Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 04 October 1909 |
| Docket Number | 1,775. |
| Citation | 174 F. 116 |
| Parties | METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WILLIAMSON. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
W. G M. Thomas and Richard W. Walker, for plaintiff in error.
J. L Andrews, for defendant in error.
Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.
This is an action on an insurance policy issued by the plaintiff in error, payable to the defendant in error, for $5,000, on the life of Lawrence L. Williamson. The case was tried in the court below, and resulted in a verdict and judgment against the company for the amount of the policy. The main contention here is that the trial court should have instructed the jury to find for the company: (1) Because of defenses presented under the suicide clause of the policy; and (2) because the first premium was never paid, nor the policy delivered.
1. One of the conditions of the policy was that, 'if the insured * * * die by his own hand or act, * * * the company shall not be liable. * * * ' The insured died from the effects of a dose of morphine. There was evidence, consisting of oral declarations made by him shortly before his death and of letters written by him, tending to show that the morphine was taken by him with suicidal intent. But the letters were susceptible of the construction that the morphine was taken to alleviate pain and to secure sleep. The evidence showed that the insured had a wife and children, with whom he lived and to whom he was devoted. There was nothing in the evidence to show a reason for self-destruction. For several days before his death, he had suffered from neuralgia or other painful affliction, which deprived him of sleep. On the day of his death, at his wife's suggestion he returned home from his place of business about 10:30 o'clock in the morning for the purpose of getting needed sleep. When he reached home, he went with his wife to a quiet part of the house, and his wife left him there. Whether he took the morphine with suicidal intent or not is a question of fact No one can read all the evidence, and say that it conclusively and unquestionably shows that he did so. It is not inconsistent with the evidence to conclude that he took an overdose accidentally-- that he intended only to take an amount sufficient to relieve his suffering and to secure sleep. The trial court clearly should not be reversed for submitting the question as to suicide to the jury. The authorities on this point, in cases involving the same question, are conclusive. Pythias Knights' Supreme Lodge v. Beck, 181 U.S. 49, 21 Sup.Ct. 532, 45 L.Ed 741; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Love, 111 F. 773, 49 C.C.A. 602; National Union v. Fitzpatrick, 133 F. 694, 66 C.C.A. 524.
2. There are several provisions in the policy to the effect that it is not to be binding till the actual payment of the premium and its acceptance by the company. We quote one:
'No obligation is assumed by this company upon this policy until the first premium has been paid and the policy duly delivered.'
The contention of the company is that the jury should have been instructed for the defendant, because there was (1) no delivery of the policy and (2) no payment of the premium.
After the death of the insured, the policy was found among his other insurance policies and important papers in a trunk. Proof was offered of the declarations of Jackson, one of the company's agents, who had solicited Williamson to insure, that he had delivered the policy. The agents of the company testified that they had left the policy in the possession of Williamson; but their evidence tends to show it was so left for examination by Williamson. The record shows, however, that by the company's rules governing agents they were not permitted to leave a policy with an applicant for insurance before the actual payment of the premium:
'Specimen policy should be given to applicant who desires to hold and examine policy before paying premium.'
From the facts shown by the record, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the policy was duly delivered.
Williamson did not pay the premium of $181.25 in cash. He gave his note for that sum, payable to the company's agent individually. It was a note waiving exemption, which means, under the local law, that the maker could not claim the benefit of the exemption laws against the enforcement of the payment of the note. The agent testified that he had no authority to take the note; but he admitted that it was his practice to take notes under such circumstances for the first premium. His admissions to other witnesses and his evidence on the stand tend to show that he took notes for the first premium for '50 per cent.' of the business done by him. He denied that he had in any way notified the company that he had taken the note; nor was it shown, unless inferentially, that the company knew that it was his custom to take notes for the first premium. The agent testified that he had no authority to take the note or deliver the policy till the cash was paid, yet he cheerfully said that he would have collected the note if the insured, Williamson, 'had kept on living.' In this connection, it should be remembered that, when first approached on the subject after Williamson's death, the agent denied that he had taken a note from Williamson, but admitted it later, when it probably became apparent that proof could be made that he had shown the note to others. It is not reasonable that the agent would have done 50 per cent. of his business by taking notes for first premiums and that the company would have remained in ignorance of it. A letter was in evidence from the president of the company to the insured, which recognized him as having placed 'some insurance' with the company.
The letter clearly refers to the policy in question here, or, at least, there is nothing in the record to show that it could have other meaning.
It is a matter of common knowledge that insurance companies seek to extend their business by employing many agents, to whom they pay large commissions. The record does not show, except inferentially, just what part of the first premium on Williamson's policy would have been retained by the agent. It does show that the agent wanted at least one-fourth of the amount of the note for the first premium raised in cash, thereby indicating that only one-fourth was to be sent to the company. It cannot be doubted...
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