the filing of a dispossessory action and an order deciding the validity of several substantive issues on summary judgment. For reasons provided below, we do not reach the merits of the order granting leave to file a dispossessory action and we affirm in part and reverse in part the summary judgment order.

The relevant facts show that Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless (the "Task Force") operates a homeless shelter in a building located at the corner of Peachtree Street and Pine Street in downtown Atlanta ("the property"). The Task Force owned the property unencumbered from 1997 to 2001, when it took out a total of $900,000 in loans with its two original lenders—Institute for Community Economics ("ICE") and the McAuley Institute, which transferred its promissory note and security deed to Mercy Housing, Inc. ("Mercy").¹ In 2009, the Task Force was in default on its loans with ICE and Mercy, but the parties entered into forbearance agreements in which ICE and Mercy agreed to do nothing on the notes until February 28, 2010. On January 26, 2010, however, defendant Ichthus Community Trust ("Ichthus")² purchased the outstanding notes from ICE and Mercy for $781,112.84.³ Ichthus used money borrowed from defendant Premium Funding Solutions, LLC ("PFS") to buy the notes. After the forbearance period had expired and the Task Force had not made payment, Ichthus foreclosed on the property and sold it on the

298 Ga. 222

courthouse steps on May 4, 2010. Ichthus, as the sole bidder, purchased the property for at least the amount it paid for the notes.⁴ On May 21, 2010, Ichthus filed an action against the Task Force in the superior court requesting temporary and permanent injunctive relief in the form of access to the property and the eviction of the Task Force. At the same time, Ichthus also filed a dispossessory action in magistrate court; but this action and any other dispossessory efforts by Ichthus were ultimately stayed on June 17, 2010, by consent order. In the superior court action, the Task Force counterclaimed for injunctive relief to maintain its right of possession (wrongful foreclosure) and to quiet title in the property. In addition, the Task Force counterclaimed for: violations of Georgia's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; tortious interference with business relations; libel, slander and defamation; bad faith; and punitive damages. In June 2010, the Task Force filed a separate action against Central Atlanta Progress ("CAP"), Atlanta Downtown Improvement District ("ADID"), Benevolent Community Investing Company, LLC

780 S.E.2d 316

("BCIC"), PFS,⁵ and Emanuel Fialkow⁶ ("defendants") for the same relief it counterclaimed for against Ichthus. In 2011, while these actions were pending, Ichthus defaulted on its loan obligation with PFS and, as a result, Ichthus executed a warranty deed and transferred its interest in the property to PFS.

In 2013, the parties argued defendants' motions for summary judgment before a special master who issued an order on January 25, 2014, concluding that the Task Force has viable claims for a jury to decide—specifically, its claims for wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, tortious interference, bad faith, and punitive damages. The parties filed objections to the special master's summary judgment order and the trial court heard argument on July 11, 2014. On August 8, 2014, the trial court adopted the special master's order on summary judgment. In addition, the trial court issued an order granting PFS's motion for leave to file a dispossessory action against the Task Force. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review on August 18, 2014. We granted the parties' interlocutory applications for review; the parties' appeals and cross-appeals were docketed to the April

298 Ga. 223

2015 Term of this Court; and we heard oral argument on June 2, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss as moot the appeal concerning the order granting leave to file a dispossessory action and we affirm in part and reverse in part the summary judgement order as adopted by the trial court.

Order Granting PFS Leave to File Dispossessory Action⁷

1. The Task Force contends the trial court erred when it granted PFS's motion for leave to file a dispossessory action.

a. Jurisdiction

It is "incumbent upon this Court, even when not raised by the parties, to inquire into its own jurisdiction." Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia LLC v. Deep South Sanitation, LLC, 296 Ga. 103(1), 765 S.E.2d 364 (2014). In this case, by lifting a stay and finding that PFS could file a dispossessory action prior to the resolution of matters pending for trial after summary judgment, the trial court has effectively dissolved injunctive relief which was shielding the Task Force from efforts to remove it from the property during the course of the proceedings in the main case. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI., Par. III(2) and the Task Force was entitled to immediately appeal the trial court's order pursuant to OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(4). Once our equity jurisdiction is invoked, we may consider appeals and cross-appeals of other rulings in the case pursuant to OCGA §§ 5–6–34(d) and 5–6–38(a).

b. Merits

Relying on Howard v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 321 Ga.App. 285, 739 S.E.2d 453 (2013), the trial court determined that PFS could file a dispossessory action while the main case is still pending and it terminated the stay prohibiting the filing of any such action. The Task Force claims this ruling is an error. We conclude that the issue is moot.

After Ichthus transferred its interest in the property to PFS in 2011, PFS filed a dispossessory action and it received a writ of possession from the trial court in February 2012. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the granting of the writ of possession based on the trial court's failure to follow the appropriate procedures. See Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v. Premium Funding Solutions, LLC, 321 Ga.App. 100(1), 741 S.E.2d 225 (2013). The trial court then issued the instant order granting leave to file a

298 Ga. 224

dispossessory action and this Court denied the Task Force'semergency

780 S.E.2d 317

motion for supersedeas while the instant appeal was pending before us. The Task Force then filed a motion to dismiss and plea in abatement below. The trial court granted the plea in abatement and PFS filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. After this Court heard oral argument in the instant appeal, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in Premium Funding Solutions, LLC v. Metro Atlanta Task Force For the Homeless, 333 Ga.App. 718, 776 S.E.2d 504 (2015) (physical precedent only), upholding the grant of the plea in abatement and neither party petitioned for certiorari.⁸ BASED ON THESE DEVelopments, we conclude that the instant allegation of error is moot inasmuch as the Task Force has successfully obtained a remedy at law for the dispossessory action filed by PFS. The Court of Appeals decision is also res judicata as to any future dispossessory actions between these parties while the case remains pending. See Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 565, 458 S.E.2d 826 (1995) ("A prior action may bar a subsequent action under the doctrine of res judicata if the prior action resulted in an adjudication by a court of competent...