Metwally v. City of New York
| Decision Date | 16 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-08206 (GBD) (SDA) |
| Parties | Osama Metwally, Plaintiff, v. City of New York et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Currently before the Court is a motion by Defendant, the City of New York (“Defendant” or “City”) pursuant to Rules 12(c) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss this action. (8/31/22 Notice of Mot ECF No. 56.) For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that Defendant's motion be GRANTED and this case be dismissed.
On May 17, 2016, Plaintiff Osama Metwally (“Metwally” or “Plaintiff”), filed a lawsuit in Queens County Supreme Court, Index No. 705076/2017 (“Metwally I”), against the City and others alleging that his civil rights were violated in an incident that occurred on June 12, 2014. On September 3 2019, Metwally initiated the instant action by filing a Complaint alleging that the City and NYPD Police Officers Imran Zahoor (“Zahoor”) and Jonathan Massas (“Massas”) violated his constitutional civil rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments during an incident that occurred on September 4, 2016. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1-2, 7, 68-73.) As against the City, Metwally asserted in this action a municipal liability claim, pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (See id. ¶¶ 40-51.)
On January 9, 2020, the parties settled Metwally I for the sum of $18,000.00. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 3; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 3.) In connection therewith, Metwally executed settlement documents, including a General Release releasing all claims he may have against the “City of New York, and all past and present officers, directors, managers, administrators, employees, agents, assignees, lessees, and representatives of the City of New York” except for those claims listed by Metwally in the General Release. (Id.) In the form of release, Metwally did not list any actions or claims to be excluded from the General Release. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4.) Following receipt of the Metwally I settlement documents, the City remitted to Metwally the sum of $18,000.00 on or about April 29, 2020. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 5.)
On November 17, 2021, Metwally filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in this action that, like his initial Complaint, contained a Monell claim against the City. (FAC, ECF No. 40, ¶¶ 3344.) By letter dated November 26, 2021, Defendants stated their intention to file a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (11/26/21 Ltr., ECF No. 42.)
In December 2021, the City requested that Metwally voluntarily dismiss this action by reason of the General Release executed in connection with the Metwally I settlement, but Metwally refused. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 4-6; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6.) The basis for Metwally's refusal was his claim that he did exclude this action in the release form for the Metwally I settlement but that Rehan Nazrali, Esq. (“Attorney Nazrali”), the attorney who represented him in Metwally I, mistakenly submitted the wrong first page of the release form to the City that did not contain his intended list of excluded cases and that this action was intended to be excluded. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 7; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 7.)
By Order dated June 28, 2022, the claims against Zahoor and Massas were dismissed. (6/28/22 Order, ECF No. 52.) By Order dated July 13, 2022, the Court adopted the parties proposed briefing schedule regarding the City's anticipated dismissal motion. (7/13/22 Order, ECF No. 55.)
On August 31, 2022, the City moved for dismissal of this action on the grounds that Metwally has not stated a Monell claim against the City and that Metwally released his claims against the City based upon the General Release he executed in connection with the Metwally I settlement. (Def.'s Mem., ECF No. 59.) In opposition, Metwally contended that he pled a plausible Monell claim against the City and that the Metwally I release should not bar his claim against the City. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem., ECF No. 66.) Because, as set forth below, the Court finds that Metwally released his claims against the City, the Court need not and does not address the sufficiency of the Monell claim.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23 (1986). A dispute concerning material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In making its determination, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
“Settlement agreements and releases are construed according to the general principles of contract law.” Caines v. Oudkerk, No. 17-CV-00360 (PGG), 2018 WL 3059653, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2018) (citing, inter alia, Collins v. Harris-Bode, 303 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002)). A contract is unambiguous if it contains “a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [contract] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion.” Drew v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-10714 (ER), 2019 WL 3714932, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019) (citing Robert Littlejohn v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 18-CV-06336 (KPF), 2019 WL 3219454, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019)) (alteration in original). “The determination of whether the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, or, conversely, subject to more than one meaning and therefore ambiguous, is to be made by the trial judge from an examination of the four corners of the release.” Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Lloyd E. Rigler-Lawrence E. Deutsch Found., No. 04-CV-05332 (NRB), 2005 WL 2875327, at *4 n.34 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005) (quoting 29 Williston on Contracts, § 73.7 (4th ed. 2003)); see also GE Funding Capital Mkt. Servs. v. Neb. Inv. Fin. Auth., 767 Fed.Appx. 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) () (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brad H. v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 180, 186 (2011)).
“Under New York law,[2] a court must give full effect to unambiguous contract terms.” HOP Energy, L.L.C. v. Local 553 Pension Fund, 678 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002)). “Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary the terms of a facially unambiguous contract.” Id. (citing Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 572 (1986)). “With unambiguous contracts, a party's subjective intent and understanding of the terms is irrelevant.” Id. Thus, “[u]nder New York law, a release that is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced.” Cuffee v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-08916 (PGG) (DF), 2018 WL 1136923, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Tromp v. City of New York, 465 Fed.Appx. 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2012) () (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing cases).
“Moreover, ‘[t]he proper interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court, and a dispute on such an issue may be properly resolved by summary judgment.'” Caines, 2018 WL 3059653, at *3 (quoting Omni Quartz, Ltd. v. CVS Corp., 287 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Fischer & Mandell, LLP v. Citibank, N.A., 632 F.3d 793, 799 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if the terms of [a] contract are unambiguous”) (alteration in original).
“A defendant has the initial burden of establishing that a release bars the plaintiff's claims.” Muhammad v. Schriro, No. 13-CV-01962 (PKC), 2014 WL 4652564, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014) (citing Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276 (2011)). “The burden then shifts to the plaintiff ‘to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release.'” Id. (quoting Fleming v. Ponziani, 24 N.Y.2d 105, 111 (1969)).
Under New York law, reformation of a contract “may be appropriate where a writing does not set forth the actual agreement of the parties.” Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. CDL Hotels USA, Inc., 322 F.Supp.2d 482, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). There is, however, “a heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifests the true intention of the parties, and a correspondingly high order of evidence is required to overcome that presumption.” Id. at 496 (quoting Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 574 (1986)). A claim for reformation “must be grounded upon either mutual mistake or fraudulently induced unilateral mistake.” Greater N.Y....
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