Metropolitan Nat Bank v. Rogers

Citation47 F. 148
PartiesMETROPOLITAN NAT. BANK v. ROGERS et al.
Decision Date31 July 1891
CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania

C. C Dickey and James Bredin, for complainant.

William L. Chalfant, for defendants.

ACHESON J.

The purpose of this suit is to set aside as fraudulent as against creditors a deed of conveyance of real estate made by William Rogers and Thomas J. Burchfield to Mary Ann Rogers, (wife of William Rogers,) dated July 8, 1872, acknowledged by the grantors, respectively, on July 29 and August 2, 1872, and duly recorded May 10, 1873. This real estate consists of 10 acres of land situate in Armstrong county, Pa. The original plaintiffs in the suit were the assignees in bankruptcy of the grantors. The present plaintiff, the Metropolitan National Bank, acquired title pendente lite by deed from said assignees.

In looking into this record we are at once struck with the plaintiffs' sluggishness in prosecuting the suit, and their extraordinary delay in bringing the cause to a final hearing. A brief recital of the proceedings will make this plain. William Rogers and Thomas J. Burchfield, who had been copartners under the firm name of Rogers & Burchfield in the business of manufacturing sheet-iron and iron in other forms upon their petition filed November 1, 1875, were adjudged bankrupts, and in the course of a few weeks their assignees were chosen and qualified. Undoubtedly the assignees immediately after their appointment knew all the facts connected with the title of Mrs. Rogers to the real estate here in dispute, yet their bill in this case was not filed until December 14, 1877, only six days before the bar of the statute of limitations (section 5057, Rev. St.) would have protected her effectually. The answer of Mrs. Rogers and her husband to the bill, which was under oath, and traversed all the material allegations upon which the plaintiffs' right to relief rested, was filed May 28, 1878. The plaintiffs filed their replication December 24, 1878, and then procured the appointment of an examiner. Here the case long rested. Without having taken any testimony, the assignees in bankruptcy, on June 20, 1879, exposed this real estate to public sale, and sold their title to the Metropolitan National Bank for $1,200. A conveyance, however by the assignees to the bank was not made until May 31, 1881. The first active movement on the part of the plaintiffs in pushing the suit was made so late as July 14, 1883, when they proceeded to have the deposition of Thomas J. Burchfield taken. It was filed August 27, 1883. Not until January 7, 1886, did the Metropolitan National Bank take any step to intervene in the suit. On June 2, 1886, an order was made, allowing the bank to file a supplemental bill. On February 17, 1888, more than 10 years after the original bill was filed, the plaintiff bank formally closed its proofs in chief. The defendants commenced to take their proofs on May 7, 1888, and continued so doing from time to time. While thus engaged, the plaintiff bank on March 11, 1889, resumed the taking of testimony, calling before the examiner Thomas J. Burchfield, and re-examining him at length. His testimony thus taken, although upon the same matters, is more unfavorable to Mrs. Rogers than was his original deposition. So, too, the bank, at this stage of the case, recalled and re-examined their witness S. M. Jackson. The bank also here examined other witnesses. In some instances this evidence is styled 'rebuttal,' but in the main it was really evidence in chief. It is upon this testimony, thus introduced out of order, and taken nearly 12 years after the suit was brought, and more than 16 years after the transactions under investigation occurred, the bank now mainly relies to defeat Mrs. Rogers' title. No reason is assigned why the witnesses could not all have been examined at an early date after suit brought. The defendants resumed the taking of their proofs on March 25, and closed them on June 16, 1890. The testimony taken by the examiner was filed October 20, 1890, and the cause was brought on for final hearing in February, 1891. Now, it is true that it was in the power of Mrs. Rogers to speed the cause by enforcing the rules of the court. But she was in possession of the land, and repose on her part was natural. The assignees in bankruptcy in the first instance, and then their vendee, the bank, were the actors, and the duty of promptitude was upon them. Their needless and unreasonable delay may not, indeed, conclude the bank; but a court of equity may well incline to look with some disfavor upon a claim so haltingly pursued, and now depending so much on the uncertain recollection of witnesses as to remote events.

The bill of complaint, after setting forth the proceedings in bankruptcy, and reciting the conveyance on or about July 8 1872, of said real estate to Mrs. Rogers, alleges that the deed therefor was without consideration other than the recited nominal consideration of one dollar; that, subsequently to its date, a dwelling-house was erected and improvements made on the land at a cost of about $15,000; that this cost was paid out of the funds of Rogers & Burchfield, and on the books of the firm was charged to the individual account of William Rogers; that at the date of the deed, and at the time when the house was built and improvements made, the firm was extensively engaged in the manufacture and sale of iron; that this business was hazardous, and one in which the firm was necessarily obliged constantly to incur large debts and run great risks; that the firm 'was largely indebted at the date of said deed, and so continued until on or about the 1st day of November, A.D. 1875, when it became insolvent;' that shortly before the adjudication in bankruptcy, and at a time when the said firm and William Rogers individually were hopelessly involved, he, (Rogers,) by a quitclaim deed dated May 31, 1875, and recorded July 27, 1875, conveyed to his wife his interest in said real estate without consideration therefor; and the bill then avers 'that as your orators are advised, the said deeds are wholly void as to creditors, and in fraud of their rights; and by reason of said deeds your orators have been unable to sell said real estate at anything like its value, whereby the creditors of said bankrupts have been hindered and delayed in the collection of their just claims. ' This is the whole substance of the plaintiffs' case as set out in the bill. It is to be carefully noticed that the bill does not charge any actual fraud in the transactions complained of. The allegation (if it can be so called) just quoted, that 'the said deeds are wholly void as to the creditors, and in fraud of their rights,' is a mere legal conclusion, unwarranted by the facts stated; and even in making this suggestion of constructive fraud the assignees cautiously state that they are so 'advised.' There is no allegation in the bill that the deed of 1872 was made or the land improved with any intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors of the grantors, existing or future. Nor is it alleged that the firm of Rogers & Burchfield, or either of the individual members, was insolvent or embarrassed when the deed of 1872 was executed, or when the house was erected and the other improvements were made. All that the bill asserts is that at the date of that deed the firm was 'largely indebted,' and 'so continued' until about November 1, 1875, 'when it became insolvent.' But this is entirely consistent with solvency in July, 1872. Neither does the allegation of continued indebtedness from July, 1872, until the insolvency and bankruptcy in November, 1875, imply that any debt which existed at the time of the conveyance of the land remained unpaid on November 1, 1875, and certainly the bill does not expressly so charge. True, it is averred that, when the quitclaim deed of 1875 was executed, 'both said firm and William Rogers were hopelessly involved;' but it is quite clear that the quitclaim deed was a matter of no moment whatever. It was made merely to cure a supposed defect in Mrs. Rogers' title, arising from the fact that by the deed of 1872 Rogers conveyed directly to his wife, without the intervention of a trustee; but, undoubtedly, the earlier deed of the husband was effective, and passed to the wife a substantially good title. Thompson v. Allen, 103 Pa.St. 44; Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225. Therefore the title of Mrs. Rogers to the land in dispute is to be regarded as having vested in her at least as early as August 2, 1872, the date when the deed...

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2 cases
  • Bank of Orofino v. Wellman
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • October 23, 1914
    ...the law presumes that he intended it for her benefit." (Appeal of Connecticut Humane Society, 61 Conn. 465, 23 A. 826; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Rogers, 47 F. 148.) mere fact that a husband, by his labor, has improved the real estate of his wife, will not render it subject to his debts." (C......
  • Metropolitan Nat Bank v. Rogers
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • January 27, 1893
    ...is an appeal by the Metropolitan National Bank of Pittsburgh from a decree of the circuit court for the western district of Pennsylvania (47 F. 148) dismissing a bill filed by Miller, Jr., et al., assignees in bankruptcy of William Rogers and Thomas J. Burchfield, to set aside a conveyance ......

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