Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. James

Decision Date06 October 1932
Docket Number8 Div. 361.
Citation225 Ala. 561,144 So. 33
PartiesMETROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. JAMES.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1932.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lauderdale County; J. Fred Johnson, Jr. Judge.

Action on a policy of life insurance by Jesse James against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Eyster & Eyster, of Decatur, and W. H. Mitchell, of Florence, for appellant.

L. A May and Simpson & Simpson, all of Florence, for appellee.

BOULDIN J.

The action is on a life insurance policy.

The contract stipulated the insurer shall incur no liability until "a policy is issued and delivered, and the full first premium stipulated in the policy has been paid to and accepted by the Company during the lifetime of the applicant."

By appropriate pleas this provision was set up with allegations that the policy was never delivered, nor the full first premium paid, during the life of the insured.

The controlling issues of law and fact relate to this defense.

Roosevelt James, the insured, made application through the local agent of defendant at Florence for the policy in question, naming his brother, Jesse James, the plaintiff, as beneficiary.

The application was approved, and the policy, dated December 10 1930, was issued at the home office, and forwarded to the local agent to be delivered upon payment of the first quarterly premium. The insured resided at Florence, but was working as a farm laborer in the employ of Mr. Blalock, at Seven Mile Island, in the Tennessee river, several miles below Florence. Leaving funds to pay the first premium in the hands of the plaintiff, the insured went back to Seven Mile Island. The policy remained in the possession of the local agent, Mr. Hester, until late in the afternoon of December 24th, when plaintiff, the beneficiary, paid the premium and received the policy.

Meantime however, the insured had disappeared under circumstances discussed later. His body was found in the waters of the Tennessee river near Seven Mile Island on February 3, 1931. Thereupon, the plaintiff prepared and forwarded to the insurer profits of death. In the sworn statement of plaintiff, as claimant of the proceeds of the policy, the following appears touching the insured: "4. Date of Death. Last seen on December 20, 1930, crossing Tenn. River, near where he was found. 5. Cause of Death. Supposed to have drowned in Tenn. River. 6. Place of Death. Tenn. River near 7 Mile Island." In the "Statement of Friend" forwarded by plaintiff as part of the proof of death, this appears: "6. State date of Death. December 20."

And the "Statement of Physician" the following: "3. Date of Death? Month, December, Day 20, Year 1930. *** 5. Place of Death? Tenn. River near 7 Mile Island. 6. Cause of Death? Supposed to have drowned in Tenn. River."

The evidence thus far being without conflict, we consider the governing rules of law.

The issuance of the policy, the possession of same by the beneficiary, with recitals or other proof that the first premium had been paid, with evidence of death of the insured, and that notice and proof of death have been furnished the insurer as required by policy, without more, made out a prima facie case for plaintiff. It discloses a subsisting contract of insurance, and a maturity of the demand by the death of the insured, with notice and formal proof of same. National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Winbush, 215 Ala. 349, 110 So. 571; Watts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 Ala. 404, 100 So. 812, 813.

The stipulation of the contract prepared by the insurer in keeping with the application to the effect that no obligation should be incurred unless the policy was delivered and first premium paid while the insured was alive, was within the clear legal right of parties to prescribe the events upon which a life insurance contract shall come into being. If the insured died on December 20th, or prior to December 24th, when the premium was paid and the policy delivered to the beneficiary by the local agent, there was no contract. The whole matter remained in negotiation merely. The agency of the beneficiary to pay the premium and receive delivery was revoked by death.

In several of our cases policies have provided in effect that no liability is incurred unless when the premium is paid and policy delivered the insured is "alive and in sound health." The stipulation as to sound health is, by virtue of our statutory provisions, construed as a warranty. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mandelbaum, 207 Ala. 234, 92 So. 440, 29 A. L. R. 649.

But the stipulation that the insured must be alive involves a different principle. If dead, there is no one to make a warranty, no one to contract, no life to insure; hence no contract ever comes into existence. Ivie v. International Life Ins. Co., 217 Ala. 559, 117 So. 176; 69 A. L. R. 562, note.

We come, then, to consider the proofs of death as evidence in support of this defense. Proofs of death furnished by the beneficiary to the insurer in accordance with the terms of the policy are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, as against the beneficiary, and, when not explained or rebutted, are conclusive. Union Mutual Aid Ass'n of Mobile v. Carroway, 201 Ala. 414, 415, 78 So. 792; Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32, 22 L.Ed. 793; Hanna v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 Misc. 431, 28 N.Y.S. 661, affirmed 150 N.Y. 526, 44 N.E. 1099; Abraham v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 183 Mass. 116, 66 N.E. 605; Felix v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 216 Pa. 95, 64 A. 903; 8 Rose Notes 784; 37 C.J. 560, § 316, and notes.

The proofs of death furnished the company, consisting of the statement of claimant and others sent in by him, disclosed December 20th as the date of death of the insured so far as known or believed by the witnesses. Claimant answered the question by giving date last seen crossing Tennessee river near where the body was found, and the cause of death "supposed to have drowned in Tennessee River," and place of death the same. Other statements are less qualified.

Taken together, this proof...

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13 cases
  • Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. James, 8 Div. 507.
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    ...Cal. 135, 159 P. 423; Smith v. Knowlton, 11 N.H. 191; In re Christin's Estate, 128 Cal.App. 625, 17 P.2d 1068; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. James, 225 Ala. 561, 144 So. 33, 34; Lesser v. New York Life Ins. Co., 53 Cal.App. 236, 200 P. 22; Tisdale v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 Iowa ......
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    ... ... 427-432] or by the result of ... disease, are material questions of fact to be determined by ... the jury. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, 230 ... Ala. 193, 160 So. 248; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v ... James, 225 Ala. 561, 144 So. 33; Benefit Association ... ...
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    ... ... whether death of insured (whose body was found in the river) ... resulted from drowning or accident or violent means ... Metropolitan Life Ins. Company v. James, supra (225 Ala. 561, ... 144 So. 33)." Parenthesis supplied ... When ... death or injury results from taking ... ...
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