Meyer v. Haselwood

• Decision Date: 27 March 1886
• Citation: 116 Ill. 319,6 N.E. 480
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. MEYERv.HASELWOOD, County Clerk, etc.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

116 Ill. 319

6 N.E. 480

PEOPLE ex rel. MEYER

v.HASELWOOD, County Clerk, etc.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 27, 1886.

Petition for mandamus.

This is an original proceeding in this court on the relation of Henry C. Meyer, who claims to be town collector for the town of Quincy, for a mandamus against Willis Haselwood, county clerk of Adams county, commanding him to deliver to the relator the tax-books for that town for the year A. D. 1885. Sufficient allegations are in the petition to entitle the relator to the mandamus prayed for if, under the statute in force and applicable, the office of town collector exists independently of the office of city treasurer of the city of Quincy. The respondent sets up an ordinance of the city of Quincy whereby the duties of town collector of that town are devolved upon the city treasurer; that Charles F. Schwindeler, city treasurer, who has formally qualified for that purpose, has demanded the tax-books; and that respondent, being unable to decide between the parties, has refused to deliver the tax-books to either. The parties stipulate as follows:

‘It is hereby conceded and agreed by the parties in interest in this case that if the office of town collector of the town of Quincy, in Adams county, Illinois, was not, by force and effect of the act of the general assembly of the state of Illinois entitled ‘An act to authorize county boards, in counties under township organization, to organize certain territory situated therein as a town,’ approved May 29, and in force July 1, 1877, and the act of 1883 amendatory of fifth section of said first-named act, and the ordinances of the city of Quincy in respondent Haselwood's answer set forth, united to the office of city treasurer of said city of Quincy, in said county, in the person of said city treasurer, then the relator, C. Henry Meyer, is the lawfully elected and qualified town collector of said town, and that upon his petition in this cause, and the answer of respondent, Haselwood, thereto, and the demurrer of the petitioner to said answer, said relator is entitled to the writ of mandamus prayed for in his said petition. If, however, on the other hand, the said office of town collector was, by force and effect of the acts and ordinances aforesaid, united to the office of city treasurer of said city of Quincy, in the person of said city treasurer, then said relator is not such collector, and is not entitled to any relief in this cause. And it is further conceded and agreed that the town of Quincy was fully organized as a town by, under, and in pursuance of the general township organization law, approved and in force March 4, 1874; and that the bond of relator, C. Henry Meyer, was approved by the supervisor and town clerk of said town, as alleged in the petition, and before said supervisor and town clerk approved the bond of said Charles F. Schwindeler, as alleged in the answer of respondent. And the pleadings in this cause may be treated as properly alleging the facts herein conceded and agreed to.'

SCOTT, J., dissents.Carter & Govert, for relator.William McFadon and George Anderson, for defendant.SCHOLFIELD, J.

The section of the general township organization law in force March 4, 1874, under which the town of Quincy was organized, is the twentieth, and reads thus:

‘When, in any county under township organization, there is any territory co-extensive with the limits of a city situated therein, and which is not included within any organized town, such territory shall constitute a town by the name of such city, and all the provisions of this act shall apply to the town so constituted, the same as if it had been organized in the manner provided in this act in the case of the organization of new towns.’

Thereafter, on the twenty-third of May, A. D. 1877, an act was approved, entitled, ‘An act to authorize county boards under township organization to organize certain territory situated therein as a town.’ The first and second sections are as follows:

‘Section 1. That the county board in any county under township organization may provide that the territory embraced within any city in such county shall be organized as a town: provided, such territory shall have a population of not less than three thousand, and provided the city council in such city shall, by resolution, request such action by the county board.

‘Sec. 2. The territory of any city now organized, within the limits of any county under township organization, and not situated within any town, shall be deemed to be a town.’

The third section requires that all town officers shall be elected at the annual charter election of such city. The fourth section provides that the powers vested in the town shall be exercised by the city council. The fifth section was amended by an act approved June 18, 1883, so as to read as follows:

‘The city council in such city and town may, by ordinance, provide that the offices of city and town clerk shall be united in the same person; that the offices of treasurer and town collector shall be united in the same person; that the election of highway commissioners shall be discontinued; and that the offices of supervisor and poor-master shall be separated, and the poor-master be appointed by the city council.’

Plainly, as we think, this is not the creation of a new and independent system of township organization, but an adaptation of the general system previously in force, with modifications deemed essential to the different relations and circumstances, to territory under city organization; and this act is therefore in pari materia with the statute embracing the general law in relation to township organization, and the whole must be read and construed together as constituting one entire system, and as if enacted in a single act. Nance v. Howard, Breese, (Beecher's Ed.) 245; Young v. Stearns, 91 Ill. 221. It was not ruled in People v. Brayton, 94 Ill. 341, that this act did not in any respect amend or change the law previously existing in relation to township organization, but simply that it did not repeal or amend the law requiring that the question of uniting several towns into one shall be submitted to a vote of the people. On the contrary, it was expressly said that section 1 was intended to supply a supposed omission in the statute, and authorize the county board, where a township organized under the township organization law contained within its limits a city with a population of not less than 3,000 inhabitants, to establish a township out of the territory embraced within the city. The effect of the other sections did not fall within the line of investigation and discussion, and no opinion of any kind was expressed in regard to either of them.

The second section is, in our opinion, in substance and effect, but a re-enactment of the section of the general law by virtue of which the city was in the first instance incorporated. The territory of the city of Quincy is not, as counsel contend, within the town of Quincy. Its limits are simply co-extensive with the limits of the territory of that town, and therefore neither is within the other. Not only is this construction required by the literal meaning of the word ‘within’ in this connection, but it is essential to give section 2 a distinct, effective meaning; for it cannot be reasonably pretended, and in the argument here it is not, that, in counties organized into townships under the general law, there can be any territory outside of the limits of an organized township, whether in a city or elsewhere; and section 1 applying to all instances where a township contains within its limits a city with a population of not less than 3,000 inhabitants, and authorizing the county board to establish a township out of the territory embraced within the city,-that is, in effect dividing the township. The only instance in which the words employed can have their full meaning is where the limits of the city and the township are co-extensive.

Of course, if section 2 is but a repetition of section 20 of the general law, it was unnecessary for the mere purpose of bringing into existence that class of townships; but there was obviously the same consideration urging that the different provisions of the other sections of the act should apply to townships created as such because their limits were co-extensive with the limits of the city, as urged that they should apply to other townships whose limits did not extend beyond the limits of the city; and it was one way of making this application, and liable to no constitutional objection of which we are aware, to repeat the enactment organizing townships whose limits are co-extensive with the limits of the city, and then in subsequent sections embody...