Meyer v. Davenport Elevator Co.

• Decision Date: 02 September 1899
• Citation: 12 S.D. 172,80 N.W. 189
• Parties: MEYER et al. v. DAVENPORT ELEVATOR CO.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

12 S.D. 172

80 N.W. 189

MEYER et al.

v.DAVENPORT ELEVATOR CO.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Sept. 2, 1899.

Appeal from circuit court, Brookings county; J. O. Andrews, Judge.

Action by Theodore Meyer and another against the Davenport Elevator Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs and an order overruling a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.Alexander & Hooker, for appellant. Cheever & Hall, for respondents.

FULLER, J.

This appeal is from a judgment and an order overruling a motion for a new trial entered in an action for the value of some wheat covered, it is claimed, by a chattel mortgage and converted by the defendant. The facts and circumstances, either admitted, or appearing from competent testimony properly submitted to the jury, and sufficient to sustain a verdict, by which they stand proved, are these: On the 7th day of March, 1895, to secure his promissory note of even date, George Schnellar executed to respondents a chattel mortgage, which was duly filed, covering all crops to be grown and harvested during the years 1895 and 1896 on his land therein described. On the 11th day of February, 1896, by an instrument absolute on its face, he leased the same premises, for one year from the 1st day of December preceding, to O. T. Grattan to secure the payment of an existing indebtedness, and this lease was not filed for record until the 12th day of March, 1897. The grain in controversy, which was part of the crop sown, grown, and harvested during the year 1896 on the land described in the instruments upon which the parties rely, respectively, was delivered to appellant at its elevator in the month of September of that year; whereupon its buyer and manager, having both actual and constructive notice of the existence of respondents' mortgage, refused to surrender to them the grain or its proceeds, and latterly paid the full market value thereof to Grattan, upon the assurance “that he would see him out, or something to that effect.” Although advised that Grattan claimed an interest in the property, there is in the record no intimation that appellant had any knowledge of the unrecorded lease or the debt to secure the payment of which it was executed and delivered.

Our conclusion that the testimony, though conflicting, is sufficient to justify the finding of the jury that the parties to the lease thereby intended to secure the payment of a debt, is reached after carefully considering all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record, and we deem it unnecessary to present the evidence in this opinion. In actions at law it is allowable only to...