Metzger v. City of Leawood
| Decision Date | 20 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.00-2015-KHV.,CIV.A.00-2015-KHV. |
| Parties | Donna L. METZGER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LEAWOOD and Leawood City Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
David R. Smith, Brendan J. Donelon, Michael R. Fletcher, Sanders, Simpson, Fletcher & Smith, L.C., Kansas City, MO, for Donna Metzger.
Cheryl Bloethe Linder, Morrison & Hecker L.L.P., Kansas City, MO, Rebecca S. Yocum, Morrison & Hecker, L.L.P., Overland Park, KS, Patricia A. Bennett, Office of City Atty., Leawood, KS, for Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that her employer, the City of Leawood, Kansas, through its police department, discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Petition And Supporting Suggestions (Doc. # 64) filed July 21, 2000; defendants' Motion To Dismiss (Doc # 43) filed June 2, 2000; Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 87) filed September 22, 2000; plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of The Pretrial Order (Doc. # 99) filed November 8, 2000; defendants' informal motion to strike plaintiff's statement of uncontroverted facts in Defendant City Of Leawoods' Reply To Plaintiff's Response To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 125) filed February 15, 2001; and Plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply To Defendants' Reply To Plaintiff's Response To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 128) filed March 6, 2001. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, overrules defendants' motions to dismiss and to strike plaintiff's statement of facts, and sustains plaintiff's motions for reconsideration, to amend and to file a sur-reply.
The following facts are either undisputed or, where disputed, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Plaintiff worked as a civilian employee at the Leawood police department for nine years, from June 15, 1987 through September 8, 1996. The Leawood Police Department consists of civilian employees and sworn officers. Civilian employees such as plaintiff work in the administrative division and sworn officers work in the patrol division. Each division is supervised by a captain. Periodically, the captains rotate. The administrative division consists of three departments: dispatch, records and the court clerk's office. Plaintiff originally worked as a dispatcher. Less than 18 months after she started work, defendants promoted her. Consequently, for the last seven years, from March 1989 to August 1996, plaintiff supervised the other dispatchers and served as senior communications officer. Plaintiff received excellent evaluations in her yearly performance reviews. Upon her initial employment, plaintiff received a copy of defendants' sexual harassment policy.
Before March 1989, Ronald Anderson, captain of the administrative services division, made plaintiff's workplace environment uncomfortable because he was having an affair with Sue Keller, who then served as senior communications officer and supervised plaintiff's work as a dispatcher.1 Anderson supervised Keller and thus indirectly supervised plaintiff. During the affair, Anderson chastised plaintiff for disloyalty because she did not tell him that rumors about the affair were circulating throughout the department. He also issued plaintiff a letter of reprimand on the subject. Plaintiff complained about this admonishment to Stephen Cox, Chief of Police. Cox told plaintiff to not worry about the incident. Six months after the affair began, Keller left the police department. Plaintiff then filled Keller's position as senior communications officer and Anderson became her direct supervisor.
While Anderson supervised plaintiff, he made negative comments to her about taking sick leave to care for her child and not working overtime because she had child care difficulties. Anderson advised plaintiff that other employees might think plaintiff had a bad work ethic. Plaintiff does not know Anderson's policy on child care issues with regard to the other people he supervised or whether he treated her differently than other employees. Plaintiff told Anderson that she had a personality conflict with Rose Coleman, supervisor of court services. Anderson counseled plaintiff that the conflict was a "girl thing" and said that he did not like to supervise women. Anderson, along with Sidney Mitchell, Captain of Patrol, also reprimanded plaintiff for taking smoke breaks with Cox. Plaintiff made several verbal complaints to Cox about Anderson. In December 1994, plaintiff lodged a written complaint with Cox about Anderson's negative comments and generally hostile attitude toward women. Plaintiff began to document her complaints because she felt insecure in her job. The written complaint alleged that Anderson's comments and actions impaired plaintiff's employment and that he discriminated against her because she was a new mother. Plaintiff documented 23 episodes which illustrated Anderson's lack of support for her as a supervisor and stated that Anderson harassed her due to her child care responsibilities.2 Plaintiff's complaint did not contain the verbal complaints she had earlier made to Cox about Anderson.
Under defendants' policy, an employee can report possible harassment to an immediate supervisor, a department head or the human resources director. Following plaintiff's complaint, Cox rotated the captain positions so that Anderson oversaw patrol and ended his supervision of plaintiff. Cox told Anderson that he was making the switch because Anderson's goal was to retire as captain of patrol. Cox did not tell Anderson any other reason for the rotation, nor did he inform him of plaintiff's complaint, meet with him to discuss discrimination issues or reprimand him in any way. Moreover, in violation of city policy, Cox did not relay plaintiff's complaint to the human resources department for the city. Another employee, Shirley Whiles, told Anderson that plaintiff had instigated the transfer and planned to sue him for sex harassment. In any event, Mitchell became the new administrative services captain and supervised plaintiff. Cox told Mitchell about plaintiff's discrimination complaint. He asked Mitchell to not tell Anderson about it and to be alert for any impending problems that might occur if Anderson learned of the complaint.
After Anderson's transfer, plaintiff encountered department-wide rumors that she was having an affair with Cox. Plaintiff and Cox had a close professional relationship but not a sexually intimate one. Plaintiff viewed Cox as a mentor. In the fall of 1995 through May of 1996, however, Cox led plaintiff to believe that he wanted a sexual relationship. In early fall of 1995, while he was having personal problems, Cox told plaintiff "I don't know what's wrong with me, maybe I should have an affair."3 Plaintiff responded, "Well, maybe you should." Cox replied, "Would you like to volunteer?" Plaintiff laughed and told Cox, "You know, no, you're my Chief." Cox repeated this request twice: once during a smoke break while plaintiff was at work and again when plaintiff resigned on August 8, 1996. During the smoke break, Cox told plaintiff, "You know the offer still stands." Plaintiff responded, "What offer?" and Cox replied, "To have an affair." Plaintiff said, "No, I don't think so." Cox told her, "You know you hold my career in your hands right now." Plaintiff told him, "You don't need to worry about your job."4 Plaintiff continued to think of Cox as a friend and felt that she could control the situation as long as Cox did not demand sexual favors.
Plaintiff had gallbladder surgery in January of 1996 and Cox visited her in the hospital and kissed her on the lips. Also in January of 1996, Cox insisted on taking plaintiff to the grocery store in bad weather when her husband was out of town. After the trip, he kissed plaintiff good-bye and she told him "Don't do this, please." Exhibit B in Appendix To Plaintiff's Response To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 84-85. Plaintiff became uncomfortable because she felt that Cox wanted something in return for taking her to the store in bad weather. Cox also made plaintiff uncomfortable during this time period by holding her hand when he took plaintiff to lunch (and paid for their meals). After one of the lunch dates, Cox attempted to kiss plaintiff. In April or May of 1996, Cox and plaintiff met for a drink after work. Cox saw a portion of plaintiff's bra and remarked "God, I love your taste in bras." Exhibit B in Appendix To Plaintiff's Response To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 81:24. This comment was the first overtly sexual remark that Cox had made toward plaintiff. Immediately after Cox made the comment, plaintiff told Cox that his requests for an affair and his comment about her bra made her uncomfortable. Cox did not make any other sexual comments or overtures until three months later, on the date plaintiff resigned, August 8, 1996. Other than the second overture about an affair during a smoke break, it does not appear that any of the incidents between plaintiff and Cox took place at work. Mitchell and Anderson believed that there was something more to the relationship between Cox and plaintiff, and they chastised plaintiff for taking smoke breaks with Cox and appearing to be too friendly with him. Anderson also downgraded plaintiff on one of her yearly evaluations because of her relationship with Cox. Department-wide rumors spread about the relationship between plaintiff and Cox. Cox took no steps to stop the rumors about the two of them.5
Cox did not follow plaintiff's suggestion that city...
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