Meul v. People

• Decision Date: 25 October 1902
• Citation: 198 Ill. 258,64 N.E. 1106
• Parties: MEUL v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

198 Ill. 258

64 N.E. 1106

MEUL

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 25, 1902.

Error to criminal court, Cook county; A. M. Waterman, Judge.

August Meul was convicted of violating the game law, and brings error. Affirmed.

O'Donnell & Coghlan (William J. Naughton, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

H. J. Hamlin, Atty. Gen., C. S. Deneen, State's Atty., and F. L. Barnett, Asst. State's Atty., for the People.

BOGGS, J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, and convicted in the criminal court of Cook county of the charge of unlawfully having in his possession five living wild birds, not game birds, namely, five wild goldfinches or canaries, in violation of the provisions of section 3 of the act adopted by the general assembly April 24, 1899, entitled ‘An act to provide additional remedies for the protection of game, wild fowl and birds, and to amend, revise and consolidate the amended game law, approved June 1, 1889, and in force July 1, 1889, and the game warden act, approved June 27, 1885, in force July 1, 1885, and the act to prohibit persons from hunting within the enclosures of others without leave, as amended by act approved June 17, 1891, in force July 1, 1891.’ Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 924. From the judgment of said criminal court, inflicting a fine of $20 upon him, the plaintiff in error has prosecuted this appeal.

It is contended that the enactment under which the proceeding against the plaintiff in error was instituted and maintained is in violation of the provisions of the constitution of the United States and of the constitution of the state of Illinois, and therefore invalid. It is urged first that, under the proper construction of the title of the act, but one subject of legislation as to birds is expressed in the title, namely, game birds. The argument is that the objects and things to which the act is to refer, as expressed in the title, is game, and that the enumeration in the title of ‘wild fowl and birds,’ by the application of the maxim ejusdem generis, must be held to be so limited as to include only such fowl and birds as are properly classed as game fowl or game birds. The word ‘game’ means birds and beasts of a wild nature, obtained by fowling and hunting. Bouv. Law Dict., tit. ‘Game.’ Quail and other wild fowl or birds fit for food are included within the meaning of the word ‘game.’ People v. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325, 39 N. W. 1. It is to be presumed that the general assembly, in framing the title to the act, employed the word ‘game’ in its proper sense, and therefore as including all game birds, game fowl, and all game animals. That being true, it is clear that the words ‘wild fowl and birds' were added for the reason that the word ‘game’ did not include certain species of wild fowl and birds designed to be protected by the act. The intent which controlled in the addition of these words was that the title should disclose that birds and fowl which were not game birds or game fowl were objects of the enactment. This intent being unmistakable, the general and specific words employed in the title of the act do not take color from each other, for the reason that the purpose to be attained by the application of the maxim ejusdem generis is to enable the court to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent, and not for the purpose of defeating it. Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 687;Harlow v. Tufts, 4 Cush. 448;Willis, v. Mahon, 48 Minn. 140, 50 N. W. 1110,16 L. R. A. 281, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626;State v. Williams, 2 Strob. 474;Grissell v. Railroad Co., 54 Conn. 447, 9 Atl. 137,1 Am. St. Rep. 138;Com. v. Percavil, 4 Leigh, 686. The principle is illustrated in the decisions of the cases of Albert v. Order of Chosen Friends (C. C.) 34 Fed. 721, and Hilton's Appeal, 116 Pa. 351, 9 Atl. 342.

It is argued that if the maxim ejusdem generis is not applied in the construction of the title of the act, and the words ‘wild fowl and birds' are held to mean fowl and birds other than game fowl and game birds, then the enactment embraces two distinct subjects, namely, game birds and game fowl, and birds and fowl other than game birds and fowl. This argument, counsel for the plaintiff in error contend, leads to the conclusion that the act is void, for the reason that if it embraces two subjects it is in contravention of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution of 1870, which declares that no act shall embrace more than one subject. We think the statute in question has but one general object. The end designed to be attained by the act is the preservation of beasts, birds, and fowl ferae naturae. The provisions of the act relate to beasts that are taken for food, for their fur, or for the mere gratification of the sportsman, and to birds and fowl that are sought for food, for their plumage, or their powers of song. But all such provisions legitimately tend to effectuate the one general purpose of the enactment. All the provisions of the statute, so far as our attention has been called to them, were designed to promote one general purpose, which is to protect animals ferae naturae.

Section 8 and 10 of the act provide, in substance, that one-half of the fines imposed and collected under the act shall be paid to the informer. Section 13 of article 5 of the constitution of 1870 vests in the governor of the state power ‘to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses,’ etc. It is insisted by counsel for the plaintiff in error that, after the conviction of one who has violated the provisions of the act in question, the right of an informer to that portion of the fine given him by said section 8 and 10 becomes vested and fixed, and cannot be remitted or discharged by a pardon granted by the governor. The act is therefore said to be unconstitutional for the reason that, if given operation, it would deprive the governor of the power granted the executive by the constitution to pardon all offenders and remit all fines assessed against them. In this, counsel are in error. The power committed to the governor by the organic law to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction does not confer or include power to remit the interest of others in the fines and penalties which have become fixed and vested. Holliday v. People, 5 Gilman, 214; 17 Am. § Eng. Enc. Law, 325-327; 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 910.

It is next urged that the act denies to persons within the jurisdiction of the state the equal protection of the law, and is therefore in contravention of the provisions of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and for that reason should be adjudged to be void. This insistence of counsel grows out of the provisions of sections 20, 21, and 22 of the act. Section 20 authorizes any justice of the peace to issue a search warrant upon complaint that any person or corporation has in his, her, or its possession any game, wild fowl, or birds in violation of section 1, 2, or 3 of the act. Section 21 provides for the hearing of the...