Metzinger v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs

• Decision Date: 14 December 2021
• Docket Number: 2020-1906
• Citation: 20 F.4th 778
• Parties: Rebecca METZINGER, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Veterans Health Administration, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

20 F.4th 778

Rebecca METZINGER, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant

v.DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Veterans Health Administration, Defendants-Appellees

2020-1906

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Decided: December 14, 2021

Marie O. Riccio, Law Offices of Marie Riccio, New Orleans, LA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

Douglas Glenn Edelschick, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by Reginald Thomas Blades, Jr., Jeffrey B. Clark, Robert Edward Kirschman, Jr.

Before Prost, Clevenger, and Stoll, Circuit Judges.

Prost, Circuit Judge

Appellant Rebecca Metzinger, M.D., appeals from an order of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana transferring her Equal Pay Act ("EPA") claim to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Metzinger brought an EPA action against her employer, the Department of Veterans Affairs, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. She alleged that the government violated the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), by paying her less than her male subordinates, and she sought over $10,000 in damages.¹

The government moved to dismiss Dr. Metzinger's EPA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over EPA claims against the government for over $10,000. In the alternative to dismissal, the government requested that the district court transfer Dr. Metzinger's EPA claim to the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Dr. Metzinger opposed dismissal but allowed that if the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, it should transfer the EPA claim to the Court of Federal Claims.

The district court agreed with the government that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Dr. Metzinger's EPA claim and that the Court of Federal Claims had such jurisdiction. J.A. 8, 10, 14. So, instead of dismissing the claim, the district court transferred it to the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which provides:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court ... and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action ... to any other such court ... in which the action ... could have been brought at the time it was filed ..., and the action ... shall proceed as if it had been filed in ... the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in ... the court from which it is transferred.

Dr. Metzinger appealed, both to this court and to the Fifth Circuit. After docketing this appeal, we issued an order staying the briefing schedule and directing the parties to inform us how they believed the appeal should proceed in light of the docketed Fifth Circuit appeal. See Order (June 30, 2020), ECF No. 2. Shortly thereafter, the government moved to dismiss Dr. Metzinger's Fifth Circuit appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit did so summarily. The parties then jointly informed us how they believed this appeal should proceed. Notably, in this joint filing, the government reversed course: it now "agree[d] with Dr. Metzinger that the [district court] possesse[d] jurisdiction to hear her case, and that it erred when it concluded that it did not." Joint Response at 2 (Aug. 26, 2020), ECF No. 20-1.

We have exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal from the district court's transfer order. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

A proper 28 U.S.C. § 1631 transfer requires both that the transferor court lack jurisdiction and that the transferee court have it. See Fisherman's Harvest, Inc. v. PBS & J , 490 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The district court transferred this EPA claim to the Court of Federal Claims under § 1631 because it concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim and that the Court of Federal Claims had it. If the district court's jurisdictional conclusions were correct, the parties do not suggest any abuse of discretion in its decision to transfer under § 1631 instead of dismissing. See Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States , 521 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reviewing for abuse of discretion trial court's decision whether to transfer under § 1631 or dismiss if it lacks jurisdiction). The propriety of this transfer therefore depends solely on the district court's conclusions of subject-matter jurisdiction, which we review de novo. E.g., Fisherman's Harvest , 490 F.3d at 1374.

There is no question that under our precedent the Court of Federal Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction over Dr. Metzinger's EPA claim. In Abbey v. United States , this court continued a long line of cases holding that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), gives the Court of Federal Claims subject-matter jurisdiction over a money-damages claim against the government brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"). 745 F.3d 1363, 1368–72 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Because the EPA is part of the FLSA—indeed, the same statutory provision that supplied the FLSA claim in Abbey , 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), supplies Dr. Metzinger's EPA claim here—Abbey dictates that the Court of Federal Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction over Dr. Metzinger's EPA claim. Although the government maintains that Abbey was incorrectly decided, Appellees' Br. 7, 10–13, that argument is misplaced; we are bound by prior panel decisions of this court unless and until overturned en banc. Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co. , 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

The question, then, is whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. If it did, this transfer was improper. The parties say it did.² They argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 gave the district court federal-question jurisdiction over the claim. And they insist that Abbey did not decide that a district court would have lacked jurisdiction over a claim such as this—only that the Court of Federal Claims has it. Appellant's Br. 28–29; Appellees' Br. 7. For the reasons below, we disagree with this cramped reading of Abbey and conclude that under Abbey 's reasoning district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over an FLSA or EPA claim such as Dr. Metzinger's—i.e., one against the government for over $10,000. But before addressing the argument, we briefly review the principal statutes and caselaw bearing on this issue, up to and including Abbey.

I

"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). The Tucker Act and its companion the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), provide such a waiver. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe , 537 U.S. 465, 472, 123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003) (Tucker Act); United States v. Bormes , 568 U.S. 6, 9–10, 133 S.Ct. 12, 184 L.Ed.2d 317 (2012) (Little Tucker Act). The Tucker Act (sometimes dubbed the "Big" Tucker Act) gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over nontort claims "against the United States" founded upon "any Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Little Tucker Act (as relevant here) gives that same jurisdiction to district courts, but only for claims not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). These statutory provisions "do not themselves create substantive rights"; they "are simply jurisdictional provisions that operate to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law."³ Bormes , 568 U.S. at 10, 133 S.Ct. 12 (cleaned up).

The EPA (as part of the FLSA) gives aggrieved employees a right of action for money damages against their employers:

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 ... of [the FLSA] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation,^{[4 ]} as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.... An action to recover the liability prescribed in the preceding sentence[ ] may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). Two observations are relevant here. First, the government is expressly identified as a suable (and thus potentially liable) employer. Id. ; see also id. § 203(d) ("Employer"), (x) ("Public agency"). Second, the forum designated for FLSA and EPA money-damages claims is "any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction." Id. § 216(b).

In Zumerling v. Devine , 769 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1985), we addressed the appropriate forum for FLSA money-damages claims against the government. There, a district court heard such claims brought by individual federal firefighters. It based its jurisdiction on the Little Tucker Act only after satisfying itself that the firefighters' respective claims did not exceed $10,000. See id. at 746, 748. On appeal, the firefighters argued that their claims did not need to be so limited in amount because the district court had jurisdiction independent of the Little Tucker Act. Id. at 749. We disagreed. After acknowledging that § 216(b) authorizes FLSA suits "in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction," we concluded that "the words ‘of competent jurisdiction’ tell us that the words do not stand alone but require one to look elsewhere to find out what court, if any, has jurisdiction. " Id. (emphasis added). We then relied on precedent from our predecessor court holding that the Court of Federal Claims "was thus designated where the suit was against the Federal Government."⁵ Id. Accordingly, because when looking "elsewhere" it was the Tucker Act that supplied the referenced jurisdiction over FLSA...