Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 98-1632

• Citation: 163 F.3d 1048
• Decision Date: 24 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-1632,98-1632
• Parties: 160 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2136 John G. MEYER, Appellant, v. SCHNUCKS MARKETS, INC., and Cy Jansen, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 1048

163 F.3d 1048

160 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2136

John G. MEYER, Appellant, v. SCHNUCKS MARKETS, INC., and Cy Jansen, Appellees.

No. 98-1632.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 24, 1998.

Decided Dec. 24, 1998.

Susan Kreher Roach, Chesterfield, MO, argued, for the appellant.

Mary Beth Ortbals, St. Louis, MO, argued (Dennis G. Collins, on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

John Meyer is a meatcutter who has worked for Schnucks Markets since 1960. He believes that in recent years Schnucks managers have failed to enforce proper sanitation procedures in their meat departments and have condoned mixing outdated meat with fresh meat and then selling the mixture as fresh. On several occasions, Mr. Meyer expressed his concerns about these matters to his supervisors. Mr. Meyer claims that in retaliation for his criticisms Schnucks allowed its supervisors to harass him and to criticize him publicly, and that Schnucks transferred him to a store farther away from his home. Mr. Meyer further asserts that Cy Jansen, a Schnucks vice-president, told him in the presence of other employees that he was "a poor and substandard employee, that he was a trouble maker, that he had no right to question the improper health and safety standards ... and that Plaintiff was a complainer and sounded like a lawyer."

Mr. Meyer sued Schnucks and Mr. Jansen in Missouri state court for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with a business relationship, and civil conspiracy. Schnucks removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Schnucks then moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that because all of Mr. Meyer's claims arose in the course of his employment they could have been pursued through the grievance procedure set up by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in effect at Schnucks and were therefore completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), see 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

The district court rejected Schnucks's argument that all of the claims were preempted as too broad, and held that the slander claim was not preempted because it did not depend on the interpretation of any provision of the CBA. See Luecke v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 85 F.3d 356, 359-62 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 517, 136 L.Ed.2d 405 (1996). The district court concluded, however, that the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy were preempted because they required the interpretation of the section of the CBA protecting employees against unjustifiable or discriminatory transfers. Since the district court had federal-question jurisdiction over the transfer-based claims, it then reasoned, it was authorized to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). After a careful analysis, the district court granted summary judgment to Schnucks, holding that each of the five counts in Mr. Meyer's complaint either failed to state a claim or was preempted by the LMRA or Missouri workers' compensation law. Mr. Meyer appeals.

We hold that none of Mr. Meyer's claims, even those based on his transfer to another store, is preempted by the LMRA, and thus that the district court had no removal jurisdiction over the case. Since federal jurisdiction is lacking, we do not reach the question of the propriety of summary judgment to Schnucks on Mr. Meyer's claims.

I.

We note, first, that the district court was right to reject Schnucks's suggestion that Mr. Meyer's claim was preempted by the LMRA merely because his complaint alleged facts that could have formed the basis for a grievance under the CBA. The Supreme Court has held that the fact that a CBA provides for arbitrated dispute resolution for claims based on the same facts as those forming the basis for a plaintiff's complaint does not mean that state-law causes of action based on those facts are preempted. There is no preemption unless the state-law claim itself is based on, or dependent on an analysis of, the relevant CBA. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). A plaintiff is the master of his or her cause of action, and the fact that a claim could have been laid as a violation of a CBA does not necessarily mean that the LMRA preempts it. We have applied this principle many times. See, e.g., Luecke, 85 F.3d at 359, and Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir.1990).

We recognize that some of our cases do not seem to have applied Lingle in an appropriately narrow way. In Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir.1989), we held that a claim for slander did indeed depend on an analysis of the CBA and was thus preempted, when the statements in question "relate[d] to a dispute over an event occurring at the workplace and would be governed by the grievance procedure." In the same case, we held that claims arising from an employee's alleged wrongful discharge, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, also depended on rights and obligations created by the CBA and were thus preempted. Id. In deciding whether the claims were preempted, moreover, we noted that we had to consider defenses based on the CBA as well and thus took a broad view of what it means for a case to be substantially dependent upon an interpretation of a CBA. Id. at 623.

On the other hand, a separate line of our cases holds that claims based on state law that are intimately related to events at the workplace and could have been taken through the grievance process are not preempted as long as they involve purely factual questions and are not based on provisions of the CBA. Luecke, 85 F.3d at 359, holding that a state defamation action was not preempted, is such a case. "[N]o express or implied ... provision" of the CBA, we said, "guides the factual inquiry into whether the speakers actually said [that] Luecke refused to take the [drug] test, whether their statements were false, whether malice attached, and whether damages resulted." Id. at 360. A number of our cases have also held that state-law retaliatory discharge claims are not preempted by the LMRA, because they turn on purely factual questions about the employer's conduct and motives rather than on the scope of the employer's contractual authority to discharge employees. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1244 (8th Cir.1995). The fact that the defense to the claim relied upon the CBA, the employer asserting that there was "just cause" for the...