Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Tuck
Decision Date | 29 June 1982 |
Docket Number | Nos. 63810,63811,s. 63810 |
Citation | 292 S.E.2d 878,163 Ga.App. 132 |
Parties | , 5 Ed. Law Rep. 285 METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. TUCK et al. TUCK et al. v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Terrence Lee Croft, Lawrence L. Thompson, Atlanta, for appellant in no. 63810.
Stephen L. Goldner, Howard M. Lessinger, Atlanta, for appellee in no. 63810.
Stephen L. Goldner, Atlanta, for appellant in no. 63811.
Terrence Lee Croft, Howard M. Lessinger, Atlanta, for appellee in no. 63811.
On December 1, 1978, plaintiff-appellee Jeffrey Tuck, a minor, was riding home from school on a bus owned and operated by defendant-appellant Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA). The bus was not identified and equipped as a "school bus" in the manner provided by Code Ann. § 68A-706. When the MARTA bus stopped across the street from Jeffrey's home, he stepped from the bus and ran in front of the bus and into the street. While in the street, Jeffrey was struck by an automobile owned and operated by Anthony Rucker.
Jeffrey and his father, S. J. Tuck, each brought suit against MARTA and Rucker. Subsequently, the plaintiffs and MARTA entered into a joint stipulation of material facts and filed cross motions for summary judgment to determine whether the MARTA bus was, at the time of the incident, a "school bus" within the definition of Code Ann. § 68A-101(46)(b) and thus in non-compliance with the identification and equipment requirements of Code Ann. § 68A-706(c). The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to this issue and denied MARTA's motion. Accordingly, the case was submitted to the jury under instructions that MARTA's non-compliance with Code Ann. § 68A-706(c) "at the time of the accident amounts to negligence as a matter of law." The jury returned verdicts in favor of both plaintiffs, apportioning the damages recoverable against each defendant. With regard to S. J. Tuck's claim for his son's medical expenses, the verdict stated: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff S. J. Tuck $4,500.00 in compensatory damages against defendant(s) MARTA in the amount of $700.00 and Rucker in the amount of $3,800.00." With regard to Jeffrey Tuck's claim, the verdict returned stated: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff Jeffrey Tuck, b/n/f S. J. Tuck, $38,400.00 in compensatory damages against defendant(s) MARTA in the amount of $6,000.00 and Rucker in the amount of $32,400.00." The trial court, after making inquiry from the jury foreman, entered a final judgment on both verdicts. Said judgments made no apportionment between MARTA and Rucker and were entered, in favor of S. J. Tuck and Jeffrey Tuck in the amounts of $4,500 and $38,400 respectively, against both defendants "jointly and severally."
In Case Number 63810, MARTA appeals from the joint and several judgments entered on the verdicts returned for the plaintiffs. In Case Number 63811, the plaintiffs cross-appeal, asserting as error an evidentiary ruling by the trial judge and certain jury instructions.
1. MARTA asserts that, as a matter of law, the bus in which Jeffrey Tuck was riding on December 1, 1978, was not a "school bus." MARTA relies upon former Code Ann. § 68-311 as construed in Hanks v. Georgia Power Co., 86 Ga.App. 654, 656-657, 72 S.E.2d 198 (1952):
However, resolution of the issue presented for review also requires consideration of the holding in Dishinger v. Suburban Coach Co., 84 Ga.App. 498, 66 S.E.2d 242 (1951). In Dishinger, a case also involving former Code Ann. § 68-311, it was held: (Emphasis supplied.) Dishinger, 84 Ga.App. at 505, 66 S.E.2d 242, supra.
The undisputed facts of the instant case demonstrate that the operation of the MARTA bus on December 1, 1978, falls squarely within the "circumstances" held in Dishinger to show the operation of a "school bus" rather than the "incidental" transporting of school children which was shown in Hanks. Those facts are as follows: The MARTA bus route in question, P-164, was, at the times relevant to the instant appeal, a regularly scheduled MARTA route but one in which the determinative factor for the establishment of that regular schedule was the transportation of school children, not the general public. On each day of the school year, a MARTA bus would leave the garage at approximately 2:15 p.m. and proceed to the driveway of Jeffrey Tuck's school, the first scheduled stop of the route. The bus would then apparently wait for the end of the school day before beginning its route. On certain days, the school principal or a teacher assisted the children from the school in boarding the bus. On occasion, the principal or teacher asked the MARTA driver to wait past the scheduled departure time or told the driver that all the children from the school had boarded the bus, indicating that the driver need not wait until the scheduled departure time to leave the school grounds. Although the bus followed a predesignated route after leaving the school, one of the children, the "Safety Patrol", instructed the driver where to stop along the route in order to let the other children off. This is the procedure which was followed on December 1, 1978. Jeffrey Tuck and approximately 29 other children left the school and boarded the MARTA bus which bore no signs designating it as a "school bus". At the first stop requested by the "Safety Patrol", Jeffrey Tuck disembarked, ran in front of the bus and was struck by Rucker's automobile. At that time, all the passengers on the bus were school children. The evidence further establishes that the route and procedure which was followed during the school year and which was being followed on December 1, 1978, differed from that in effect when Jeffrey's school was not in session. During the period when school was not being held, MARTA's route P-164 apparently provided for no stops whatsoever at Jeffrey's school and the actual route which the bus followed was not the same as the one in effect during the school year.
This evidence shows that, at least during the school year and on December 1, 1978, MARTA was operating a "school bus" on its route P-164. Hanks, 86 Ga.App. 658, 72 S.E.2d 198, supra. Under the evidence in the instant case, the transportation of children from Jeffrey's school to certain points designated by the "Safety Patrol" was not merely "incidental" to MARTA's common carrier duty of transporting members of the general public. The children were boarded en masse at the school yard--which was the originating point of the route--and were carried to points, designated by the "Safety Patrol" not MARTA, as close to their respective homes as was possible. The children were not picked up indiscriminately along a regularly scheduled common carrier line. The route was tailored to meet the transportation needs of the school children, not the general public, and the children were not merely "incidental" public passengers on the MARTA bus.
MARTA seeks to avoid categorizing its route P-164 during the school year as a "school bus" route by asserting that it had a policy and practice of permitting any regular fare-paying passenger to ride the bus serving that route after it had left the school yard and had begun its run. Although there were no such passengers on the bus on December 1, 1978, MARTA asserts that its policy and practice in this regard precludes a...
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