Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Henry

• Citation: 24 N.E.2d 918,217 Ind. 33
• Decision Date: 23 January 1940
• Docket Number: 27315.
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. HENRY.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

24 N.E.2d 918

217 Ind. 33

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. HENRY.

No. 27315.

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 23, 1940

Appeal from Warrick Circuit Court; Union W Youngblood, Judge.

Meyer Fine & Bamberger, of Evansville, for appellant.

John H. Jennings, of Evansville, for appellee.

SHAKE Chief Justice.

The appellee, as plaintiff, sued appellant on a policy of life insurance which also provided for disability benefits. The dissues were made up by a complaint in one paragraph and an answer in general denial. There was a verdict and judgment for appellee and a motion for a new trial, which was denied.

The policy provided that within six months after receipt by the appellant at its home office of proof of the insured's permanent disability, it would pay certain specified sums. No time was fixed within which such proof was to be made. The undisputed evidence shows that appellee became permanently disabled on September 28, 1928, and that proof thereof was not submitted to the insurer until April 15, 1935. It has been decided by this court that where a policy of the character here under consideration fixes no definite time within which notice and proof of disability must be made, such proof must be submitted within a reasonable time. The six and one-half year period that elapsed between the beginning of appellee's disability and the submission of proof constituted an unreasonable delay and would defeat his right to recover unless such delay was satisfactorily explained. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Johnson, 1938, 214 Ind. 1, 12 N.E.2d 755. All of the alleged errors presented on this appeal may be determined by the answer to the single question: did the evidence show a satisfactory explanation or justification for the appellee's delay in submitting proof of his disability?

On November 1, 1920, West Kentucky Coal Company obtained from the appellant a group policy of insurance upon its employees. The policy embraced both life and disability protection. Premiums were deducted from the pay of the employees during the continuance of their employment and remitted by the coal company to the appellant. A master policy was issued by the appellant and delivered to the coal company, which retained it. Clause 6 thereof provided: 'The Company will issue to the Employer for delivery to each Employee insured hereunder an individual Certificate showing the insurance protection to which such Employee is entitled * * *.'

Appellant issued certificates pursuant to said clause and delivered them to the coal company, but appellee says that no such certificate was delivered to him and that he never saw the master policy; that he was told at the office of his employer that the policy was one of life insurance; that he had no knowledge or information that it covered disability as well and did not learn of that fact until three days before he submitted his proof of claim; and that such proof was made as promptly as possible after he learned that he had disability coverage.

It seems clear to us from the relations of the parties that in the negotiations that resulted in the issuance of the policy; in receiving and accepting the certificate referred to in clause 6; and in deducting premiums from the appellee's pay and in remitting them to the insurance company the coal company was acting in the capacity of agent for the appellee. From this it would follow that the only fact in evidence remotely bearing upon the reason for appellee's delay in submitting the required proof of claim was the circumstance of his personal ignorance of the provisions of the policy.

If the policy had been in the hands of the appellee at...