Meyer v. Industrial Com'n of Mo.

• Decision Date: 18 October 1949
• Citation: 223 S.W.2d 835,240 Mo.App. 1022
• Parties: Phillip Meyer et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Industrial Commission of Missouri et al., (Defendants), Fulton Iron Works Co., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

223 S.W.2d 835

240 Mo.App. 1022

Phillip Meyer et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Industrial Commission of Missouri et al., (Defendants), Fulton Iron Works Co., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis District

October 18, 1949

Respondents' Motion for a Rehearing or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Cause to Supreme Court of Missouri Overruled November 18, 1949.Respondents' Application to Transfer from St. Louis Court of Appeals Denied by the Supreme Court on January 9, 1950.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis; Hon. James E. McLaughlin, Judge.

Reversed.

Thompson Mitchell, Thompson & Young, John O. Hichew and James P. Brown for appellants.

The Court erred in reversing the findings of fact and decision of the Industrial Commission and remanding the case for further proceedings, for the following reasons: (1) Voluntary refusal to cross a picket line to report for work constitutes participation in the labor dispute and disqualifies for unemployment benefits.Section 9431 II(a), R. S. Mo. 1939, as amended, Laws of Mo. 1943, page 937;In re Persons Employed at St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company,7 Wash.2d 580, 110 P. 877;Bodinson Manufacturing Co. v. California Employment Commission,17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935;Matson Terminals v. California Employment Commission,24 Cal.2d 695, 151 P.2d 202;Aitken v. Board of Review(N. J., 1948), 56 A.2d 587;Brown et al. v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board(Md.),55 A.2d 696;Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc., et al. v. Davis(Md.),57 A.2d 820.(2) Voluntary refusal to cross a picket line when work is available constitutes participation in the labor dispute for the entire duration of the strike even though the work available would not last the duration of the strike.Brown et al. v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board(Md., 1947), 55 A.2d 696;Matson Terminals v. California Employment Commission,24 Cal.2d 695, 151 P.2d 202.(3) The findings of fact and decision of the Commission that plaintiffs voluntarily refused to cross the picket line is supported by competent and substantial evidence.Bodinson Manufacturing Co. v. California Employment Commission,17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935;Goetz v. J. D. Carson Co.(Mo. Sup.),206 S.W. 2d 530;Ashwell v. United States Seed Co. et al.(Mo. App., 1943), 167 S.W. 2d 950;Scott v. Wheelock Brothers, Inc., et al.(Mo. Sup.),209 S.W. 2d 149;N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co.(3rd Cir.),105 F.2d 167;Ex parte Bell, 19 Cal.2d 448, 122 P.2d 22;United States of America v. International Union of Mine Workers of America (D. C. D. C.),77 F.Supp. 563.(4) As a matter of law plaintiffs' refusal to cross the picket line was not involuntary.Bodinson Manufacturing Co. v. California Employment Commission,17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935;Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc., et al. v. Davis(Md., 1948), 57 A.2d 820.

Bartley & Bartley and Malcolm L. Bartley for respondents.

The Court did not err in reversing the findings of fact and the decision of the Industrial Commission and remanding the case to the Commission, for the following reasons: (1) The findings and decision of the Industrial Commission of Missouri, in this case, must be supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record.The duty of the reviewing court is to decide whether the Industrial Commission could reasonably have made its findings and reached its decision upon a considertion of all the evidence before it; if such findings and decision are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, they must be set aside and reversed by the reviewing court.Constitution of Missouri, 1945, Article V, Section 22;Goetz v. J. D. Carson Co.(Mo. Sup.),206 S.W. 2d 530;Henderson v. Laclede Christy Clay Products Co.,206 S.W. 2d 673.(2) While it is within the province of the Industrial Commission, as triers of the facts, to reject or disregard any and all of the oral testimony as being incredible, even though there was no evidence to the contrary, this rule does not authorize the Commission arbitrarily to disregard and ignore the competent, substantial and undisputed testimony of witnesses who have not been impeached, or to base its findings and decision upon conjecture or upon its own opinion unsupported by sufficient competent evidence.Palm v. Southwest Missouri Wholesale Liquor Co.(1943, Mo. App.), 176 S.W. 2d 528;Stepaneck v. Mark Twain Hotel(Mo. App.),104 S.W. 2d 761;Allison v. Eyermann Const. Co.(Mo. App.),43 S.W. 2d 1063.(3) Even when the facts are in dispute, the findings of the Industrial Commission, to be conclusive, must be supported by substantial competent evidence, and it is a question of law, calling for a decision of the reviewing court, whether such finding is so supported.Palm v. Southwest Missouri Wholesale Liquor Co., supra.(4) But where, as in this case, the facts are undisputed or concerning which there is no substantial dispute, the finding and decision of the Industrial Commission is a matter of law, and the conclusions of the Commission are not binding upon the reviewing court.Palm v. Southwest Missouri Wholesale Liquor Co., supra;Taucher v. Quality Dairy Co. et al.,96 S.W. 2d 659;Hassel v. C. J. Reineke Lumber Co.,54 S.W. 2d 759;Yancey v. Egyptian Tie and Timber Co.(Mo. App.),95 S.W. 2d 1230;Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co.(Mo. Sup.),328 Mo. 112, 40 S.W. 2d 601;A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,152 S.W. 2d 184, 348 Mo. 147.(5) While "voluntary" participation in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work disqualifies a worker from unemployment compensation benefits in Missouri, "involutary" participation therein does not; failure of the plaintiffs to cross the picket line of the molders and to report for work, if due to reasonable fear of bodily harm or violence, is not voluntary participation in the labor dispute within the meaning of the Missouri statute and does not disqualify from unemployment compensation benefits.Section 9431 II (a)(1), R. S. Mo., 1939, as amended, Laws of Mo. 1943, page 937;Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Commission,17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935;Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc., et al., v. Davis(Md.1948), 57 A.2d 820;Case v. St. Louis Public Service Co.(Mo. App.),192 S.W. 2d 595, 238 Mo.App. 1029.(6) The findings of fact and decision of the Industrial Commission that plaintiffs had no actual reason to fear violence or bodily harm from the hands of the pickets and that plaintiffs voluntarily refused to cross the picket line is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record, is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and, in view of the undisputed nature of the evidence in this case, is a question of law and not binding on this Court.As a matter of fact and of law, plaintiffs involuntarily failed to cross the picket line because they were intimidated and coerced into not doing so by the actions and conduct of the pickets.This being so, plaintiffs cannot be said to have participated in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work and are entitled to unemployment benefits.Kayser v. Fitzgerald,178 N.Y.S. 130, 109 Misc. 27;Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 41 P.2d 314, 2 Cal.2d 312;Pezold v. Amalgamated etc. Workmen,54 Cal.App. 120;Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle(Mo. Sup.),114 S.W. 997, 215 Mo. 421; 48 Corpus Juris Secundum 119;Southern California Iron and Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, etc.,1 Cal.App. 696, 92 P. 1079;Bayonne Textile Corporation v. American Federation of Silk Workers,168 A. 799, 114 N.J.Eq. 307;Michael v. Hillman,183 N.Y.S. 195, 112 Misc. 395;In Re Bell,19 Cal.2d 488, 122 P.2d 22;National Labor Relations Board v. Perfect Circle Co.(CCA 7),162 F.2d 566;Section 9422, R. S. Mo., 1939, as amended, Laws of Mo. 1947, Vol. II, p. 390.(7)Plaintiffs, as a matter of fact and of law, do not belong to the same "class or grade" of workers (molders) as those who were on strike, and therefore are entitled to unemployment benefits within the meaning of Section 9431 II (a)(2), R. S. Mo., 1939, as amended, Laws of Mo. 1943, page 937.Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission,139 P.2d 208;Wicklund v. Commissioner of Unemployment Compensation, etc.(Wash.),138 P.2d 876;Johnson v. Pratt,200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E.2d 865;LocalNo. 658, Boot and Shoe Workers Union et al. v. Brown Shoe Co.(Ill.Sup. 1948)(reported in Commerce Clearing House, Inc., "Unemployment Insurance Reporter", page 16,566).

John L. Porter for Amicus Curiae, Division of Employment Security.

The Division adopts in its entirely the Points and Authorities set out in Appellant's brief and desires to add the following authorities to those cited by Appellant under Point (3): Constitution of Missouri 1945, Article V, Section 22;Subsection 9431 II, R. S. Mo. 1939, as amendedLaws 1943, p. 937;Williams v. International Shoe Company(St. L. Ct. ofApp., 1948), 213 S.W. 2d 657;Moore v. International Shoe Company(St. L. Ct. ofApp., 1948), 213 S.W. 2d 215;A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission(Mo. Sup.1941), 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W. 2d 184;Section 9422, R. S. Mo. 1939, amendedLaws 1947, Vol. II, p. 390.

OPINION

Wolfe, C.

This action was brought in the Circuit Court for judicial review of a final decision of the Industrial Commission of Missouri.The Commission had denied unemployment compensation, but upon review of the record the Circuit Court set aside the finding and decision and remanded the cause with directions to find in favor of the plaintiffs.It is from this judgment that the defendants appeal.

It is the contention of the defendants and the finding of the Industrial...