Meyer v. Burritt

• Decision Date: 04 March 1891
• Citation: 60 Conn. 117,22 A. 501
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MEYER et al. v. BURRITT et al.

22 A. 501

60 Conn. 117

MEYER et al.

v. BURRITT et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 4, 1891.

Appeal from district court of Waterbury; Cowkll, Judge.

Action by Louis Meyer and others against Angelo C. Burritt and others to enforcea tax-lien. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

C. F. Thayer and W. A. Hriscoe, for appellant.

E. F. Cole, for appellee.

TORRANCE, J. This is an action brought to foreclose certain tax-liens claimed to exist in favor of the town of Waterbury, the city of Waterbury, and the Center school-district of Waterbury. It was first brought in the name of Meyer alone, who is the tax collector for the three communities, who are now joined as plaintiffs. Subsequently, after a demurrer had been filed by the Chelsea Savings Bank,—one of the defendants,—the court below, on motion of the collector, and against the objection of the bank, admitted the three above-named communities as parties plaintiff. In one of the reasons of appeal by the bank this action of the court is assigned for error. In the case of Hart v. Tiernan, recently decided by this court, (59 Conn. 521, 21 Atl. Rep. 1007,) it was held that the tax collector of these three communities, after he had settled his rate-bill with the communities, and had paid over to them the tax, under the provisions of the private act concerning the collection of taxes within the town of Waterbury, passed in 1881,¹ and found in the Private Acts of that year, might bring a suit in his own name to foreclose tax-liens existing in favor of the communities for taxes which the collector had so paid. The reasons for so holding are given in the report of that case. We think there is nothing in that decision to warrant the inference that such collector can bring such a suit before he has so settled and paid over the tax to the communities, nor do we think that in such a case any such right exists. The record in the case at bar shows that the present action was brought before the collector had settled his rate-bill or paid the tax to the communities. Under these circumstances, the collector could not bring such suit in his own name. Under the practice act, however, it was, we think, within the discretion of the trial court to admit the communities as parties plaintiff, and its action in so doing in the case at bar was permissible.

It appears from the record that, long before the time when the three communities were admitted as plaintiffs, the taxes here in question, with the exception of a small balance due to the city, which was in dispute, had been paid to them by the collector. After the communities were admitted as plaintiffs, the bank contended that they had no cause of action against the bank, on the ground that the taxes had theretofore been paid to them in full. The court overruled this claim, and this, we think, was right. So far as all of the defendants in a proceeding of this nature were concerned, the taxes were and still are unpaid. As against them, the lien still exists, and may be foreclosed by the communities in their own name for the benefit of the collector, who has, after suit brought, been compelled by law to pay the tax. The reasoning of this court in the case of Hart v. Tiornan, above referred to, plainly justifies this conclusion.

On the trial below, the bank further contended that, under the provisions of section 3897 of the General Statutes, the premises sought to be foreclosed were not subject to any lien for any of the taxes laid by either of the plaintiff communities, and described in the complaint, upon the ground that special provision had been made by statute for the assessment and collection of taxes within the town of Waterbury. This contention is based upon the existence of the private act of 1881, hereinbefore referred to. By a reference to that act, however, it will be seen that it makes no provision for any of the matters provided for in the sections of the General Statutes referred to in section 3897. It does not prescribe how a demand or levy shall be made by the collector, nor how he shall proceed to collect a tax. It does not provide in any manner for the existence or continuance of a lien for taxes. It does not provide for the foreclosure of such liens, nor for the sale of an equity of redemption, nor for the mode of selling land for taxes, nor for the form of the collector's deed in such case. All these matters, and others not embraced within the provisions of the private act aforesaid, are provided for only in the General Statutes. The private act provides only Tor matters with regard to the collector and the collection of taxes in Waterbury that are in a certain sense special and peculiar to that town. The private act itself refers to the general law on this subject for a description of the powers of such collector in these words: "Said collector shall have and possess all the rights and powers to enforce the collection thereof as are or may be provided by law for collectors of taxes. "In that act no special provision is made for any of the important matters relating to the collection of taxes which are provided for in the sections of the General Statutes, which are referred to in section 3897. To hold that because of the existence of this private act these three communities and their officials possess none of the important powers conferred upon other communities by those sections, would be doing that which we think the legislature never intended, namely, excluding these communities from the benefit of certain provisions, important, and almost necessary, for the due collection of taxes. The language employed by the legislature in section 3897 aforesaid does not, we think, warrant us, under the circumstances, in coming to any such conclusion. In passing upon the claim of the bank on the point in question the court below did not err.

But the bank on the trial below further asked the court to hold that, if the premises sought to be foreclosed were subject to any lien for taxes, they were subject, so far as the bank was concerned, to such a lien only for the taxes laid upon the assessed value of those premises. This claim the court overruled, and this action of the court is one of the errors assigned in the reasons of appeal. The premises sought to be foreclosed consisted of a lot of land, with buildings thereon, situated in the city of...