Metropolitan Co v. Moore
Decision Date | 02 May 1887 |
Parties | METROPOLITAN R. CO. v. MOORE, by his Next Friend, etc |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
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This is an action at law, brought by the defendant in error in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, against the plaintiff in error, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the neglg ence of the defendant's servants in the management of its cars while running upon a street railroad in the city of Washington. On the trial of the cause, and after the testimony for the plaintiff was closed, the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that, upon the testimony offered in behalf of the plaintiff, he was not entitled to recover. This was refused, and an exception taken. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000, on which judgment was rendered. The defendant thereupon filed a motion for a new trial on the following grounds: (1) Because the verdict was against the weight of evidence; (2) because the verdict was against the instructions of the court; (3) because the damages awarded by the jury were excessive; and also upon exceptions taken at the trial.
The record then shows the following proceedings: The bills of exception state the rulings of the court during the progress of the trial, with the evidence applicable thereto, and Exhibit A, referred to in the order of the court overruling the motion for a new trial, sets out in full all the testimony in the case.
The record then shows the proceedings and judgment on the appeal in the general term as follows: 'Now again come here as well the plaintiff as the defendant, by their respective attorneys; whereupon, it appearing to the court that the order of the court below overruling the motion for a new trial on a case stated, upon the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of evidence, is not an order from which an appeal lies to this court, and it also appearing to the court that the defendant's exceptions to the admissibility of evidence and to the rulings and instructions of the court were not well taken, the said appeal is hereby dismissed, and the motion for a new trial on exceptions is now overruled, and the judgment of the court is affirmed, with costs.'
The defendant below sued out the present writ of error.
Wm. F. Mattingly and Frank T. Browning, for defendant in error.
The assignment of error relied on, and the only one we find it necessary to consider, is that the court in general term refused to entertain the appeal from the action of the court at special term, overruling the motion for a new trial, so far as it was based on the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of evidence, becuase it was not an order from which an appeal lies from the special to the general term of the court. The opinion of the court, which is sent up with the record, expressly considers, discusses, and decides all the questions arising on the bills of exception, but no reason is given for that part of the judgment refusing to consider the appeal so far as it rested upon the order of the court at special term, overruling the motion for a new trial, based on the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of evidence. It was said in argument at the bar that this was because, a few weeks before, in the case of Stewart v. Elliott, 2 Mackey, 307, decided March 13, 1883, the supreme court of the District of Columbia bad given a carefully considered opinion concerning the very point in controversy. It was decided in that case that the right of appeal on motions for a new trial from the special to the general term was given only in three cases: (1 Where the motion is based on exceptions taken during the progress of the trial; (2) where the verdict has been rendered upon insufficient evidence; and (3) for excessive damages. It was also decided that a verdict against the weight of evidence cannot be said to be a verdict upon insufficient evidence. The term 'insufficient evidence,' in section 804 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, being construed as meaning evidence not sufficient in law to support a verdict. It therefore held that a motion for a new trial, because the verdict was against the weight of evidence, is left by the statute entirely within the discretion of the judge at special term trying the case, and that no appeal lies from his determination to the general term.
The sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia, affecting the question, are as follows:
'Sec. 803. If, upon the trial of a cause, an exception be taken, it may be reduced to writing at the time, or it may be entered on the minutes of the justice, and afterwards settled in such manner as may be provided by the rules of the court, and then stated in writing in a case or bill of exceptions, with so much of the evidence as may be material to the questions to be raised, but such case or bill of exceptions need not be sealed or signed.
'Sec. 804. The justice who tries the cause may, in his discretion, entertain a motion, to be made on his minutes, to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial upon exceptions, or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages; but such motion shall be made at the same term at which the trial was had. 'Sec. 805. When such motion is made and heard upon the minutes, an appeal to the general term may be taken from the decision, in which case a bill of exceptions or case shall be settled in the usual manner.
The construction given by the court below to section 804 of the Revised Statutes is that it does not limit 'the range of reasons for which the new trial might be granted by the judge who heard the cause;' but that Stewart v. Elliott, 2 Mackey, 309, 313. But this construction of the statute overlooks the operation and effect of section 772. By that section an appeal will lie from the special to the general term from any order, judgment, or decree, 'if the same involve the merits of the action or proceeding.' Certainly, motions for a new trial upon grounds other than those recited in section 804 are included in this description. A motion may be made to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial on the ground tha the verdict is against law, or against the instructions of the court, or for newly-discovered evidence, or because cause the amount is less than it should have been where the damages are ascertainable by some fixed rule of law, or for misconduct of the jury, or for fraud practiced by the successful party. None of these cases a are specifically recited in section 804, and yet, if we adopt the construction put upon that section by the supreme court of the District of Columbia, no appeal can be had from the judgment of a special term in any of them, although they involve the merits of the action or proceeding as completely as any of those mentioned in section 804.
It is the evident purpose and meaning of section 772 to give the right of appeal from the special to the general term from every order, judgment, o decree involving the merits of the action or proceeding. There is nothing in the other sections referred to...
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