Meyer, Kasindorf and Mancino, Architects v. Lafayette Bank & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 161021,161021
• Citation: 34 Conn.Supp. 84,377 A.2d 861
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: MEYER, KASINDORF AND MANCINO, ARCHITECTS v. LAFAYETTE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al.

Page 861

377 A.2d 861

34 Conn.Supp. 84

MEYER, KASINDORF AND MANCINO, ARCHITECTS v. LAFAYETTE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al.

No. 161021.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Fairfield County.

April 19, 1977.

Fleischmann & Sherbacow, Hartford, for plaintiffs.

Brownstein, DiPietro & Kantrowitz, New Haven, for defendant Thermal Acoustics, Inc.

Cohen & Wolf, Bridgeport, for named defendant.

Katz, Scoville & Kane, Glastonbury, for defendant Robert Dry Wall Company, Inc.

Lepofsky, Lepofsky & Lang, Norwalk, for defendant Thomas Reardon, Inc.

Daniel Meister, Norwalk, for defendants Modulaire Components, Inc., and Sutton Brothers, Inc.

Solomon & Brown, Meriden, for defendant George Ellis Company of New Haven, Inc.

MULVEY, Judge.

The defendant Lafayette Bank and Trust Company has filed a motion to erase this action for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien on the grounds (1) that the plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens within one year of the filing of the lien as required by § 49-39 ¹ of the General Statutes, and (2) that an arbitration agreement between the parties precludes any action to foreclose the lien.

A motion to erase will be granted only when it clearly appears on the face of the record that the court is without jurisdiction. Tuccio v. Zehrung,164 Conn. 231, 232, 319 A.2d 406. When "facts are relied upon which do not appear in the record, a plea in abatement shall be used rather than a motion to erase." Practice Book § 93.

This defendant, by affidavit, invokes facts not appearing on the record and a plea in abatement is the proper motion under the circumstances. The parties have agreed, however, that the court may decide the issues, and, of course, the question of lack of jurisdiction, once raised, must be disposed of by the court regardless of the form in which it is presented. Kohn Display & Woodworking Co. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish Corporation, 166 Conn. 446, 448, 352 A.2d 301.

The defendant's argument is essentially that because the plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens within one year of the filing of their mechanic's lien, the lien is invalid as to all parties regardless of whether the party asserting the defect has been prejudiced by the failure to file.

At common law, the equitable doctrine of lis pendens became operative when a suit affecting real property was commenced. "One who purchased property affected by litigation, pendente lite, without any notice, implied or in fact, was nonetheless bound by the judgment or decree in the suit. Every man was presumed to be attentive to what passed in the courts of his state. Norton v. Birge, 35 Conn. 250, 258-59." Ravitch v. Stollman Poultry Farms, Inc., 162 Conn. 26, 33, 291 A.2d 213, 217. To avoid the harshness of this rule, statutes were enacted requiring the filing of notice of lis pendens in order to protect third-party transferees by affording them constructive notice of the pending suit. Ravitch v. Stollman Poultry Farms, Inc., supra; see General Statutes § 52-325. Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has yet to decide the significance of the lis pendens requirement of § 49-39, the decisions in other jurisdictions reflect the view that a failure to file a notice of lis pendens is neither jurisdictional nor fatal to the foreclosure action.

The purpose of the lis pendens in the context of a mechanic's lien is the same as it is in any other situation in which real property is the subject of litigation; namely, it is intended to give constructive notice to persons seeking to purchase or encumber property after the recording of a lien or the commencement of a foreclosure suit. 53 Am.Jur.2d, Mechanics' Liens, § 345. In view of the primary purpose of the lis pendens requirement and the remedial nature of the mechanic's lien statute; see City Lumber Co. v. Borsuk, 131 Conn. 640, 645, 41 A.2d 775; the courts which have addressed this issue have found that "the filing of notice of lis pendens is not a condition precedent to a right of action. Neither does it go to the jurisdiction of the court." Julius v. Callahan, 63 Minn. 154, 65 N.W. 267; see Patten-Blinn Lumber Co. v. Francis, 166 Cal.App.2d 196, 200, 333 P.2d 255. "(T)he purpose of a notice of lis pendens under the mechanic's lien law is to perform its usual office, to give constructive notice, nothing more." Patten-Blinn Lumber Co. v. Francis, supra, 203, 333 P.2d 259. Thus if a person has actual notice of the lien and a suit commenced thereon, that actual notice may take the place of constructive notice imparted by the filing of a lis pendens. Packard Bell Electronics Corporation v. Theseus, Inc., 244 Cal.App.2d 355, 53 Cal.Rptr. 300; see Whitehead & Kales Co. v. Taan, 233 Mich. 597, 208 N.W. 148. "To hold otherwise would exalt...