Meyer v. Barnes
| Decision Date | 04 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 2419,2419 |
| Citation | 479 A.2d 1236,2 Conn.App. 485 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Joseph MEYER v. John T. BARNES. |
Brian M. Gildea, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Michael P. Foley, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).
Steven J. Errante, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before DANNEHY, C.P.J., and DUPONT and BORDEN, JJ.
This appeal 1 was taken by the defendant from the judgment rendered on the jury's verdict in a negligence action arising out of a collision between the parties' motor vehicles. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations of negligence and interposed two special defenses to the plaintiff's complaint. One of the special defenses was that the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and the other alleged that the accident was unavoidable.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and his motion to set aside the verdict. He claims that the evidence introduced was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that the defendant was negligent.
In reviewing a jury verdict on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, " 'the evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable.' " Kalleher v. Orr, 183 Conn. 125, 126-27, 438 A.2d 843 (1981); Rapuano v. Oder, 181 Conn. 515, 517, 436 A.2d 21 (1980); Sauro v. Arena Co., 171 Conn. 168, 169, 368 A.2d 58 (1976).
From the evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably found the following facts: On January 25, 1978, at approximately 6:15 a.m., the plaintiff, owner and operator of a 1976 Dodge Aspen, was traveling in a westerly direction on Interstate 95 in the town of Branford and in the vicinity of exit 53. The defendant, owner and operator of a tractor trailer, was also traveling in a westerly direction in the same place and at the same time. The roads in the center of Branford at approximately 5:45 a.m. were icy, and Interstate 95 was icy at the time of the accident. The plaintiff while entering onto the interstate determined that he had to travel at a slow speed; he saw accidents ahead and cars pulled off onto the right shoulder. The plaintiff, after traveling less than a quarter of a mile in two or three minutes, turned on his flashers and pulled off to the right shoulder of the highway. As the plaintiff was coming to a stop or had stopped, the defendant's vehicle collided with his vehicle. The impact, which was of great force, was to the left rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. The impact drove the plaintiff into the dashboard of his car. The left rear and the right front of the plaintiff's vehicle were damaged. The damage to the right front was from the impact of the collision, which caused the right front of the plaintiff's vehicle to strike a guardrail. The defendant's tractor trailer had jackknifed and the tractor was pointing in an easterly direction after the accident. The plaintiff then approached the defendant and said "You hit me." The defendant replied, "I got to get my load to New York."
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendant was negligent in one or more of five ways. One of the allegations concerned the defendant's failure to keep his vehicle under proper control and another concerned the defendant's operating his vehicle at too high a rate of speed, having due regard for the traffic, weather, width and use of the highway.
"The test with reference to speed is that rate of movement which is reasonable under all the circumstances and is that speed at which a reasonably prudent person would operate under similar or like conditions." Madow v. Muzio, 176 Conn. 374, 379, 407 A.2d 997 (1978). Solely circumstantial evidence, without expert testimony, can prove unreasonable speed. Id.; Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 318, 240 A.2d 881 (1968). The jury can, given appropriate circumstances, infer from the physical damage to a vehicle that a party was traveling at an unreasonable speed. Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, supra. Those circumstances are presented here. 2
The jury could also consider the defendant's response to the plaintiff's statement to the defendant which was made immediately after the accident. Although capable of more...
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...of insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Meyer v. Barnes, 2 Conn.App. 485, 486, 479 A.2d 1236 (1984). We must reiterate the fact that a court should be especially hesitant to set aside a jury's award of damages. " 'The t......
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...due care was being exercised at the time of the accident. Notarino v. Powers, 6 Conn.App. 300, 505 A.2d 17 (1986); Meyer v. Barnes, 2 Conn.App. 485, 488, 479 A.2d 1236 (1984). " 'When the circumstances point as strongly to the absence as to the existence of due care, or point in neither dir......
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Ketchian v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., No. CV02 0395856 S (CT 1/20/2006)
...and thus, was not exercising due care." McGloin v. Southington, 15 Conn.App. 668, 676, 546 A.2d 906 (1988). Meyers v. Barnes, 2 Conn.App. 485, 488, 479 A.2d 1236 (1984); see also Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 318, 240 A.2d 881 (1968). "The amount or type of physical damage that......