Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Chase

• Decision Date: 19 September 1961
• Docket Number: No. 13542.,13542.
• Citation: 294 F.2d 500
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Rhoda J. CHASE, Appellant and Charles W. Chase, Elinor R. Chase Jones, Georgia E. Chase Snell and Lawson W. Chase.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

294 F.2d 500 (1961)

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Rhoda J. CHASE, Appellant and Charles W. Chase, Elinor R. Chase Jones, Georgia E. Chase Snell and Lawson W. Chase.

No. 13542.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued June 5, 1961.

Decided September 19, 1961.

Raymond Godbersen, Washington, D. C. (William F. Davey, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

Eugene M. Haring, Newark, N. J. (McCarter & English, Nicholas Conover English, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Louis Lebowitz, Elizabeth, N. J. (Bassin & Bassin, Elizabeth, N. J., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before MARIS, KALODNER and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

This interpleader suit was instituted by the plaintiff, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, in the District Court for the District of New Jersey to secure an adjudication of the claims of five individuals alleging themselves to be entitled to the proceeds of certain insurance on the life of Lawson W. Chase, deceased, issued under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2091 et seq. Under the Act and the policy the insurance was payable to the beneficiary designated by the insured, or, if no beneficiary had been designated, to the widow of the insured or, if none, to his children. No person had been designated by the insured as beneficiary. Named as defendants were Rhoda J. Chase, claiming as the widow of the insured, and Charles W. Chase, Elinor R. Chase Jones, Georgia E. Chase Snell and Lawson W. Chase, claiming as his children by a prior marriage. Defendant Rhoda J. Chase had instituted an action against the plaintiff in the District Court for the District of Columbia to recover the insurance proceeds. Upon deposit of the insurance proceeds into the registry of the district court in the present action the plaintiff secured from the court an injunction restraining the further prosecution of the suit in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff is a New York corporation. Defendants Rhoda J. Chase, Charles W. Chase, Elinor R. Chase Jones and Georgia E. Chase Snell are citizens and residents of New Jersey. Defendant Lawson W. Chase is a citizen and resident of California.

The question at issue in the interpleader proceeding was whether defendant Rhoda J. Chase was the widow of the insured. If so, she was entitled to the insurance proceeds but, if not, those proceeds go to the other defendants as children of the insured. Upon consideration of the facts which were stipulated by the parties, together with annexed exhibits and affidavits, the district court found that defendant Rhoda J. Chase was not the widow of the insured and awarded the insurance proceeds to the children. 189 F.Supp. 326. This appeal by defendant Rhoda J. Chase followed.

Preliminarily the appellant asserts that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain this interpleader suit while litigation involving the same subject matter was pending in the District Court for the District of Columbia. This contention is completely devoid of merit. The suit in the District of Columbia was an ordinary civil action brought to recover the insurance proceeds. It was the type of action the further prosecution of which the district court in the present interpleader suit was expressly authorized by law to enjoin. 28 U.S.C. § 2361. The appellant asserts that the District Court for the District of Columbia could have acquired jurisdiction by counterclaim filed under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., of the interpleader controversy between the appellant and the other defendants to the present lawsuit. We do not agree. For the latter individuals were not amenable to personal service in the District of Columbia, and such personal service upon them in the District would have been a prerequisite to the acquisition by that court of jurisdiction of such a counterclaim under Rule 22. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., ¶ 22.04. A counterclaim for interpleader under Rule 22 is to be distinguished in this respect from an original action of interpleader brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 in which latter action process may be served upon defendants in any district as specifically authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2361. Moreover, the venue of an original action of interpleader could not properly have been laid in the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1397 since none of the claimants resides in the District. The district court did not err in enjoining the further prosecution of the District of Columbia action.

We turn then to the appellant's principal contention, which is that the court erred in finding that she was not the widow of the insured. The pertinent facts as stipulated and found by the district court are these:

The insured and the appellant, then Rhoda J. Green, went through the form of a ceremonial marriage in the District of Columbia on October 29, 1941, and thereafter lived together and held themselves out as man and wife until the death of the insured on July 9, 1957. During this entire period they were residents and domiciliaries of the State of New Jersey although twice a year or oftener they visited friends in the District of Columbia for a week or longer. During these visits they cohabited in the District and held themselves out as husband and wife there. Prior to 1931 the insured had married Georgia E. Chase. This marriage was still subsisting on October 29, 1941 when he went through the form of a ceremonial marriage with the appellant and it was not terminated until February 19, 1948 when he obtained a decree of divorce from Georgia in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey. At the time of her marriage in 1941, the appellant knew that the insured had previously been married and that four children had been born of that marriage, but she had been given to understand and believed that the marriage had been terminated by divorce. She had no knowledge of the actual divorce in 1948, however, until after his death and no formal ceremonial marriage was entered into by her with him between February 19, 1948 and his death in 1957. It was further stipulated that Georgia E. Chase, the first wife of the insured, had married one Robert R. Dill on March 2, 1931 in the State of New York and in her affidavit for a license to marry had stated that she was divorced in 1928 and that her former husband was dead.

It appears to be the law of the District of Columbia that when a ceremonial marriage has taken place which is invalid by reason of the impediment of a prior undissolved marriage, the subsequent removal of the impediment while the parties continue to live together as husband and wife will give rise to a valid common law marriage. Thomas v. Murphy, 1939, 71 App.D.C. 69, 107 F.2d 268; Parrella v. Parrella, 1941, 74 App.D.C. 161, 120 F.2d 728; McVicker v. McVicker, 1942, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 208, 130 F.2d 837. In New Jersey, however, where common law marriages have been abolished by statute since December 1, 1939, N.J.S.A. 37:1-10, the subsequent removal of such an impediment does not have that result and the marriage remains invalid unless and until a subsequent ceremonial marriage takes place. Dacunzo v. Edgye, 1955, 19 N.J. 443, 117 A.2d 508.

It is the contention of the appellant that when she and the insured first went to the District of Columbia after the impediment to their marriage had been removed by the 1948 divorce, and there held themselves out as man and wife, the law of the District operated in their case to give rise to a valid common law marriage. She asserts that this result followed even though their presence in the District of Columbia was merely for a temporary visit to friends and that their changed status was entitled to recognition upon their return to their domicile in New Jersey. This is the basis of her claim that she was lawfully married to the insured at the time of his death and is, therefore, entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. The appellees, on the...