Meyer v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2016
• Citation: Meyer v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 137 A.D.3d 880, 27 N.Y.S.3d 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
• Parties: Jill S. MEYER, etc., appellant, v. NORTH SHORE–LONG ISLAND JEWISH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al., defendants, Parker Jewish Institute, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

137 A.D.3d 880

27 N.Y.S.3d 188

Jill S. MEYER, etc., appellant,

v.NORTH SHORE–LONG ISLAND JEWISH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al., defendants,Parker Jewish Institute, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 9, 2016.

Wolin & Wolin, Jericho, N.Y. (Alan E. Wolin of counsel), for appellant.

Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jeffrey G. Schneider and Nathaniel S. Boyer of counsel), for respondents.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, ROBERT J. MILLER, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for tortious interference with a contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.), entered May 27, 2014, which granted the motion of the defendants Parker Jewish Institute and Cornelius Foley pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

For the reasons stated in our decision and order on a related appeal (see Meyer v. North Shore–Long Is. Jewish Health System, Inc., ––– A.D.3d ––––, 27 N.Y.S.3d 77 [Appellate Division Docket No. 2014–03829; decided herewith] ), the Supreme Court should not have directed the dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Parker Jewish Institute and Cornelius Foley on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

However, in the interest of judicial economy, we deem it appropriate to grant dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) insofar as asserted against these defendants, an alternative ground for dismissal of the complaint argued by these defendants before the Supreme Court and briefed by the parties before this Court.

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ; Sokol v. Leader, 74 A.D.3d 1180, 1181, 904 N.Y.S.2d 153 ). A court may consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) (see cplr 3211[c] ; sokol v. leader, 74 a.d.3d at 1181, 904 n.y.s.2d 153 ). When evidentiary material is considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment, the criterion is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether he or she has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate (see Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17 ).

Here, the evidentiary material submitted by the defendants Parker Jewish Institute and Cornelius Foley established that, in the absence of a...