Meyer v. Norman

Decision Date24 August 1989
Docket NumberNo. D-87-2,D-87-2
Citation780 P.2d 283
PartiesJoseph B. MEYER, Attorney General, State of Wyoming, Petitioner, v. William D. NORMAN, Respondent.
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

William D. Norman, pro se.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

ORDER OF DISBARMENT FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW

CARDINE, Chief Justice.

The Grievance Committee of the Wyoming State Bar has presented to this Court its Report, Findings and Recommendation which incorporates Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, a copy of which is attached to this order as Appendix A and hereby incorporated herein by reference. It reflects action upon an Amended Complaint for Formal Disciplinary Proceedings in the Matter of William D. Norman, Docket Nos. 68-82, 18-84, 50-85, 17-86, 23-86, 59-86, 88-86, and 89-86, filed by the Office of the Attorney General before the Grievance Committee on December 30, 1986. The Grievance Committee of the Wyoming State Bar submitted its recommendation of disbarment and the assessment of costs against the Respondent in the amount of $4,149.55 as the appropriate sanction. The Respondent-Attorney (Respondent) filed his Allegation of Errors and Brief in Answer representing his exceptions to the Report, Findings and Recommendation of the Grievance Committee pursuant to Rule VI(i)(2) of the Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar, together with transcripts of the hearing held before the Grievance Committee. Both parties have filed briefs in the matter and oral argument has been presented. The Court, having considered the file and record of the Court, the proceedings before the Grievance Committee of the Wyoming State Bar, the responsive pleading of the Respondent, and the briefs and arguments of the parties, finds and rules:

The Respondent's primary contention in opposition to the Recommendation of Disbarment submitted by the Grievance Committee is that the Grievance Committee is without jurisdiction because it had no rules that granted the executive secretary the power to accept formal complaints and to issue process and that it had not adopted evidentiary rules as required by Rule IV(d)(13) of the Disciplinary Code. Other contentions of the Respondent are his claims that he has been severely and unfairly disadvantaged through unnecessary delay in the proceedings and that the findings of fact incorporated in the Report of the Grievance Committee are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. His ultimate contention is that, due to the combination of these errors, both disbarment and assessment of costs are improper in this instance. In his Allegation of Errors and Brief in Answer, the Respondent presents these issues:

"The Bar Grievance Committee is without jurisdiction because it never established rules granting the executive secretary the power to accept formal complaints for filing and to issue process.

"There has been unnecessary delay in the proceedings to a point which has severely disadvantaged the respondent. The Grievance Committee has been guilty of laches and this should be considered in the Respondent's favor."

In his Addendum to Allegations of Error, the Respondent presents these additional issues:

"The Bar Grievance Committee did not adopt any rules of evidence as required by Rule IV(d)(13) of the Bar Disciplinary Code. As a consequence the Committee was without jurisdiction to hear the matter.

"The Bar Grievance Committee has unconstitutionally attempted to assess costs against the Respondent."

Our examination of the contentions of the Respondent causes us to conclude that they manifest a degree of misunderstanding about the Grievance Committee and its appropriate role in disciplinary proceedings. It well may be that this style of misunderstanding is not peculiar to the Respondent, and the members of the Wyoming State Bar will benefit from a clarification of certain aspects of the role and function of the Grievance Committee. The explanation charts the resolution of several of the Respondent's claims.

The Supreme Court of this state is charged with the responsibility for adopting rules and regulations concerning the practice of law in Wyoming. Section 5-2-118(a), W.S.1977 (Dec. 1977 Repl.). Cf. White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102 (Wyo.1984) (Supreme Court vested with superintending control over all the courts of the state and the state judicial system in general with a duty to protect the integrity of these entities). Inherent to this responsibility is the requirement that the court establish ethical standards as well as effective practices and procedures for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys in the event those standards are violated. Section 5-2-118(a)(i), (iii), W.S.1977 (Dec. 1977 Repl.); § 33-5-113, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.). In meeting this responsibility, the Supreme Court has adopted Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law and the Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar.

The Supreme Court, in addition and also pursuant to statute, is to establish and maintain a bar association for the purpose of enforcing such rules and regulations. Section 5-2-118(a)(ii), W.S.1977 (Dec. 1977 Repl.). All persons practicing law in this state are required to be members in good standing of the Wyoming State Bar. Rule 2, Amended Rules Providing for the Organization and Government of the Bar Association of the Attorneys at Law of the State of Wyoming; Wyoming State Bar v. Hardy, 61 Wyo. 172, 156 P.2d 309 (1945). The practice of law by any person who is not a member in good standing of the Wyoming State Bar constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, is wrongful, and is subject to sanction. Section 33-5-117, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.); Hardy. The prohibition is inclusive and clearly encompasses the attorney who once was a member in good standing but who has been disbarred for disciplinary reasons, or who, for any reason, has withdrawn from the bar or allowed his membership to lapse. Section 33-5-116, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl). Admission to the bar shall be granted only through petition to this court. Section 33-5-104, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.).

The product of this statutory scheme is to vest in the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming the power, the duty, and the corresponding jurisdiction to supervise the conduct of all Wyoming attorneys, each of whom is an officer of the court. The most serious sanction then for an infraction of the Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar is a proceeding that culminates in disbarment. Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460 (Wyo.1977). As the court said in State Board of Law Examiners of Wyoming v. Brown, 53 Wyo. 42, 48, 77 P.2d 626, 628 (1938), disciplinary proceedings and disbarment are "necessarily incident to the inherent power of courts to control properly their own affairs." Disbarment serves as an effective sanction, as well as an effective device for protecting the public, because the invocation of this remedy forecloses an attorney from the practice of law within this state. Section 5-2-118(a)(ii); § 33-5-117, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.).

In furtherance of its supervisory role, the court has provided for the establishment of a grievance committee, the primary function of which is to investigate allegations of misconduct by members of the bar and to make recommendations to the court in the event that serious transgressions are indicated. Rule IV, Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar. The committee is an ancillary body structured by the court and has no independent power, jurisdiction, or authority other than that specifically delegated to it in accordance with the Disciplinary Code. Its actual function, as the formal structure connotes, can best be described as that of an adviser to this court. See State Board of Law Examiners of Wyoming v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285 (1945). See also Brown. Ultimately, it is this court, not the grievance committee, that maintains control over disciplinary proceedings at all times. Matter of Clark, 613 P.2d 1218 (Wyo.1980); Mendicino. See Spriggs. To accomplish its appropriate role effectively, however, it is essential that the committee be vested with certain powers that enable it to carry out its investigatory and hearing functions. To that end, the court has adopted rules that delegate jurisdiction over allegedly aberrant attorneys to the grievance committee that is consistent with that afforded to the court. Rule I, Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar.

The functions that are delegated to, and exercised by, the committee in a disciplinary proceeding, however, are performed as an adjunct of this court. Rule I, Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar; Mendicino. Cf. Velkov v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 40 Cal.2d 289, 253 P.2d 25 (Cal.1953) (non-resident witness appearing in disciplinary proceedings entitled to immunity from service of process even though such proceedings technically are not conducted before a judicial tribunal). The role of the committee is advisory only, and the ultimate and actual authority to discipline resides in this court. Clark. Any question as to the intrinsic jurisdiction of the grievance committee is moot because it is, in essence, an arm of this court, and its jurisdiction is the same as the jurisdiction of the court. Rule I, Disciplinary Code of the Wyoming State Bar. We summarize by noting that, since disciplinary jurisdiction over a member of the Wyoming State Bar emanates directly from this court and not from the grievance committee, any jurisdictional issues that are concerned only with the grievance committee are not relevant despite claims, such as those of this Respondent, of its failure to establish rules granting the executive secretary the power to accept formal complaints for filing and to issue process and, for that reason, those contentions...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • January 10, 2006
    ...in an impermissible way.14 Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 2004 WY 61, ¶ 53, 90 P.3d 724, 739 (Wyo.2004); and Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo.1989). [¶ 48] The appellants' contention on appeal is that the district court erred in its analysis of their constitutional challenge. Tha......
  • Martin v. State, 88-155
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • October 11, 1989
    ...more from the medical profession, Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo.1989), than we demand from the attorneys we supervise, Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283 (Wyo.1989).7 See n. 22, infra.8 Within the status of this case where "facts" and "evidence" are de minimis, it is possible to find one fac......
  • Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Manlove
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • April 4, 2023
    ...an officer of the court.’ " Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Hinckley , 2022 WY 18, ¶ 2, 503 P.3d 584, 592–93 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Meyer v. Norman , 780 P.2d 283, 288 (Wyo. 1989) ). Wyoming Statutes charge this Court with establishing the "practice and procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbar......
  • In re Guardianship of Meo
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • July 20, 2006
    ...opportunity to be heard, the district court's establishment of the temporary guardianship lacked "fundamental fairness." Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo.1989). These procedural defects cast a shadow over the permanent guardianship as well. Mother presents additional arguments concer......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT