Metz v. E. Associated Coal, LLC, 16-0848

• Citation: 799 S.E.2d 707
• Decision Date: 06 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-0848,16-0848
• Parties: Henry METZ, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC, Defendant Below, Petitioner
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

799 S.E.2d 707

Henry METZ, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

v.EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC, Defendant Below, Petitioner

No. 16-0848

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: March 07, 2017

Filed: April 06, 2017

C. David Morrison, Esq., Michael J. Moore, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner

Ronald G. Kramer, Esq., McNeer, Highland, McMunn and Varner, L.C., Clarksburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent

Brian J. Moore, Esq, Katherine B. Capito, Esq., Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, Charleston, West Virginia and John M. Canfield, Esq., Vice President and Counsel, Amicus Curiae—West Virginia, Chamber of Commerce

Lonnie C. Simmons, Esq., DiTrapano, Barrett, DiPiero, McGinley & Simmons, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Amicus Curiae—West Virginia Employment Lawyers Association and West Virginia, Association for Justice

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

This case is before us on two certified questions from the Circuit Court of Monongalia County and presents related issues concerning when the statute of limitations begins to run with regard to an adverse employment decision in a failure to hire scenario. The circuit court asks us to determine whether the limitations period starts at the point when an individual first learns that he or she was an unsuccessful job applicant and, secondarily, whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the individual learns of the alleged discriminatory motive underlying the adverse employment decision. Upon our full consideration of these issues in conjunction with both statutory and case law, we answer the first certified question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.¹

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Henry Metz, the plaintiff below and respondent herein, was an active member of the United Mine Workers of America. As a union member, he was required to designate jobs for which he sought consideration when an opening arose. In July 2012, he bid on the position "mechanic trainee" at Federal No. 2 mine owned by Eastern Associated Coal ("EAC"), the defendant below and petitioner herein. While Mr. Metz learned of EAC's decision not to hire him on July 23, 2012, he did not learn until January 15, 2014, that the basis for the employment decision may have been his age.²

On March 19, 2014, Mr. Metz filed a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that EAC had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").³ After the requisite sixty-day period had passed for instituting an action to enforce the provisions of the ADEA,⁴ Mr. Metz instituted a civil action in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County,⁵ wherein he asserted that EAC had committed age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and the West Virginia Human Rights Act ("HRA").⁶ On December 21, 2015, EAC successfully removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. To defeat federal jurisdiction, Mr. Metz amended his complaint to remove the ADEA claim. Thereafter, the federal court remanded this employment discrimination case to state court.⁷

On March 7, 2016, EAC filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of the respondent's civil action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to institute the suit within two years of the alleged discriminatory act underlying Mr. Metz' amended complaint. During the hearing on EAC's motion to dismiss, EAC orally moved to certify the issue of whether the limitations period is tolled under the HRA until a plaintiff learns of the prospective employer's alleged discriminatory animus. As a result, the circuit court certified the following two questions to this Court by order dated May 23, 2016:

Question 1: For discriminatory hiring causes of action filed pursuant to the West Virginia Human Rights Act, codified at West Virginia Code § 5-11-1, et seq. , does the statute of limitations begin to run from the date that the plaintiff learns of the adverse employment decision?

Question 2: For discriminatory hiring causes of action filed pursuant to the West Virginia Human Rights Act, codified at West Virginia Code § 5-11-1, et seq. , does the discovery rule toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers the alleged discriminatory motive underlying the employment decision?

The circuit court answered each of the questions in the affirmative.

II. Standard of Review

Our review of issues certified to this Court from circuit courts is plenary. See Syl. Pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996) ("The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo ."). We proceed to consider the questions presented by the circuit court.

III. Discussion

Addressing the questions in turn, we initially consider whether the statute of limitations applicable to a HRA cause of action begins to run from the date a plaintiff learns of an adverse employment decision.⁸ Both sides agree that the applicable limitations period is the "catch-all" two-year period set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 (2016).⁹ See Sharp v. S. W.Va. Reg'l Health Council , 178 W.Va. 196, 199 n.4, 358 S.E.2d 455, 458 n.4 (1987) (recognizing that because HRA does not specify statute of limitations for civil actions brought in circuit court, limitations periods set forth in W.Va. Code §§ 55-2-12 and 55-7-8a control); accord McCourt v. Oneida Coal Co. , 188 W.Va. 647, 651, 425 S.E.2d 602, 606 (1992) ; see also Turley v. Union Carbide Corp. , 618 F.Supp. 1438, 1441 (S.D. W.Va. 1985) (applying two-year statute of limitations found in W.Va. Code § 55-2-12 to HRA action based on conclusion that Legislature "inten[ded] to place the parties back into the traditional judicial system" for limitation purposes).¹⁰

Almost thirty years ago and consistent with analogous federal law, we held in syllabus point two of Independent Fire Co. No. 1 v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission , 180 W.Va. 406, 376 S.E.2d 612 (1988) : "In cases alleging a discriminatory discharge from employment under W.Va. Code, 5-11-10, the time period for filing a complaint with the Human Rights Commission ordinarily begins to run on the date when the employer unequivocally notifies the employee of the termination decision." Finding no reason to treat HRA cases prosecuted in circuit court differently,¹¹ we extended this ruling in syllabus point one of McCourt :

In circuit court cases alleging a discriminatory discharge from employment, which a complainant might bring in the West Virginia Human Rights Commission under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code , 5-11-1 et seq. , the statute of limitations period for filing a complaint with the circuit court ordinarily begins to run on the date when the employer unequivocally notifies the employee of the termination decision.

188 W.Va. at 648, 425 S.E.2d at 603.

Through the first certified question, the circuit court essentially asks this Court to apply the holdings of Independent Fire and McCourt concerning the running of the statute of limitations to cases in which the alleged act of employment discrimination is the decision not to hire an individual rather than the employer's decision to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an existing employee.¹² It has long been the law that limitation periods affecting employment discrimination actions ordinarily commence when an actual or prospective employer's decision is made and communicated in some fashion to the affected individual. See Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico , 27 F.3d 746, 750 (1^st Cir. 1994) (citing Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks , 449 U.S. 250, 261-62, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) ); Hamilton v. 1^st Source Bank , 928 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1990).¹³ In the instance of failure-to-hire cases, the date on which the employer's hiring decision is made known is the reference point from which the limitations period is calculated. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (identifying refusal to hire as discrete act and finding same actionable on date of failure to hire). The employer's decision not to hire an individual is the alleged unlawful act for which the affected individual is seeking redress. Accordingly, it follows, and we so hold, that the statute of limitations for employment discrimination cases brought to enforce rights under the HRA, including allegations of discriminatory failure to hire, begins to run from the date a plaintiff first learns of the adverse employment decision.

Proceeding to the actual crux of the case, we consider whether the discovery rule should operate to toll the statute of limitations in cases brought to enforce the HRA until such time as the employer's alleged discriminatory motive is evident. Both the circuit court and the respondent favor application of the discovery rule to HRA cases. Conversely, EAC urges this Court to conclude, in consonance with the majority of courts throughout the country, that the discovery rule is inapplicable to employment discrimination cases, barring those rare instances where equitable estoppel or equitable tolling is warranted based on the facts or an employer's concealment efforts. See, e.g., Cruz v. Maypa , 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4^th Cir. 2014) (stating that equitable tolling applies "when 'the plaintiffs were prevented from asserting their claims by some kind of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant,' and ... when 'extraordinary circumstances beyond plaintiffs' control made it impossible to file the claims on time' ") (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson , 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4^th Cir. 2000) ); English v. Pabst Brewing Co. , 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4^th Cir. 1987) ("Equitable estoppel applies where, despite the plaintiff's knowledge of the facts, the defendant engages in intentional misconduct to cause the plaintiff to miss the filing deadline."); Seacrist v. Metro. Sec....