Metro Maint. Sys. S., Inc. v. Milburn

• Decision Date: 30 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 31, Sept. Term, 2014.,31, Sept. Term, 2014.
• Citation: 112 A.3d 429,442 Md. 289
• Parties: METRO MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS SOUTH, INC. v. Thomas MILBURN, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

442 Md. 289

112 A.3d 429

METRO MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS SOUTH, INC.

v.Thomas MILBURN, et al.

No. 31, Sept. Term, 2014.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 30, 2015.

Alfred A. Lacer (Alfred A. Lacer, P.A., Park Hall, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Jennifer L. Katz, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.

Kenneth J. Coughlan (Anne Hoke & Associates, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.

Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD and WATTS, JJ.

Opinion

McDONALD, J.

Various provisions of Maryland law afford a party adversely affected by an administrative agency decision an opportunity to obtain judicial review of that decision by a circuit court. Some provisions also allow further review by the appellate courts. In many instances, the result of the circuit court's review is that the court remands the case to the agency for further proceedings. The decision to remand a case as a result of judicial review is considered a final judgment—a prerequisite to immediate further review in the appellate courts.

But does the same conclusion hold true if a circuit court remands the case to the agency prior to conducting its review of the agency's decision, at the suggestion of the agency and with the consent of the party seeking judicial review? The issue in this case is whether such a remand is a final judgment and therefore appealable under Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), § 12–301. We hold that it is not, and therefore affirm the dismissal of the appeal in this case by the Court of Special Appeals.¹

IBackground

Respondent Thomas Milburn was a truck driver for Petitioner Metro Maintenance Systems South, Inc. (“Metro Maintenance”). He quit his job in January 2012, claiming “racially motivated mistreatment” by his employer. He then applied for unemployment benefits to the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (“DLLR”), the other Respondent in this case. A critical issue with respect to a claim by an employee who leaves a job voluntarily is whether the employee has good cause for doing so. Under Maryland law, an “individual who otherwise is eligible to receive [unemployment insurance] benefits is disqualified from receiving benefits if the Secretary [of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation] finds that unemployment results from voluntarily leaving work without good cause.” Maryland Code, Labor & Employment Article (“LE”), § 8–1001(a)(1).

The DLLR claim examiner determined that Mr. Milburn quit his job “without good cause” and denied his claim for benefits. Mr. Milburn appealed that decision within the agency. See LE §§ 8–508, 8–806(g) (providing for appeals to Lower Appeals Division of DLLR). In March 2012, a hearing examiner in the Lower Appeals Division of the agency conducted a hearing during which counsel for Mr. Milburn and counsel for Metro Maintenance presented evidence. Like the claim examiner, the hearing examiner concluded that Mr. Milburn had voluntarily quit his employment without good cause and denied his request for benefits. Mr. Milburn appealed that decision to the DLLR Board of Appeals. The Board declined to hear the appeal, thereby adopting the decision of the hearing examiner as its own decision—a decision that is subject to judicial review.²

In June 2012 Mr. Milburn filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County, as permitted by the unemployment insurance law.³ When a circuit court reviews a Board decision, it confines its review to questions of law and the Board's fact findings are conclusive if they are “supported by evidence that is competent, material, and substantial ... and there is no fraud.” LE § 8–5A–12(d). Both Metro Maintenance and the DLLR Board⁴ filed responses to the petition indicating that they would participate in the proceedings before the Circuit Court. As required by Maryland Rule 7–207, Mr. Milburn filed a memorandum in support of his petition, arguing that the hearing examiner's decision had failed to address whether he had been constructively discharged. As permitted by the rule, Metro Maintenance filed an answering memorandum, in which it argued that the hearing examiner's decision should be upheld.

Instead of filing an answering memorandum, the DLLR Board filed a motion requesting that the Circuit Court remand the case back to the Board before it conducted its review. The Board's motion stated that, after reading Mr. Milburn's memorandum and reviewing the agency record, counsel for the Board had recommended that it accept a remand “to review the decision of the [Hearing] Examiner” and that the Board had agreed to accept a remand. The Board did not concede that the hearing examiner had erred but requested only an opportunity to review the decision in the interest of “judicial economy.”⁵ Mr. Milburn consented to the motion to remand. Metro Maintenance opposed the motion for remand and argued that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to remand until after the court had reviewed the agency record and had concluded that the agency's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.

The Circuit Court held a hearing on January 25, 2013, on the motion to remand and heard arguments from Mr. Milburn, Metro Maintenance, and the Board. There was no discussion of the agency record or the merits of the case. The Circuit Court characterized DLLR's motion as a request for a “do over” that would precede the court's consideration “whether there's substantial evidence and ... whether or not to affirm.” At the end of the hearing, the Circuit Court granted the Board's motion for remand.

Metro Maintenance appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported decision, that court concluded that the remand order was not a final judgment or otherwise appealable and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Special Appeals relied primarily on its prior decision in Anne Arundel County v. Rode, 214 Md.App. 702, 78 A.3d 926 (2013), which had dismissed an appeal in very similar circumstances.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the remand order was a final judgment and, if so, whether the remand was an abuse of discretion or otherwise unlawful. We decide only the first question as we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the remand order was not a final, appealable judgment.

IIDiscussion

A. The Final Judgment Rule

A fundamental principle of the statute that defines the jurisdiction of the appellate courts is that, as a general rule, a party may appeal only from “a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” CJ § 12–301 ;⁶ see Schuele v. Case Handyman and Remodeling Services, LLC, 412 Md. 555, 565, 989 A.2d 210 (2010) (final judgment requirement is jurisdictional). The statute does not define finality, but instead leaves it to this Court to determine what makes a judgment “final.”⁷ Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. 579, 587, 644 A.2d 1070 (1994).

Attributes of a Final Judgment

This Court has noted that a ruling must ordinarily have the following three attributes to be a final judgment: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court acts pursuant to Maryland Rule 2–602(b) to direct the entry of a final judgment as to less than all of the claims or all of the parties, it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties; (3) it must be set forth and recorded in accordance with Rule 2–601. Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767 (1989) ; see also Hiob v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 440 Md. 466, 489, 103 A.3d 596 (2014).⁸

Only the first element—whether the remand order was intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy—is at issue in this appeal. In considering whether an order has the requisite finality, it is important to keep in mind the underlying purpose of the final judgment rule—to promote judicial efficiency by avoiding piecemeal appeals. Brewster v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., Inc., 360 Md. 602, 616, 759 A.2d 738 (2000). Apart from the interruption and delay that appeals of interlocutory orders can create in the trial courts, such appeals also have the potential to waste judicial resources if the appellate court resolves a dispute that becomes moot or irrelevant upon a final disposition.

Unqualified, Final Disposition

In order to be an unqualified, final disposition, an order of a circuit court must be “so final as either to determine and conclude the rights involved or to deny the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d 767 (emphasis in original); see also Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112–13 (Md.1835). The order must be a complete adjudication of the matter in controversy, except as to collateral matters, meaning that there is nothing more to be done to effectuate the court's disposition. See Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 324, 884 A.2d 1215 (2005) ; Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d 767.

An order need not resolve the merits of a case, however, to constitute a final judgment. Even if the order does not decide and conclude the rights of the parties, it nevertheless will be a final judgment if it terminates the proceedings in that court and denies a party the ability to further prosecute or defend the party's rights concerning the subject matter of the proceeding. See In Re Billy W., 386 Md. 675, 689, 874 A.2d 423 (2005) ; Brewster, 360 Md. at 610, 759 A.2d 738. Such an order has been described as one that has the effect of “put[ting] the [party] out of court.” McCormick v. St. Francis de Sales Church, 219 Md. 422, 426–27, 149 A.2d 768 (1959).

Terminating Proceedings in a Particular Court

In determining whether an order that terminates proceedings in a particular court can be said to “put the party out of court” the key...