Metro Fill Dev., LLC v. St. Charles Cnty.

• Decision Date: 24 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. ED 108533,ED 108533
• Citation: 614 S.W.3d 582
• Parties: METRO FILL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Appellant, v. ST. CHARLES COUNTY, Mo., and Joe Kronin, Mike Elam, Dave Hammond, Terry Hollander, Mike Klinghammer, John White, and Joe Brazil, in their official capacities, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

614 S.W.3d 582

METRO FILL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Appellant,

v.ST. CHARLES COUNTY, Mo., and Joe Kronin, Mike Elam, Dave Hammond, Terry Hollander, Mike Klinghammer, John White, and Joe Brazil, in their official capacities, Respondents.

No. ED 108533

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO.

Filed: November 24, 2020

Paul J. Puricelli, 7733 Forsyth Blvd. Ste. 500, Clayton, MO 63105, for appellant.

Ardita Roark, P.O. Box 270, 105 W. Capitol, Jefferson City, MO 65102, James R. Layton, 34 N. Meramec Ave., Ste. 600, Saint Louis, MO 63105, for respondents.

Robin Ransom, Presiding Judge

Introduction

Metro Fill Development, LLC, ("Metro Fill") appeals from the trial court's order and judgment dismissing its petition for review of the Saint Charles County Council's ("County Council") denial of its application for a conditional use permit (Count II) and for inverse condemnation based on this denial (Count I). Metro Fill asserts four points on appeal, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) dismissing Count II of its petition as untimely under Section 536.110¹ of the Missouri Administrative Procedures Act, after finding the conditional use permit proceeding to be a contested case; (2) dismissing Count I of its petition after finding Metro Fill's exclusive remedy was under the Missouri Administrative Procedures Act, and therefore Metro Fill was precluded from maintaining a claim for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 26 of the Missouri Constitution ; (3) dismissing Count I of its petition after finding Metro Fill had failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation; and (4) denying Metro Fill leave to amend its petition after entering the order of dismissal. We agree with Metro Fill that the trial court erred in its analysis of the inverse condemnation claim (Count I) and in its denial of leave to amend the petition relating to this claim, but find no error in the dismissal of the claim for judicial review under the Missouri Administrative Procedures Act (Count II). We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of Count II but reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings on Metro Fill's claim for inverse condemnation.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from Metro Fill's challenge to the County's Council's denial of its application for a conditional use permit ("CUP").

i. Metro Fill's application for conditional use permit ("CUP")

On June 21, 2017, Metro Fill filed an application for a CUP to establish a trash transfer site on property it already owned ("the Property"). The Property was zoned as a Solid Waste Disposal District under County Code Section 405.180, OSCCMo.,² which allows the establishment of a trash transfer site after obtaining a CUP. In November 2017, staff for the County Planning and Zoning Commission ("the Commission") issued a recommendation that Metro Fill's CUP application be denied and, after a public hearing, the Commission recommended denial of the CUP application. Following the Commission's recommendation, the County Council scheduled an administrative hearing on Metro Fill's CUP application.

Prior to the November public hearing and the Commission's recommendation, but after Metro Fill submitted its CUP application,³ Saint Charles County adopted Ordinance 17-072. Ordinance 17-072 enacted Section 405.511, OSCCMo., which outlined specific administrative review procedures for all CUP applications, and revised the section governing CUPs to provide that, as relevant to this appeal, all CUP applications are governed by the procedures outlined in Section 405.511, OSCCMo. The effective date of Ordinance 17-072 was August 4, 2017.

The administrative hearing on Metro Fill's CUP application was held on February 28, 2018, and followed the procedures set forth in Section 405.511, OSCCMo. Following the hearing, the County Council adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law and unanimously denied Metro Fill's CUP application. Metro Fill was informed of this denial by certified mail sent on May 22, 2018.

ii. Metro Fill's petition in circuit court

On November 20, 2018, Metro Fill filed a petition for review of the County Council's denial of its CUP application under the Missouri Administrative Procedures Act ("MAPA") (Count II), and for inverse condemnation under the Missouri Constitution⁴ based on the County Council's denial as a compensable taking (Count I).

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Metro Fill's petition, arguing the following: Metro Fill's petition was untimely because it was filed outside the thirty-day window articulated by MAPA for contested-case review; Metro Fill could not bring a claim for inverse condemnation because MAPA provided the exclusive remedy from the County Council's decision; and, further, Metro Fill failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation. After a hearing, the trial court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss. The trial court determined Count II warranted dismissal because the CUP decision was a contested case under MAPA and therefore Metro Fill's petition was not timely filed, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction. The trial court determined Count I warranted dismissal because Metro Fill failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation and, further, that Metro Fill was precluded from advancing an inverse condemnation claim because it had failed to comply with the exclusive procedures for review under MAPA.

After the dismissal of its petition, Metro Fill filed a motion for leave to amend its petition, to vacate the trial court's judgment, or to order a new trial. The trial court held a hearing on this motion and both parties submitted supplemental briefing on the question of whether Metro Fill could maintain an inverse condemnation claim independent of seeking review under MAPA. After the hearing, the trial court denied Metro Fill's motion for leave to amend and/or motion to vacate the previous order.

This appeal follows.

Discussion

Metro Fill asserts four points on appeal, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) dismissing Count II of its petition as untimely under Section 536.110 of MAPA, after finding the CUP determination to be a contested case; (2) dismissing Count I of its petition after finding Metro Fill was precluded from advancing a claim for inverse condemnation; (3) dismissing Count I of its petition after finding Metro Fill had failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation; and (4) denying Metro Fill leave to amend its petition. We agree that the trial court erred in dismissing Count I (inverse condemnation) of Metro Fill's petition but find no error in the dismissal of Count II (judicial review under MAPA). We also agree that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Metro Fill leave to amend its petition.

Standard of Review for Points I, II, and III

We review a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss de novo. Smith v. City of St. Louis , 573 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). We can affirm a dismissal on any meritorious ground stated in the motion, but view the allegations stated in the petition in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

Point I

In its first point on appeal, Metro Fill argues the trial court erred in dismissing Count II of its petition (judicial review under MAPA) after finding the CUP determination to be a contested case under MAPA. We disagree and affirm the dismissal of Count II.

Initially, we note that although the trial court improperly characterized its dismissal of Count II of Metro Fill's petition as due to a "lack of subject matter jurisdiction," we nevertheless find its dismissal of Count II was proper. See id. at 712 n.5 (argument that failure to follow proper procedures "deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction is ‘outmoded’ in light of the Supreme Court's holding in [ Webb ]"); accord J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla , 275 S.W.3d 249, 252–54 (Mo. banc 2009) (explaining distinction between jurisdiction and statutory authority). We analyze and decide this point on appeal on the grounds of statutory authority over a specific claim, not on those of jurisdiction. See Winter Bros. Material Co. v. Cty. of St. Louis , 518 S.W.3d 245, 252 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (question of circuit court review under MAPA is one of statutory authority). Such a question is properly presented on a motion to dismiss, either as a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as provided in Rule 55.27(a)(6), or as an affirmative defense that challenges a trial court's statutory authority to hear a case, as provided in Rules 55.08 and 55.27(a). See, e.g. , id. at 256 (reversing and remanding for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief should be granted, where count asked for review under wrong MAPA provision); Smith , 573 S.W.3d at 712 (providing that challenge to court's statutory authority is affirmative defense, but can be raised in motion to dismiss); see also Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.08, 55.27.

A county council acts as an administrative agency when deciding upon the issuance of a CUP, and therefore its decision is reviewable under MAPA. Winter Bros. , 518 S.W.3d at 251. MAPA outlines two distinct procedures for circuit court review of an administrative proceeding, each with different filing requirements and review processes: those for contested cases (Sections 536.100 to 536.140) and those for non-contested cases (Section 536.150). Id. ; Nowden v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control , 552 S.W.3d 114, 116–17 (Mo. banc 2018).

Whether an administrative proceeding is a contested or a non-contested case is a matter of law. Smith , 573 S.W.3d at 713. A contested case is "a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after hearing." Section 536.010(4); see also Smith , 573 S.W.3d at 713. The law requiring a hearing can include "any ordinance, statute, or constitutional provision that mandates a hearing." Nowden , 552 S.W.3d at 117 (citation omitted). Although not...