Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carter
Decision Date | 23 October 1924 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 223 |
Citation | 102 So. 130,212 Ala. 212 |
Parties | METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. CARTER. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 27, 1924
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; John Denson, Judge.
Action for assault and battery by D.G. Carter against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under section 6, page 450, Acts 1911. Reversed and remanded.
Cabaniss Johnston, Cocke & Cabaniss and Brewer Dixon, all of Birmingham, for appellant.
Leader & Ullman, of Birmingham, for appellee.
The suit is for damages for an assault and battery alleged to have been committed by an agent or employee of the defendant. The only eyewitnesses who testified were the plaintiff and said agent of defendant, who is alleged to have committed the injury for which complaint is made. Their evidence was in conflict, and susceptible to such inferences as might be drawn by the jury.
The first count of the complaint was not subject to the grounds of demurrer that were assigned. Mobile Light & R. Co. v Portiss, 195 Ala. 320, 332, 70 So. 136; Clinton Min Co. v. Bradford, 200 Ala. 308, 76 So. 74; Stoudemire v. Davis, 208 Ala. 592, 94 So. 498; Creighton v. Air Nitrates Corp., 208 Ala. 330, 94 So. 356. However, the count avers facts from which agency followed as a conclusion of law. Brown v. Comm. F. Ins. Co., 86 Ala. 189, 194, 5 So. 500. And the fact of such agency of Chesney was submitted to the jury. Written charge 7 is:
"In order for the plaintiff to be entitled to recover, you must be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that A.C. Chesney was a servant, agent, or employee of the defendant, and that the said A.C. Chesney assaulted the plaintiff while the said A.C. Chesney was acting within the line and scope of his duty as such employee and, if the evidence fails to so reasonably satisfy you of all these facts, your verdict should be for the defendant."
The instruction on the question in the oral charge is:
"If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant's servant or agent committed this assault and battery while acting within the line and scope of his employment, and that such act was the proximate cause of his alleged injury, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover compensatory damages; that is, such damages as are the usual and ordinary result of the injury complained of."
In Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 545, 86 So. 469, 471, it is said:
If the complaint had been insufficient under the rule of Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 192 Ala. 534, 68 So. 417, Ann.Cas.1917D, 929, and Jackson v Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 86 So. 469, that ruling would have been without injury under the evidence and because of the foregoing instructions to the jury. The second count was not subject to the grounds of demurrer directed thereto.
Appellee's brief contains the following admission or statement:
"We are prepared to admit that there can be no separate recovery of a corporation for opprobrious words and epithets used by a servant or agent of the corporation in committing an assault and battery and we are thoroughly familiar with Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor (150 Ala. 574, 43 So. 210, 9 L.R.A. [[[[[[[N.S.] 929, 124 Am.St.Rep. 90); Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Self (192 Ala. 403, 68 So. 328, L.R.A.1915F, 516); and Choctaw Coal & Mining Co. v. Lillich (204 Ala. 533, 86 So. 383, 11 A.L.R. 1014), but we submit that argument made on page 9 that the language used seeks a recovery separate and distinct from the assault based upon an oral defamation is not sustained by a reading of the averment in the count. The court did not, as contended by appellant, instruct the jury that opprobrious epithets could be made the basis of recovery. On the contrary, the court instructed the jury, record page 6, as follows: 'If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant's servant or agent committed this assault and battery while acting within the line and scope of his employment, and that such act was the proximate cause of his alleged injuries, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover compensatory damages; that is, such damages as are the usual and ordinary result of the injury complained of. In estimating such damages the jury may consider any mental and physical pain and suffering, any humiliation, indignity, shame, or injury to his reputation that he may have been subjected to which directly ensued as a natural and proximate consequence of the wrong complained of."
The testimony giving the opprobrious words as used by the parties was admissible (1) to explain the character of the assault made, (2) as a part of the res gestae of the difficulty itself, and (3) as the basis for an inference whether or not the assault and battery was committed in the line and scope of Chesney's authority and in the prosecution of the master's business. Refused charge 13, requested by defendant, "I charge you that you cannot award plaintiff any damages because of humiliation or disgrace resulting from A.C. Chesney calling the plaintiff a 'crook,' or a 'damn crook,' " was misleading. South Brilliant Coal Co. v. Williams, 206 Ala. 637, 91 So. 589; Mitchell v. Gambill, 140 Ala. 316, 37 So. 290; Kress v. Lawrence, 158 Ala. 652, 47 So. 574; B.R., L. & P. Co. v. Norris, 2 Ala.App. 610, 56 So. 739.
The general affirmative charge was requested on the alleged authority of Wells v. Henderson Land & Lbr. Co., 200 Ala. 262, 76 So. 28, L.R.A.1918A, 115. The language used by Chesney immediately before the assault and battery was committed, "You know you are short, you damned crook," according to plaintiff's evidence, when referred to the whole evidence could only pertain to the master's business, or was susceptible of the inference that Chesney did not step aside wholly from the master's business to pursue a matter entirely personal. Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Self, 192 Ala. 403, 68 So. 328, L.R.A.1915F, 516; Birmingham Macaroni Co. v. Tadrick, 205 Ala. 540, 88 So. 858, Cent. Foundry Co v. Laird, 189 Ala. 584, 66 So. 571; Jebeles & Collias Conf. Co. v. Booze, 181 Ala. 456, 62 So. 12; Gassenheimer v. Western Ry. of Ala., 175 Ala. 319, 57 So. 718, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 998; Case v Hulsebush, 122 Ala. 212, 26 So. 155. A jury question was presented. McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 88 So. 135. Defendant's refused charges 7 and 8 were fairly and fully covered by written charges given and in the oral charge of the court.
Assignments of error are based on improper argument of counsel appealing to a class prejudice. Davis v. Quattlebaum, 210 Ala. 242, 97 So. 701; Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 37, 43, 95 So. 171; Watts v. Espy (Ala.Sup.) 101 So. 106; A.G.S.R. Co. v. Grauer (Ala.Sup.) 102 So. 125.
In Wolffe v. Minnis, 74 Ala. 386, the objectionable argument condemned was:
--and Judge Stone there said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Adler v. Miller
... ... sectional prejudice. Metropolitan Co. v. Carter, 212 ... Ala. 212, 102 So. 130; B. R. L. & P. Co. v ... Bird v ... St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, ... [120 So. 159.] ... 120 N.E. 86, 13 A. L. R ... ...
-
Burns v. State
... ... Gonzalez, 183 Ala. 273, 287, 61 So ... 80, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 543; Carter v. State, 219 Ala ... 670, 123 So. 50; Clinton Mining Co. v. Bradford, ... 187; Hanye v ... State, 211 Ala. 555, 101 So. 108; Metropolitan Life ... Ins. Co. v. Carter, 212 Ala. 212, 102 So. 130; ... Alabama ... ...
-
Feore v. Trammel
... ... 95 N.Y. 135; In re Penny Pot Landing, 16 Pa. 79; ... Debolt v. Carter, 31 Ind. 355. The word ... "at," as used in count one of the complaint, ... Gonzalez, 183 Ala. 273, 61 So ... 80, Ann.Cas.1916A. 543; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v ... Carter (Ala.Sup.) 102 So. 130. We do not pass upon ... ...
-
Rose v. Magro
... ... prudent person, under like circumstances, in believing his ... life was in danger, or that he was about to suffer grievous ... bodily harm at ... Quattelbaum, 210 Ala. 244, 97 ... So. 701; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Carter, ... 212 Ala. 215, 102 So. 130; Anderson v ... ...