Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. People's Trust Company

• Decision Date: 14 May 1912
• Docket Number: 21,987
• Citation: 98 N.E. 513,177 Ind. 578
• Parties: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. People's Trust Company, Administrator
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

98 N.E. 513

177 Ind. 578

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. People's Trust Company, Administrator

No. 21,987

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 14, 1912

From Delaware Circuit Court; J. G. Leffler, Judge.

Action by People's Trust Company as administrator of the estate of Jonathan M. Brinsen, deceased, against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals. (Transferred from Appellate Court under § 1405 Burns 1908, Acts 1901 p. 590.)

Reversed.

W. H H. Miller, C. C. Shirley, Samuel D. Miller and Ryan &amp Ryan, for appellant.

J Monroe Fitch and Thompson & Sprague, for appellee.

OPINION

Morris, C. J.

Suit by appellee against appellant, a New York corporation, on a life insurance policy. The complaint was in two paragraphs. A several demurrer to each paragraph, for insufficient facts, was overruled. Answer in four paragraphs, the first of which was a general denial. Appellee filed a several demurrer to each paragraph of answer. The demurrer was sustained to the fourth paragraph and overruled to the second and third. No ruling was made on the demurrer to the first paragraph.

There was a trial by jury, verdict and judgment for appellee for full amount of the policy. Appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled.

The errors assigned here, and not waived, consist of the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to each paragraph of the complaint, and overruling the motion for a new trial.

In the first paragraph of complaint it is alleged, among other things, that on December 19, 1905, appellant, in consideration of a certain premium, executed and delivered to appellee's decedent the life insurance policy sued on, which is filed with the complaint as an exhibit.

It is further alleged that decedent, Brinsen, died intestate in Delaware county on February 21, 1906, and on March 26, 1908, appellee was appointed as administrator of his estate; that at the time of Brinsen's death the policy was in full force; that during his lifetime he performed all the conditions of the policy required therein by him to be performed, and, since his death, appellant has performed all conditions required therein by it to be performed; that appellant had knowledge of Brinsen's death within ten days thereafter; that on March 26, 1908, appellee notified appellant of Brinsen's death, and demanded blanks for proofs of death, required by the terms and conditions of the policy; that appellant, before and at the time it furnished blanks, denied any liability under the policy, solely because, it declared, Brinsen committed suicide; that on April 29, 1908, before the commencement of this suit, appellee made out and delivered to appellant proofs of Brinsen's death, as required by the blanks furnished by appellant, and as required by the terms of the policy, and demanded payment of the amount of the policy, which was refused.

The second paragraph is the same as the first, together with the following added averments: Appellant did not make proof of Brinsen's death earlier, because Brinsen had no relatives living at Muncie, where he died; that none of his relatives were present, when his body was buried at Muncie; that at the time of his death Brinsen was a member of a Spanish War Veterans' camp, which took charge of his funeral and burial; that when he died the policy in suit was in the clothing on decedent's person, with other papers; that the Delaware county coroner held an inquest, and thereafter deposited in the treasurer's office a suit case, containing the clothing of decedent, in which was this policy; that previous to March 15, 1908, neither the county treasurer, nor any relatives of decedent, nor any member of the Veterans' camp, nor appellee, had any knowledge of the existence of the policy sued on, or the contents thereof; that pursuant to appellee's request, appellant, on April 6, 1908, delivered to appellee blank death proofs; that as soon thereafter as it was possible to learn the facts necessary to be inserted therein, namely, on April 29, 1908, appellee furnished appellant the required proofs of death, and appellant made no objection thereto because of lapse of time from decedent's death.

Among the terms and conditions of the policy are the following:

"First. If the insured within one year from the issue hereof die by his own hand or act, whether sane or insane, the company shall not be liable for a greater sum than the premiums which have been received on this policy. * * * Sixth. Proofs of death shall be made to the home office in the manner and to the extent, required by blanks furnished by the company; and shall contain answers to each question propounded to the claimant, physicians and other persons indicated in the blanks, and shall further contain the record and verdict of the coroner's inquest, if any be held. The proofs of death shall be evidence of the facts therein stated in behalf of, but not against the company."

The policy did not contain any provision relating to the time of furnishing proofs of death to the company.

The sole reason urged by appellant against the sufficiency of either paragraph of complaint is the alleged unreasonable delay in furnishing appellant the required proofs of Brinsen's death.

Appellant's first point is that in the absence of any provision in the policy relating to the time for presenting to the company the proofs of death, the law requires that such proofs must be made within a reasonable time. This proposition correctly states the law. London, etc., Accident Co. v. Siwy (1905), 35 Ind.App. 340, 66 N.E. 481; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald (1905), 165 Ind. 317, 75 N.E. 262, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 422, 112 Am. St. 232, 6 Ann. Cas. 551; Insurance Co. of North America v. Brim (1887), 111 Ind. 281, 12 N.E. 315; § 4803 Burns 1908, § 3770 R. S. 1881.

It is next insisted that two years and two months after death was not a reasonable time within which to present proofs of death, under the facts alleged.

In Insurance Co. of North America v. Brim, supra, it was said that what constitutes reasonable notice must depend on all the circumstances of the particular case; that the purpose of the notice is to enable the company to take proper precaution for its own protection. It was further said in the course of the opinion (p. 287), relative to the facts in that case: "It is sufficient to say, since it does not appear that the company made any objection to the claim on account of the insufficiency of the notice, or that any detriment resulted to it on account of the delay, the notice was, under all the circumstances, reasonably in time."

In Provident Life Ins., etc., Co. v. Baum (1867), 29 Ind. 236, it was held that ignorance of a provision of the policy on the part of plaintiff excused a delay in giving notice of the death of the insured, where the plaintiff did not have access to the policy.

In Peele v. Provident Fund Soc. (1897), 147 Ind. 543, 44 N.E. 661, 46 N.E. 990, it was held, in a suit on an accident policy, which provided that in the event of injury or death of the assured, notice thereof should be given within ten days from the date of the injury or death, that a notice within sixteen days after death was sufficient, where the notice was given within five days after the beneficiary learned that the death was accidental. In the course of its opinion the court said: "A distinction has been made between conditions preceding the loss or accident, and upon which the question of liability primarily rests, and conditions which relate to matters following such loss or accident. The former are more usually of the essence of the contract, and are, therefore, generally interpreted more strictly. * * * In the case of an insurance policy the one who takes out and pays for the policy may well be expected to know its conditions and to comply with them. But in the event of his death, the party suffering the loss is often at a disadvantage, both as to knowing the conditions and as to being able to comply with them according to the strict letter of their terms."

In Trippe v. Provident Fund Soc. (1893), 140 N.Y. 23, 35 N.E. 316, 37 Am. St. 529, 22 L. R. A. 432, the court said: "Such condition in a policy of insurance must be considered as inserted for some reasonable and practical purpose, and not with a view of...