Metwaly v. Barr
| Decision Date | 08 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-1289-MLB |
| Parties | Metwaly, Hassan Alsotohy and Mahmoud, Marem Medhat, Plaintiffs, v. William Barr, in his capacity as United States Attorney General, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiffs Hassan Alsotohy Metwaly and Maarem Medhat Mahmoud, citizens of Egypt, seek judicial review of a decision by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS") denying their Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status. They claim Defendants Former United States Attorney General William Barr, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of USCIS Kenneth Cuccinelli, Director of the Texas Service Center Gregory Richardson, and Director of the National Benefits Center Robert Cowan improperly denied their application.1 Defendants move to dismiss. (Dkt. 17.) The Court grants Defendants' motion.
Plaintiff Metwaly entered the United States on a visitor visa in June 2015. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.) His period of stay expired on December 19, 2015. (Id.) On November 19, 2015, he applied for asylum and withholding removal through Department of Homeland Security Form I-589. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff Metwaly received a receipt stating, "You may remain in the U.S. until your asylum application is decided." (Dkt. 1-3.) His asylum application remains pending. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 18.)
On December 5, 2018, Plaintiff Metwaly's employer filed Form-140, a petition to allow Plaintiff Metwaly to work in the United States on a permanent basis. (Id. ¶ 19.) Both Plaintiffs then filed their respective Form I-485 applications to adjust their status to permanent residents. (Id.) USCIS requested more information about Plaintiffs' maintenanceof lawful status, and Plaintiffs responded with copies of Plaintiff Metwaly's Form I-589 receipt. (Id. ¶ 20.)
On September 4, 2019, USCIS denied Plaintiffs' I-485 applications.2 (Id. ¶ 21.) In its decision, USCIS explained that the period during which Plaintiff Metwaly had "failed to maintain a lawful status or violated the terms and conditions of [his] admission [had] exceed[ed] the 180 days excusable under INA 245(k)." (Id.) Plaintiff Metwaly filed a Form I-290B Motion to Reconsider which USCIS also denied. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)
On March 24, 2020, Plaintiffs initiated this action challenging USCIS's denial of Plaintiffs' adjustment applications. (See Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations, and (maybe) the Due Process Clause of the Unites States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 25-50.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants' findings were arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with the law. (Id. ¶¶ 25-34.) Plaintiffs also allege it was "legally incorrect, manifestly unjust, an abuse of discretion and in violation of thelaw" for the decision denying Plaintiffs' application to simply refer to USCIS's discretionary authority rather than explaining the factors and describing how it weighed them. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.) Plaintiffs argue that, because the denial of Plaintiff Metwaly's Form I-485 was legally incorrect, manifestly unjust, arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the law, the denial of Plaintiff Mahmoud's Form I-485 was also legally incorrect, manifestly unjust, arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with the law. (Id. ¶¶ 43-45.) Plaintiffs finally allege that injunctive relief for irreparable harm is justified because negative action on Plaintiff Metwaly's Form I-589 at this time would constitute an illegal and manifestly unjust attempt to interfere with Plaintiffs' eligibility for adjustment of status after those applications were duly filed and in retaliation for filing this lawsuit. (Id. ¶¶ 46-50.) Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 17.)
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. "[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction,a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case." Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). It is presumed that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a case until the plaintiff shows the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
A defendant may attack subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) in two ways—a facial attack or a factual attack. See McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't. of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). "A 'facial attack' on the complaint 'require[s] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.' " Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (alterations in original). A factual attack, however, challenges the underlying facts supporting the Court's jurisdiction. Odyssey Marine Expl., Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2011). When evaluating a factual attack, "the district court is not obligated to take the allegations in the complaint as true." Id. Instead, the Court "may consider extrinsic evidence such as deposition testimony and affidavits." Id. (quotationomitted). And from this evidence, the Court may "independently weigh the facts and is not constrained to view them in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Id.
A court may dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). Even so, a complaint offering mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Put another way, a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This so-called "plausibilitystandard" is not a probability requirement. Id. Even if a plaintiff will probably not recover, a complaint may still survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and a court reviewing such a motion should bear in mind that it is testing the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the case. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; see also AFL-CIO v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) )).
Rule 12(b)(6) is an appropriate method for resolving a question of law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (). Here, the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis does not turn on applying alleged facts to legal standards. Rather, the analysis focuses on pure legal analysis under which Plaintiffs' complaint can or cannot state a cognizable claim for relief.
According to the APA, "final agency action[s] for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704. Federal jurisdiction is thus lacking under Rule 12(b)(1) when the administration's action is not final. See LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C., 776 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2015). This allows an administrative agency the opportunity to conduct its own internal review of a decision, apply its institutional expertise, and correct any errors. Judicial review is thus unavailable until "an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed by statute or agency rule." Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993).
The parties disagree as to whether Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies—Plaintiffs insisting they are out of options and Defendants insisting they can still push their adjustment argument in a subsequent removal proceeding. Defendants are correct that, if and when, USCIS begins removal proceedings, Plaintiffs may renew their application for adjustment of status. An immigration judge hearing a removal proceeding "has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate anyapplication for adjustment of status the alien may file." 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1).3 As such, the Eleventh Circuit has determined an alien in a removal proceeding does not have a final decision on an adjustment of status so as to allow judicial review. Ibarra v. Swacina, 628 F.3d 1269, 1270 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010).4
Plaintiffs, however, have not yet been placed in removal proceedings. And the Eleventh Circuit has not yet determined whether an alien in Plaintiffs' situation has exhausted all administrative remedies (and thus a district court has jurisdiction under the APA). Id.at 1270 n.2 (...
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