Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Goolsby, Docket No. 91247

• Decision Date: 05 February 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 91247
• Citation: 165 Mich.App. 126,418 N.W.2d 700
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York corporation, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy GOOLSBY, Conservator of the Estates of Steven E. Goolsby, Bobbie Jean Goolsby, and Michelle R. Gordon, minors, Defendants-Appellants, and Gene R. Myers, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jessie Goolsby, deceased, Mildred Goolsby, Charlene Goolsby, Eddie Mae Goolsby Page, and Jessie Goolsby, Jr., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 700

418 N.W.2d 700

165 Mich.App. 126

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York corporation, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy GOOLSBY, Conservator of the Estates of Steven E.

Goolsby, Bobbie Jean Goolsby, and Michelle R.

Gordon, minors, Defendants-Appellants,

and

Gene R. Myers, Personal Representative of the Estate of

Jessie Goolsby, deceased, Mildred Goolsby,

Charlene Goolsby, Eddie Mae Goolsby

Page, and Jessie Goolsby, Jr.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 91247.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 3, 1987.

Decided Dec. 9, 1987.

Released for Publication Feb. 5, 1988.

C. Frederick Robinson, Flint, for defendants-appellants.

Gottlieb Law Offices, P.C. by Norman N. Gottlieb, Flint, for defendants-appellees.

Before CYNAR, P.J., and SAWYER and GILLIS, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an interpleader action brought by plaintiff to determine the appropriate distribution of the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued by plaintiff on the life of the deceased. The defendants represent two factions of the deceased's family. Appellants are the deceased's second wife, Dorothy Goolsby, who was divorced from the deceased prior to his death, and the children of that marriage. Appellees, other than the personal representative, are the deceased's first wife, Mildred Goolsby, and the adult children of that marriage. It appears that the first marriage may have been a common-law marriage, while the second marriage was solemnized in a civil ceremony.

Since both the deceased's first and second families, as well as the personal representative of the estate, filed for benefits under the life insurance policy, the instant action was commenced by plaintiff. Settlement negotiations were held at various times, allegedly resulting in an agreement between the parties' attorneys in January, 1986. Therefore, appellees sought specific performance of the settlement.

The trial court granted specific performance, finding that appellant Dorothy Goolsby had instructed her attorney to accept the settlement offer and that her attorney communicated that acceptance to appellees' attorney. Appellants now appeal and we reverse.

The trial court correctly recognized that settlement agreements should not normally be set aside and that once a settlement agreement is reached a party cannot disavow it merely because he has had "a change of heart." See Thomas v. Michigan Mutual Ins. Co., 138 Mich.App. 117, 358 N.W.2d 902 (1984). We have no difficulty in accepting the trial court's factual conclusion that appellees made an offer which appellant Dorothy Goolsby authorized her attorney to accept and which was accepted by her attorney. Dorothy Goolsby's later "change of heart" would normally be insufficient to justify the setting aside of the settlement agreement.

However, our analysis does not hinge on whether there was sufficient reason to disavow the settlement agreement. Rather, a court rule controls here, namely, MCR 2.507(H), which provides as follows:

An agreement or consent between the parties or their attorneys respecting the proceedings in an action, subsequently denied by either party, is not binding unless it was made in open court, or unless evidence of the agreement is in writing, subscribed by the party against whom the agreement is offered or by that party's attorney.

This...