Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 12 May 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13563,13563
• Citation: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 645 P.2d 356 (Idaho 1982)
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Lenore Jensen JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. Lou JOHNSON, Laura Gay Johnson, Lola Lynn Johnson Pfiefer, Lyla Ann Johnson Scanlan and Linda Lee Johnson, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 356

645 P.2d 356

103 Idaho 122

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v.Lenore Jensen JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant, v.Lou JOHNSON, Laura Gay Johnson, Lola Lynn Johnson Pfiefer, Lyla Ann Johnson Scanlan and Linda Lee Johnson, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 13563.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

May 12, 1982.

Lowell N. Hawkes and DaLon Esplin of Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered, Pocatello, for defendant-appellant.

Dean Williams of Kerr & Williams, Blackfoot, for defendants-respondents.

SHEPARD, Justice.

The sole issue on this appeal is the existence of a valid common law marriage between appellantLenore Jensen Johnson and the decedent, Lyle E. Johnson.The appeal is from a judgment in an interpleader action distributing the proceeds of a life insurance policy.The trial court held that appellant was not the common law wife of the decedent and awarded the proceeds of the life insurance policy to the decedent's children, the respondents here.We reverse.

Lyle E. Johnson was covered by a policy of insurance on his life written by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and upon his death conflicting claims to the proceeds were asserted by Lenore Jensen Johnson and by the decedent's five children, and Metropolitan therefore filed this interpleader action, deposited approximately $11,500 into court, and was dismissed.The beneficiary of the policy was left undesignated, and the policy provided in such event that the proceeds were payable to his surviving spouse or, if he left no spouse, to his children.Lenore Jensen Johnson answered the complaint of Metropolitan and cross-claimed against the Johnson children asserting that she, as the decedent's widow, was entitled to the proceeds.The Johnson children answered and cross-claimed denying the existence of the marriage between Lenore Jensen Johnson and Lyle Johnson and asserted their right to the proceeds since Lyle Johnson did not leave a surviving spouse.

The facts are essentially undisputed.Prior to 1971Lyle Johnson and Lenore Jensen had been married and those marriages were dissolved, one by divorce and the other by death.In 1971 Lyle and Lenore began keeping company, but each maintained a separate residence, and there was no cohabitation.At one time they set a marriage date but it was cancelled because of the illness of a daughter.Thereafter the couple discussed marriage on several occasions and finally decided to marry on October 22, 1976.On that date, Lenore moved into Lyle's home.Although they also discussed a ceremonial marriage on that date, they believed that such would result in the loss of Lenore's civil service widow pension and that they would not be able to manage financially.The couple's only stable sources of income were Lenore's pension of $200 a month and Lyle's disability pension of $86 a month and social security benefits of about $100 a month.On that date it was also agreed that Lenore and Lyle would enter into a ceremonial marriage in 1984, after Lenore had reached age 60, at which point she would not lose her widow's pension.

On that same date, October 22, 1976, the couple informed Lenore's children that they had been married that day, and Lyle told his youngest daughter that they had been married that day and that Lenore was her new mother.Thereafter their business and personal affairs were managed as husband and wife, and although they kept their previously existing separate checking accounts, they established a joint checking account in the name of Lyle and Lenore Johnson from which their household bills were paid.Their property insurance and medical records reflected a marital relationship, and Lyle's medical records showed Lenore as his next of kin and wife.Automobile insurance records indicated that the couple were husband and wife, and the bills and receipts of everyday transactions indicated Lyle and Lenore represented themselves as husband and wife.Anniversary, birthday and valentine cards between Lyle and Lenore indicated they considered themselves husband and wife, and numerous wedding anniversary, birthday, Christmas, Mother's Day and Father's Day cards, including cards from Lyle's children, indicated their general reputation in the community as husband and wife.Lenore did receive some mail addressed to Lenore Jensen and her pension check continued to be sent in the name of Lenore Jensen.

In July 1977, Lyle named Lenore as a beneficiary in the amount of $4,000 under a life insurance policy not here at issue wherein she was designated as "Lenore Jensen " and her relationship was listed as "friend".Lyle redrafted his will for the sole purpose of changing the executrix and Lenore was not mentioned in that will, although she was aware it was being redrafted.Lenore testified she neither read the document, nor knew of its contents until after Lyle's death.

Following Lyle's death in December, 1977, newspaper obituaries named Lenore as his widow and his death certificate indicated that Lyle was married at the time of death.Lenore did not file for letters of administration in the probate court but did file for a surviving spouse's statutory allowances.

Following trial the court specifically found that Lenore and Lyle held themselves out to the community as husband and wife and enjoyed that reputation in the community and among Lyle's children.The court also found that there was cohabitation and a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties and obligations as between Lenore and Lyle.However, the court found that "on October 22, 1976, the requisite agreement and consent to be married which is a condition precedent to a valid common-law marriage" did not exist between Lenore and Lyle.The court stated:

"This Court is unwilling to hold as a matter of law that any one of the following single facts, standing alone, would be sufficient to negate a common-law marriage, but the Court is willing to hold as a matter of law that the combination of the following facts are sufficient to negate a consent or agreement to enter into a binding marriage relationship on October 22, 1976:

(1) Dual identity of Lenore, i.e., Lenore Jensen to the Civil Service Commission and others; Lenore Johnson to the general community.

(2) An acknowledgment on October 22, 1976 of an intent to enter into a ceremonial marriage at a future date.

(3) Lenore's acquiescence in being known only as Lenore Jensen, "friend", in Lyle's application for change of beneficiary on his veteran's policy.

(4) Lenore's acquiescence in not being named as a beneficiary in Lyle's will.

(5) Lenore's failure to file for Letters of Administration as Lyle's widow and her acquiescence in the filing for Letters by one of the defendant children."

The court thereafter ordered that the proceeds of the policy be delivered to the personal representative of the estate of Lyle Johnson, to be disbursed to his children.

As initially noted, the sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that Lyle and Lenore did not agree or consent to marry.This case thus affords a unique opportunity to clarify the law of this state with respect to the consent requirement in the context of an asserted common law marriage.

We note that Idaho is among the dwindling minority of states which continue to recognize common law marriage.In 1952, twenty American jurisdictions could be listed as recognizing common law marriage.Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 88, 89(1960).By 1960, the number was sixteen, Id., and by 1974 the number had diminished to fourteen.Note, Common Law Marriage and Unmarried Cohabitation: An Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 579, 585-86(1978).In addition to Idaho, the jurisdictions presently recognizing common law marriages are Alabama, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennyslvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas.The trend toward abolition of common law marriage indicates an obvious hostility to the doctrine.That hostility is not confined to those states which do not recognize common law marriages.The courts of many jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine also view it with disfavor.Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Elder, 274 S.W.2d 144, 147(Civ.App.1954)("the law does not favor, but merely tolerates, common law marriages."), aff'd155 Tex. 27, 282 S.W.2d 371(1955);In re Redman's Estate, 135 Ohio St. 554, 21 N.E.2d 659, 661(1939)("So-called common law marriage contravenes public policy and should not be accorded any favor; indeed, it is quite generally condemned.");Baker v. Mitchell, 143 Pa.Super. 50, 17 A.2d 738, 741(1941)("The law of Pennsylvania recognizes common law marriages.But they are a fruitful source of perjury and fraud, and, in consequence, they are to be tolerated, not encouraged.");McCoy v. District of Columbia, 256 A.2d 908, 910(D.C.1969)("The considerations which history teaches gave rise to judicial recognition of such informal and unrecorded marital agreements can hardly justify modern day perpetuation.")Thus, to discourage common law marriage claims, many jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine impose stringent evidentiary burdens on the party seeking to establish a common law marriage.Baker v. Mitchell, 143 Pa.Super. 50, 17 A.2d 738(1941)(great scrutiny);Goodman v. McMillan, 258 Ala. 125, 61 So.2d 55(1952)(clear and convincing proof; close scrutiny), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 929, 73 S.Ct. 789, 97 L.Ed. 1359(1953);Chatman v. State, 513 S.W.2d 854(Tex.Cr.App.1974)(close scrutiny);Sardonis v. Sardonis, 106 R.I. 469, 261 A.2d 22(1970)(clear and convincing evidence);In re Marriage of Grother, 242 N.W.2d 1(Iowa1976)(regarded with suspicion and closely scrutinized);In re Estate of Fisher, 176 N.W.2d 801, 805(Iowa1970)("when one party is dead, the essential elements must be shown by clear, consistent and convincing evidence");In re Estate of Soeder, 7...