Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Estes
Decision Date | 17 May 1934 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 566. |
Citation | 228 Ala. 582,155 So. 79 |
Parties | METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. ESTES et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; John Denson, Judge.
Action in ejectment by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company against Walter F. Estes and wife. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Cabaniss & Johnston and Smyer, Smyer & Bainbridge, all of Birmingham for appellant.
J. C Burton, of Birmingham, for appellees.
The suit was statutory (Code 1923, § 7452 et seq.) ejectment.
Count 2, upon which the trial was had, was stated in Code form.
Defendants' pleas were the general issue, and special pleas alleging that the property sought to be mortgaged was and is the homestead of defendants; that the plaintiff claims title to said property under a foreclosure deed which is founded on a mortgage purporting to be signed and acknowledged by the defendants; that said mortgage was not signed and acknowledged by defendants as required by the statute (Code 1923, § 6838 et seq.).
The principal question for decision is presented by the refusal of the general affirmative charge requested by the plaintiff. The rules governing the giving and refusal of such instructions need not be restated. McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 40, 88 So. 135.
We have examined the evidence and there are conflicts, or reasonable inferences thereof, that justified the refusal of such charge and warranted the submission of the controverted facts-that of the due execution of the mortgage by Estes and wife to Jemison & Co., Inc.,-to the jury.
The defendants' testimony was unequivocal and positive, to the effect that they, or either of them, did not acknowledge the execution of the mortgage; that they did not know the officer purporting to have taken their acknowledgments at the time or until after the mortgage loan was made; that one Feld, an employee of Jemison & Co., came to their home with the mortgage and had them sign; that the alleged officer making the certificates of acknowledgment was not present; and that thereafter they never appeared before such officer and acknowledged before him the execution of the mortgage.
Defendants further testified that at the time the property sought to be so incumbered and conveyed was their homestead; that Jemison & Co. negotiated or made the loan; that they received the proceeds thereof, and subsequently made payments on account of that mortgage debt.
The mortgage in question is not witnessed, but purports to have been acknowledged by the respective grantors before the notary public making the alleged certificates of acknowledgments which are in the form prescribed by the Code for a husband and wife, and there purports to have been a separate acknowledgment by the wife.
The alleged notary public as a witness for plaintiff testified that the signatures to the certificates affixed to the mortgage were those of witness; that he had no "positive recollection of taking the acknowledgment to those papers"; that he recalled having seen Mr. Estes before, but as to whether or not he recalled ever having seen Mrs. Estes before, testified merely that "her face is familiar," yet he could not swear that they came before him and "acknowledged said mortgage," saying, "I haven't got a sufficient recollection of it." He further testified that he handled several hundred transactions that year and did not know whether witness "closed this transaction" unless his signature was on the check orders, or somewhere in the file that would so indicate; that he had no independent recollection as to the matter.
On cross-examination that witness stated that he could not say positively that he had a record of Mr. and Mrs. Estes acknowledging that thing before him; that the chances are that he did; that if he had such a record (section 9244, Code) he would say "that I destroyed it"; that he took acknowledgments generally at "the office of Jemison and Company," and "occasionally went out of the office to take acknowledgments"; that he did not know whether he went out to the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Estes to take their acknowledgments to this mortgage, only knew where their home was located; had no recollection of having ever been in the house; did not recall where they were living at the time this mortgage was made; could not say whether Mr. Estes, Mrs. Estes, or Mr. Feld was there, nor whether as a matter of fact he (Starke) examined the mortgagor at the time the paper was signed; that as a matter of fact, he did not know what transpired in this case. Witness concluded by saying, "All I know is that this is my signature on this mortgage."
The mortgage was to Jemison & Co., Inc., and duly transferred by it to the plaintiff in ejectment. There was foreclosure and auction deed to the plaintiff. And there was an alleged lease for rent in the name of the mortgagors to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of subsequent date, reciting that the latter was the owner of the property under foreclosure deed.
The mortgagors deny acknowledgment before the notary public in question, saying Mr. Feld, acting for Jemison & Co., was the only person at their home when he procured the execution of the mortgage, and that their signatures were not acknowledged, that Mr. Feld did not witness the execution, and was not such an officer.
The witness, Walter F. Estes, said:
Mrs. Estes, one of the defendants, testified:
In respect to a due execution under their pleading-the general issue and of non est factum-the mortgage being in evidence and the certificates of acknowledgment being in due form, a prima facie case was made out for plaintiff, and the burden then rested upon the defendants of proving that the property constituted the homestead of the mortgagors (McClendon...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Biglane v. Rawls
...was held not to be applicable where the land involved was part of the homestead, and worth less than $2,000. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Estes, 228 Ala. 582, 155 So. 79, in a dictum, endorsed the rule of Williams v. Kilpatrick, but held it was not applicable to the facts in that Thorp v. ......
-
Majors v. Killian
... ... DeGraffenried v. Clark, 75 Ala. 425, and ... Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Estes, 228 Ala. 582, ... 155 So. 79 ... ...
-
Peterson v. State
... ... possibility of defendant being pardoned if given a life ... sentence, to which defendant objected and the court sustained ... Phillips ... v. Ashworth, 220 Ala. 237, 124 So. 519; American ... Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 224 Ala. 387, 140 So. 555; ... Peterson v. State, 227 ... 361, 150 So. 156; ... Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Estes et al., 228 Ala ... 582, 155 So. 79; Bachelor v ... ...
-
Moorer v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co.
... ... 253, 256; Ex parte St ... Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 236 Ala. 543, 184 So. 267, ... and cases cited in them ... [20 ... definite period, extending to that of his life. Smith v ... Davis, 199 Ala. 687, 75 So. 22. But any parol agreement ... 330; Fiscus ... v. Young, 243 Ala. 39, 8 So.2d 514; Metropolitan ... Life Ins. Co. v. Estes, 228 Ala. 582, 155 So. 79; and ... may be ... ...