Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
Decision Date | 06 February 2001 |
Citation | 255 Conn. 295,765 A.2d 891 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY ET AL. |
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Spear, JS. Francis J. Brady, with whom were Randy K. Paar, pro hac vice, Wesley W. Horton, and, on the brief, Everett E. Newton, Jerold Oshinsky, pro hac vice, Eugene R. Anderson, pro hac vice, and Mark Garbowski, pro hac vice, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas J. Groark, Jr., with whom was Kathleen D. Monnes, for the appellees (defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al.).
Stephen A. Fennell, pro hac vice, with whom were John B. Farley and, on the brief, Charles G. Cole, pro hac vice, Brian J. Leske, pro hac vice, Margaret A. Arnold, pro hac vice, Stephen R. Apel, pro hac vice, R. Cornelius Danaher, Kathleen F. Munroe, Ralph G. Eddy and Keith McCabe, for the appellees (defendant The Home Insurance Company et al.).
Louis B. Blumenfeld, Laura A. Foggan, pro hac vice, Daniel E. Troy, pro hac vice, and Keith U. Kuder, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the Insurance Environmental Litigation Association as amicus curiae.
This appeal requires us to determine the scope and meaning of the "per occurrence" limit of liability under certain excess insurance policies issued by the defendant insurers1 to the plaintiff, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan). In particular, we must determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, there was one occurrence under the policies, namely, Metropolitan's alleged failure to warn of the dangers of asbestos exposure, which resulted in bodily injury to the underlying claimants, or whether each claimant's exposure was a separate occurrence. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants, concluding that each claimant's exposure to asbestos was a separate occurrence. Because we agree that there are multiple occurrences in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court found the following facts. "Metropolitan... is a large mutual insurance company that insured employee health care plans of various manufacturers and distributors of asbestos and products containing asbestos.... Beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present time, [Metropolitan] has been named as a defendant in thousands of lawsuits filed throughout the United States seeking recovery for asbestos-related bodily injuries resulting from [Metropolitan's] alleged failure to publicize adequately the health risks of asbestos exposure. These underlying claims refer to a period of time beginning in the 1930s when [Metropolitan] engaged in medical research activities. Certain reports and articles were generated either by or under the direction of Dr. Anthony Lanza, [Metropolitan's] assistant medical director.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X04-CV-95-0115305S (April 16, 1999) (24 Conn. L. Rptr. 381, 381-82). Id., 381.2
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are also relevant to this appeal. The defendants' insurance policies "all provide a stated dollar amount of insurance on a `per occurrence' basis, and are in excess of [the Travelers Indemnity] coverage of $25 million per occurrence." Id., 382. Thus, the defendants' policies are not implicated until Metropolitan exhausts the underlying coverage of $25 million per occurrence. In addition, the defendants' policies contain, or incorporate by reference, the following batch clause (hereinafter referred to as the continuous exposure clause) contained in the Travelers Indemnity umbrella insurance policies: "" 3 Id., 383. The defendants' policies do not define the term "occurrence."
In 1995, Metropolitan brought the present action against the defendants, all excess liability carriers, seeking coverage for the various asbestos related claims. Specifically, Metropolitan sought declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract. In the first count, Metropolitan requested that the court enter a declaratory judgment that: (1) the defendants were liable to pay in full Metropolitan's defense costs and all sums it had paid, or would become legally obligated to pay, as damages with respect to the underlying claims; and (2) Metropolitan was entitled to designate the policy years called upon to provide such payments. In the second count, Metropolitan alleged that the defendants had breached or would breach the contractual obligations set forth in the excess policies.
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on various grounds, including: (1) that each underlying claim for which Metropolitan sought coverage from the defendants should be treated as a separate occurrence (exposure to asbestos being the defining event);4 (2) that the injuries should be allocated on a pro rata basis to all periods in which the injuries or damage took place;5 (3) that Metropolitan could not sue for breach of contract because, before the filing of the action, it had failed to tender a claim and the defendants had not disclaimed coverage;6 and (4) that the professional services exclusion in the policies precluded coverage.7
On April 16, 1999, the trial court rendered summary judgment for the defendants on the first two grounds. Id., 387. Applying New York and Connecticut law, the court determined that the occurrence, as that term was used in the subject policies, had been each claimant's exposure to asbestos, and not Metropolitan's alleged failure to publicize adequately the dangers of asbestos exposure. Id., 384. Because the claimants had been exposed to asbestos separately, the trial court concluded that there had been multiple occurrences. Id. The trial court also determined that, because the claimants' injuries had spanned several years and Metropolitan was unable to prove "what portion of injury [had] occurred during the policy periods," the damages should be allocated on a pro rata basis "to all periods in which injury or damage took place."8 Id. Thereafter, Metropolitan appealed to the Appellate Court and, pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199, we transferred the appeal to ourselves.
On appeal, Metropolitan claims that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) each of the claims alleging exposure to asbestos constituted a separate occurrence under the excess liability policies at issue; and (2) Metropolitan's damages should be allocated on a pro rata basis to all periods in which injury or damage took place.9 Specifically, on the occurrence issue, Metropolitan contends that we must examine the cause of its liability in the underlying claims. On that basis, it argues that there is a single occurrence,10 i.e., its alleged failure to warn of the health risks of asbestos exposure. Given this "common cause," and the continuous exposure clause in the policies, Metropolitan seeks a determination of a single occurrence as a matter of law. The defendants dispute Metropolitan's claims and argue additionally that, with regard to the allocation of damages count, they had not breached their contracts with Metropolitan, and that consequently, summary judgment was proper.11
The principal issue in this appeal is ...
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