Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Lyons
Decision Date | 31 May 1912 |
Docket Number | 7,654 |
Parties | METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. LYONS |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From Superior Court of Marion County (17,406); Clarence E. Weir Judge.
Action by Catherine Lyons against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
W. H H. Miller, C. C. Shirley and Samuel D. Miller, for appellant.
Thomas D. McGee, Edward D. Reardon and James H. Drew, for appellee.
Appellee recovered a judgment on a policy of insurance issued by appellant on the life of Michael Broderick.
The complaint was in two paragraphs, and the only substantial difference between them is that the first paragraph avers that Michael Broderick died on or about July 1, 1903, while the second paragraph does not allege the death of Broderick, but avers that "on or about the day of August, 1901, the said Broderick left the city of Indianapolis and went to the city of St. Louis in the state of Missouri; that on or about the day of January, 1903, the said Broderick left his usual place of residence and went to parts unknown and has absented himself from his usual place of residence ever since for a space of more than five years, and that he has not been heard of or seen by any one since."
The only error assigned is the action of the trial court in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial; and the only questions presented by the brief of appellant are that the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and that the decision of the court is contrary to law.
To sustain the first paragraph of complaint the evidence must prove as a fact that the assured was dead before the commencement of the action; but to sustain the second paragraph it was not necessary to prove that such assured was in fact dead. Evidence showing that the assured had absented himself from his usual place of residence and gone to parts unknown for a period of five years would be sufficient to sustain the allegations of the second paragraph, provided the facts attending such disappearance and absence were such as to give rise to the presumption of death as provided by §§ 2747, 2748 Burns 1908, § 2232 R. S. 1881, Acts 1883 p. 209.
Even though it be conceded that the evidence is sufficient to sustain every material allegation of the second paragraph of complaint, a verdict resting on that paragraph could not be sustained, for the reason that such a verdict is contrary to law. This court has recently held that the sections of statute to which we have just referred relate exclusively to the settlement of the estates of absentees, and do not apply to a case such as the one we are now considering. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. King (1911), 47 Ind.App. 587, 93 N.E. 1046.
At common law a person was presumed to be living for seven years after his disappearance, and a presumption of death arose only from an unexplained absence for that length of time. It was held in the case just cited that the statutes under consideration do not change the common law in this regard, except in so far as the settlement of the estates of such absentees is concerned. In this case, therefore, proof of the unexplained absence of the assured for five years would not be sufficient to authorize a presumption of death under the statutes relied on, and a finding in favor of the plaintiff on the second paragraph of complaint is contrary to law.
The only other question is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decision on the first paragraph of complaint. If the evidence is sufficient to authorize the court to find as a fact that Michael Broderick was dead before the commencement of the action, or if the facts proved were sufficient to warrant an inference of such fact, then the decision can be sustained on this paragraph.
Where a person is shown to have been alive at a particular time, the presumption of life continues, and the burden of proving that he is dead rests on the party asserting such fact. If the person alleged to be dead has been absent from his home for seven years, a presumption of death may arise, but proof of absence alone will not give rise to this presumption. If, in addition to the absence of such person for the required time, it is shown that he left for a temporary purpose of business or pleasure and that he had not returned, and that those most likely to hear from him have received no word or tidings from him, the presumption of death arises after an absence of seven years. Thomas v. Thomas (1884), 16 Neb. 553, 20 N.W. 846; Brown v. Jewett (1846), 18 N.H. 230.
If it is known, however, that he established a fixed residence abroad, proof that his family and friends have heard nothing from him for seven years will not be sufficient to establish the presumption of his death. In addition to this fact, it must be shown that due inquiry was made at the place where he had established such residence, and that no tidings of him could be obtained. Bailey v. Bailey (1877), 36 Mich. 181; Wentworth v. Wentworth (1880), 71 Me. 72.
In some cases it becomes material to prove the death of such an absentee at some particular time within the seven years, or to prove the fact that he died before the presumption would arise from absence. In such cases it is necessary to prove his death as a fact, and when this can not be done by direct evidence it may be shown by proof of circumstances from which such death may be rightly and reasonably inferred. A court or jury in such a case is not warranted in finding death as a fact from facts and circumstances in evidence which would be sufficient only to create a presumption of death after the lapse of seven years; but additional facts and circumstances may be shown which will warrant such a finding. Some authorities have held that in order to justify a finding of the death of an absent person it must appear that when last seen or heard from he was in a situation of particular peril calculated to shorten or destroy life.
In Eagle's Case (1856), 3 Abb. Pr. 218, it was said that if it was attempted to apply the presumption short of seven years, special circumstances would necessarily have to be proved; as for example, that at last accounts the person was dangerously ill or in a weak state of health; was exposed to great perils of disease or accident; that he embarked on a vessel which has not since been heard from, though the length of the usual voyage has long since elapsed. In all such cases the circumstances are sufficient to warrant the submission of the question of the fact of death to the determination of the court or jury trying such issue.
There are cases, however, which hold that circumstances other than that of particular peril calculated to destroy life may be sufficient to justify the inference of death. Tisdale v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1868), 26 Iowa 170, 96 Am. Dec. 136; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore (1876), 34 Mich. 41; Supreme Tent, etc., v. Ethridge (1909), 43 Ind.App. 475, 87 N.E. 1049; Lancaster v. Washington Life Ins. Co. (1876), 62 Mo. 121; Fidelity Mut. Life Assn. v. Mettler (1901), 185 U.S. 308, 22 S.Ct. 662, 46 L.Ed. 922.
The case of Tisdale v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra, is a leading case on this point. The facts in that case are that the party on whose life the policy was issued was a married man about thirty years of age, of exemplary habits, excellent character, of fair business prospects, respectably connected, and of the most happy domestic relations. He had the fullest confidence of his friends and the entire affections of his wife, and was living in apparent happiness, with no apparent cause of discontent with his conditions which would have influenced him to break the domestic and social ties which bound him so pleasantly to his home. In the statement of the case it was said: It was held by the Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court, in that case that these facts were sufficient to warrant an inference of death. The court said in part:
We quite agree with the rule of law announced above, and the rule has been adopted by this court and applied...
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