Meyer v. N.Y. Office of Mental Health

Decision Date28 March 2016
Docket Number12-CV-6202 (PKC)
Citation174 F.Supp.3d 673
Parties Jill Meyer, M.D., Plaintiff, v. State of New York Office of Mental Health ; Creedmoor Psychiatric Center; and Caterina Grandi, M.D., Chief of Psychiatry/Chair, Department of Psychiatry, Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Alan E. Wolin, Wolin & Wolin, Esqs., Jericho, NY, for Plaintiff.

Sania Waheed Khan, NYS Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). Plaintiff Jill Meyer (Plaintiff), a former employee of Defendants State of New York Office of Mental Health (OMH) and Creedmoor Psychiatric Center (CPC), applied to, but was not hired for, certain positions advertised by Defendants OMH and CPC and was interviewed therefor by Defendant Caterina Grandi (Grandi) (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiff sued Defendants, under a failure to hire theory, for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) arising out of alleged gender, religion, and age discrimination. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Title VII claims, which must be dismissed, with prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims, which are likewise dismissed, without prejudice.

BACKGROUND
I. Relevant Factual History

Plaintiff is a Jewish woman, approximately 63 years old, who received a medical degree from Ross University in 1981. (Def. 56.11 ¶¶ 1, 3 (61 years old at time of 2014 deposition); Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 3, 146.)2 Defendant OMH operates psychiatric hospitals and licenses various out-patient mental health services, including Defendant CPC, across New York State. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was employed at Defendant CPC from December 2004 to June 2005. (Id . ¶ 8.) Defendant Grandi, the Chief of Psychiatry at CPC for the past 20 years, interviewed Plaintiff for the job at CPC and, in fact, recommended that Plaintiff be hired for that job. (Id . ¶¶ 9, 35, 36; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 128.) As part of the hiring process, Defendants conducted a background check on Plaintiff, including a validation of her professional experience, and found nothing negative concerning Plaintiff. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 130, 131.)

a. CPC

Plaintiff's role at CPC was that of a Psychiatrist I at CPC's Astoria Clinic. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 34.) The qualifications for a Psychiatrist I include a completed residency and possession of a license to practice, but not Board Certification, which is a requirement for a Psychiatrist II position. (Id . ¶¶ 24–25.)3 A woman named Dr. Eunice D'Souza was Plaintiff's direct supervisor during Plaintiff's time at CPC. (Id . ¶¶ 35, 38.) Plaintiff had a “good” relationship with D'Souza and had “positive interactions” with her. (Id . ¶ 39.)

While at CPC, Plaintiff was also supervised by Joseph Bachner, Chief of Service of CPC's Astoria Clinic. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 40.) Plaintiff's interactions with Bachner led her to conclude that he “wasn't respectful,” though she was not sure whether that was because she was a “woman or [an] M.D.” (Meyer Tr.4 at 39:11–19.)5

Plaintiff did not typically interact with Grandi, other than in Grand Rounds, which are group lectures for medical professionals held once a week at CPC. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 44.) However, Plaintiff described her interactions with Grandi as “positive.” (Meyer Tr. at 37:8–14.) Grandi never made any comments to Plaintiff about her gender during Plaintiff's employment with CPC. (Id . at 54:4–6.)

Plaintiff's coworkers at CPC were “aware that [she] was Jewish” and that she “took [days] off for the Jewish holidays, [the] High Holy Days,” but Plaintiff “never discussed it” with them. (Id . at 45:5–14.) Plaintiff did not know of any other Jewish employees with whom she worked at CPC. (Id . at 46:14–19.)6 Grandi was raised a Roman Catholic. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 149.) In December 2004, when Plaintiff first began working at CPC, she attended CPC's Christmas party, at which both Grandi and D'Souza commented that it was “known that [Plaintiff] do [es]n't celebrate Christmas.” (Meyer Tr. at 200:5–201:4; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 147.)7 Grandi disputes making any statements to Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff's religion. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 52.) In addition, [d]uring the latter part of [Plaintiff's] employment at [CPC], around Passover in the spring [of 2005],” D'Souza “acknowledged that [Plaintiff] was Jewish.” (Meyer Tr. at 180:2–15; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 144.)8 Plaintiff did not “have any exact statements that were made” regarding her religion while she worked at CPC “beyond stating or mentioning the holidays that [Plaintiff] took off”; she just recalled “reference[s] to her Judaism. (Meyer Tr. at 181:8–182:5.)

At CPC, newly hired psychiatrists are subject to a one-year probationary period, during which they are to receive a performance evaluation every three months, culminating in one report at the end of the year to determine whether they have passed probation. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 32, 33; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 151–53.) Consistent with this practice, after starting in December 2004, Plaintiff received an initial evaluation in February 2005, signed by Plaintiff on February 7, 2005 and by Grandi on February 9, 2005. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 45; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 155; Meyer Tr. Ex. D.) In that evaluation, out of three possible scores of “good,” “average,” or “unsatisfactory,” Plaintiff was evaluated as “good” in “relationships with people,” “attendance and punctuality,” and “cooperation and training,” and as “average” in both “quantity” and “quality of work,” her “work habits and interests,” and “resourcefulness and leadership qualities.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 158; Meyer Tr. Ex. D.) The “overall impression” of Plaintiff was “average,” and it was recommended that her probationary period be continued. (Id .)

Throughout Plaintiff's employment at CPC, Grandi had verbal conversations with D'Souza regarding Plaintiff's performance, with D'Souza characterizing Plaintiff as being overwhelmed, disorganized, and not able to deal with the patients she had to see. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 46, 47.)9 In addition, after Plaintiff's February 2005 evaluation, D'Souza informed Grandi of an incident where Plaintiff prescribed medication for a patient but wrote down the wrong name on the prescription. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 48; Grandi Decl.10 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff denies that this incident occurred. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 48.) Plaintiff also disputes Defendants' characterization of her work, arguing that she was not disorganized and was not overwhelmed, among other things. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 46, 132.)11 Other than D'Souza, Grandi did not speak to anyone else regarding Plaintiff's job performance at CPC, including Bachner. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 165; Grandi Tr. at 62:4–11.) Moreover, Grandi had no knowledge of any complaints about Plaintiff other than what she heard from D'Souza. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 166; Grandi Tr. 62:24–63:5.) Plaintiff received no written document concerning her job performance, nor was she counseled, during her time at CPC, other than her February 2005 evaluation. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 154, 160, 161.)

In May 2005, Plaintiff was due for a second evaluation under CPC's guidelines for the probationary year. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 156; Grandi Tr. at 48:19–49:4.) She did not receive one, however, before she resigned on May 13, 2005. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 54; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 156, 157; Grandi Tr. 49:5–22.) Defendants allege that Plaintiff resigned because D'Souza informed her that she was going to fail probation. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 53, 54; Grandi Tr. at 63:10–14; Grandi Decl. ¶ 19.) There is nothing in writing indicating that Plaintiff was placed on notice that she was failing probation. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 163.) Plaintiff denies that she was so informed and alleges that she resigned because, after she had initially been approved to provide weekend coverage (“moonlighting”), Grandi abruptly withdrew that approval hours before Plaintiff was to being her first moonlighting shift. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 49, 50, 53; Meyer Tr. at 38:3–13.)12 Plaintiff was not informed of the decision by Grandi herself. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 50, 51; Meyer Tr. at 50:16–51:15.) Plaintiff alleges that this was what caused her to feel “at all discriminated against while working at [CPC].” (Meyer Tr. at 37:20–39:10; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 162.) According to Plaintiff, she “left because [she] was very disappointed in the not having the moonlighting [sic], the extra service, and [she] decided to leave in good standing.” (Meyer Tr. at 51:21–52:2.)

After Plaintiff's resignation, Grandi alleges that Plaintiff was not considered rehirable, [b]ecause [Grandi] felt [Plaintiff] was not competent in providing psychiatric coverage in an outpatient setting,” based upon Grandi's conversations with D'Souza. (Grandi Tr. at 64:3–13; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 168.) This determination was not put in writing. (Grandi Tr. at 64:14–17; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 167.)

b. Jacoby Medical Center (“Jacoby”)13

After Plaintiff resigned from CPC in May 2005, she worked at Jacoby, where she was employed as a staff psychiatrist for approximately six weeks. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 80; Meyer Tr. at 54:18–55:4, 55:17–19.) She left because she “didn't like it at all” and “missed [ ] public psychiatry.” (Meyer Tr. at 55:20–24.)

c. Bronx Psychiatric Center (“BPC”)

In July 2005, Plaintiff went from Jacoby to BPC,14 controlled and operated by OMH like CPC, and run by Dr. Leroy Carmichael, the Executive Director. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 55, 58; Meyer Tr. at 57:9–15.) In connection with Plaintiff's application to BPC, Grandi completed a reference inquiry to verify Plaintiff's past affiliation with CPC. (Wolin Decl. Ex. 4; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 169.) In that form, Grandi checked “No” as to whether there had been any clinical privileges, employment, or association denied, limited, or terminated for alleged misconduct or malpractice. (Id .)15 Grandi could not explain why Plaintiff was...

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