Meyer v. Runyon, Civ. A. No. 93-12181-RCL.
| Decision Date | 23 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 93-12181-RCL. |
| Citation | 869 F. Supp. 70 |
| Parties | Elinor MEYER, Plaintiff, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General of the United States, William P. Concannon, and Ronald E. Henderson, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Paul L. Nevins, Wellesley, MA, for plaintiff.
Cheryl L. Conner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, MA, Peter W. Gallaudet, Law Dept., U.S. Postal Service, Windsor, CT, for defendants.
Report and Recommendation Accepted.
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE DEFENDANTS MARVIN T. RUNYON, POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AND RONALD E. HENDERSON AND WILLIAM P. CONCANNON, AS THEY ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND INDIVIDUALS (DOCKET ENTRY # 10)
Defendants Marvin T. Runyon ("Runyon"), Postmaster General of the United States, William P. Concannon ("Concannon"), Human Resources Specialist for the Northeast Area Injury Compensation Office of the United States Postal Service, and Ronald E. Henderson ("Henderson"), Manager of Human Resources for the Providence District of the United States Postal Service (collectively: "defendants") seek dismissal or, alternatively, summary judgment. (Docket Entry # 10). Plaintiff Elinor Meyer ("plaintiff"), an employee of the United States Postal Service at the time of her injury, opposes the motion. (Docket Entry # 13). After conducting a hearing (Docket Entry # 17), this court took the motion (Docket Entry # 10) under advisement.
Prior to summarizing the factual record, it is necessary to determine the contents of the record. Construed as a motion for summary judgment, this court may consider the affidavits attached to defendants' memorandum (Docket Entry # 11) as well as the verified complaint submitted by plaintiff (Docket Entry # 1). Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1262-1263 (1st Cir.1991) ().
Both parties submitted statements of material facts as required by LR. 56.1 of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Material facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations, set forth in the statements are admitted unless controverted. LR. 56.1. With these precepts in mind, the factual record for purposes of summary judgment is as follows.
On or about September 17, 1988,1 plaintiff, a letter carrier at the Plymouth Post Office in Plymouth, Massachusetts, slipped and fell while delivering mail on her route. (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. A, ¶ 1; Docket Entry # 14, ¶¶ 1 & 2). Plaintiff completed her route and reported to work on her next scheduled day, September 19, 1988. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 7; Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 3). In September 1988, Concannon avers that plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim, also referred to as an injury compensation claim. Concannon was assigned to administer the claim. (Docket Entry # 14, Ex. C).
On or about September 19, 1988, plaintiff sought medical attention. An orthopedic physician described plaintiff as "Post Carpal Tunnel Syndrome." (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 9; Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 5).
By letter dated September 23, 1988, Concannon advised a claims examiner at the Office of Workers' Compensation for the Department of Labor ("the DOL") about plaintiffs injury and diagnosis. He surmised that the injuries described were inconsistent with the nature of the September 17, 1988 incident. Concannon requested that the "claim be closely examined" inasmuch as the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service") incurred a significant monetary liability for employees injured in the course of their job. (Docket Entry ## 1 & 14; Docket Entry # 11, Ex. C & Att. B).
On November 31, 1988, the DOL accepted plaintiffs claim for workers' compensation benefits for the condition of her arm, elbow, head and back contusions and abrasions. (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. C, ¶ 12). The parties dispute whether Concannon treated plaintiff in a respectful manner and, in particular, whether he coerced or encouraged plaintiff to terminate her employment with the Postal Service. (Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 8; Docket Entry # 11, Ex. C, ¶ 6).
Plaintiff attests that on June 7, 1989, Concannon telephoned her and insisted that she should be working. Plaintiff further attests that Concannon telephoned plaintiff again on June 13, 1989, and told plaintiff that, "This has gone on long enough and I am going to (sic) you back to work, no matter what."2 (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 13-14; Docket Entry # 14, ¶¶ 9-10).
In June 1989 Concannon contacted the office of plaintiffs treating physician, "Dr. Ruby," to determine if plaintiff could return to work in a limited duty capacity. Concannon spoke with Dr. Ruby's assistant who advised him that plaintiff could perform work in a limited capacity. (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. C, ¶ 8). According to plaintiff, Concannon telephoned her again on June 16, 1989, and insisted that she return to work. In fact, according to plaintiff, Concannon told plaintiff that if she did not return to work, she would be terminated.3 (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 15-18; Docket Entry # 14, ¶¶ 11-14).
On June 19, 1989, plaintiff reported to work and, despite the pain in her arms and hands, continued working. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 20 & 27; Docket Entry # 11, Ex. C, ¶ 9). Concannon denied plaintiffs request to leave work on June 19, 1989, despite her complaints of pain.4 (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 26-28). After several attempts, plaintiff contacted her treating physician, on June 20, 1989, who advised her to leave work. Following Dr. Ruby's advice, plaintiff left work around noon on June 20, 1989. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 19, 25, 31 & 32).
Plaintiff telephoned Concannon when she arrived home on June 20, 1989. Concannon informed her that he did not believe she was in pain or unable to work. He also "yelled at her."5 (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 33-35).
On June 27, 1989, Henderson directed plaintiff to undergo a fitness for duty examination on July 5, 1989. As explained in Henderson's letter to plaintiff, the purpose of the examination was to determine plaintiffs ability to return to work in a limited capacity. (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. D & Att. C & D).
Henderson also wrote to the medical examiner, Dr. James D. McEleney ("Dr. McEleney"), on June 27, 1989, and explained the nature of plaintiffs injury. After noting that plaintiff underwent surgery to her right wrist in May of 1989, he advised Dr. McEleney that plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Ruby, believed that further surgery was needed on her left wrist before plaintiff could return to work. Henderson also described plaintiff's condition to Dr. McEleney as "not so serious as to prevent her from doing clerical duties at the Post Office."6 (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. D & Att. D). The medical examiner, presumably Dr. McEleney, determined that plaintiff was totally disabled. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 38; Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 34).
On September 5, 1989, Concannon wrote to the DOL claims examiner. Attaching a copy of plaintiff's employment application, Concannon noted that plaintiff was formerly employed at the Jordan Hospital and that the Postal Service had received information that plaintiff had been experiencing carpal tunnel syndrome since 1985.7 Accordingly, Concannon asked the claims examiner to direct plaintiff to submit any medical records associated with her carpal tunnel syndrome. Concannon, whose responsibilities included administering the "return-to-work program" of disabled employees and identifying employees eligible to return to work, considered it his duty to fully apprise the DOL of information concerning plaintiff's condition. .
On January 23, 1990, the DOL accepted plaintiffs claim for benefits for her condition of "bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome." (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. C, ¶ 13). On May 14, 1990, Henderson ordered plaintiff to undergo a second fitness for duty examination. By letter dated May 14, 1990, Henderson advised plaintiffs attorney of the examination and its purpose. On the same day, Henderson wrote to the medical examiner noting that, "It appears as though plaintiff may be extending her disability unnecessarily." (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. D, ¶ 8 & Att. E & F; Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 42; Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 38).
On January 27, 1992, Henderson directed plaintiff to undergo a third fitness for duty examination. He also sent letters to plaintiff's attorney and the medical examiner explaining the basis for his decision. In the letter to the medical examiner, Henderson indicated that plaintiff "does not appear to be undergoing any type of treatment" and was seeing a doctor who "advises everyone to `take three months off.'" (Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 38; Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 43; Docket Entry # 11, Ex. D, ¶ 9 & Att. G & H).
On March 2, 1992, Concannon wrote to plaintiff, enclosed a "CA-7" form and asked her to complete it. Concannon avers that he needed a completed form in order to continue processing plaintiffs workers' compensation claim. (Docket Entry # 11, Ex. C, ¶ 14 & Att. D). Plaintiff characterizes the letter as harassing. (Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 40).
On March 18, 1992, plaintiff telephoned the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office. (Docket Entry # 14, ¶ 41 & Ex. 2 & 3; Docket Entry # 11, Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-5). The Counseling Intake Form indicates that plaintiff alleges discriminatory treatment as a result of:
written misstatements concerning her compensable injury, harassing phone calls continually, threat of job loss for pursuing her injury comp sic claim, failure to file OWCP forms in a timely manner, alleged loss of OWCP forms sent by plaintiff to the P.O. and then for submission to the Dept. of Labor-OWCP. Failure to provide information sheets with OWCP forms so they may be completed correctly. Verbal...
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