Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ham

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SPINDEN; LOWENSTEIN, P.J., and HANNA
• Citation: Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ham, 930 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. App. 1996)
• Decision Date: 25 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Parties: METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, v. Norman G. HAM; Serene Ham; and Donald Stockman, David K. Brisendine and Bob Gratz, County Commissioners for Cole County, Appellants. 52180.

Page 5

930 S.W.2d 5

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, v. Norman G. HAM; Serene Ham; and Donald Stockman, David K Brisendine and Bob Gratz, County Commissioners for Cole County, Appellants.

No. WD 52180.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

June 25, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Aug. 27, 1996.

Application to Transfer Denied

Oct. 22, 1996.

Ronald R. McMillin, Jefferson City, for Appellants.

Michael Berry, Jefferson City, for Respondent.

SPINDEN, Judge.

On May 11, 1992, 14-year-old Serene Ham helped set a fire which destroyed the Cole County Juvenile Center in Jefferson City. Cole County's commissioners, Donald Stockman, David K. Brisendine and Bob Gratz, made a claim for damages against Ham and her father, Norman G. Ham. The Hams notified their insurer, Metropolitan Property and Casualty, of the commissioners' claim.

Metropolitan denied coverage and filed this declaratory judgment action in circuit court. The Hams and three county commissioners filed a counterclaim. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court declared that Metropolitan was not liable for coverage in light of this court's holding in Easley v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 847 S.W.2d 811 (Mo.App.1992)(en banc), and entered judgment for Metropolitan. We affirm.

The appellants ¹ contend that the circuit court erroneously declared the law in ruling that the intentional and criminal act exclusions in Metropolitan's policy negated coverage. They claim coverage should not be denied because Serene Ham did not intend to destroy the building; she intended only to set a small fire to assist her escape from the detention center. The circuit court based its decision on the "intentional acts" and "criminal acts" exclusions in Metropolitan's policy. Those provisions excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property damage which is reasonably expected or intended by you or which is the result of your intentional and criminal acts." ² The policy also stated that the "exclusion is applicable even if you lack the mental capacity, for whatever reason, to govern your conduct."

We agree with the circuit court's concluding that Easley controls with respect to the "intentional acts" exclusion. In Easley, this court considered exclusionary language nearly identical to that contained in the policy in this case. The policy in Easley excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property damage ... which is expected or intended by any insured." The insured in Easley claimed that he was entitled to coverage under his mother's homeowner's policy for injuries he inflicted in hitting another boy during a fight. The insured claimed that he had intended only to blacken the other boy's eye or bloody his nose--that he had not intended the more severe injuries that resulted. Id. at 811-12. He contended that the insurer was required to establish that the insured intended the precise results which occurred. Id. at 813. In rejecting that contention, this court held that the insurer was not liable for the insured's conduct because the insured acted volitionally and with an intent to injure notwithstanding the insured's claim that he intended a less serious injury. Id. at 814. This court found that the willful and deliberate conduct of the insured was not covered because of the policy's exclusionary clause and because public policy "prohibits an insured from insuring against the consequence of his intentional acts." Id.

In this case, Serene Ham admitted that she intentionally participated in setting the fire and knew that her actions would damage detention center property. The appellants claim, nevertheless, that coverage should not be denied because ...