Meyer v. State

• Decision Date: 01 March 1978
• Docket Number: No. 60249,60249
• Citation: 92 Misc.2d 996,403 N.Y.S.2d 420
• Parties: Douglas MEYER and Robert Meyer, Claimants, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 420

403 N.Y.S.2d 420

92 Misc.2d 996

Douglas MEYER and Robert Meyer, Claimants, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.

Claim No. 60249.

Court of Claims of New York.

March 1, 1978.

Moskowitz & Passman, New York City, for claimants, by Donald S. Sherwood, New York City, of counsel.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., by Robert G. Farrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DECISION

GERARD M. WEISBERG, Judge.

This claim is for personal injuries sustained by Douglas Meyer on April 6, 1976, when he fell from a footbridge located on the Stony Brook Campus of the State University of New York (Stony Brook). His father Robert Meyer, seeks recovery for medical expenses and loss of services. ¹

The facts of the damage-causing accident were described by Douglas Meyer from whose testimony the Court finds the following:

Douglas Meyer became a student at Stony Brook in January, 1976. On April 6, 1976, at about 1:00 A.M., he was on a bridge located in a wooded area between Kelly Quad and the Earth and Space Sciences Building parking lot. He was coming from the Student Union Building and was going to Kelly Quad where he lived. To get there, Douglas used a dirt path through the woods which led to the footbridge. He customarily used this route and had observed other students doing the same.

Douglas was walking with his friend, Nicholas, and the two were engaged in conversation. The path was illuminated by lights from the parking lot. Douglas and his friend stopped on the footbridge to talk. When Douglas leaned on the bridge railing, it broke, precipitating him into a small creek approximately three feet below. He fell on some rocks and was injured.

A number of photographs of the bridge were put in evidence. The bridge was of a very rudimentary nature and was constructed of tree branches and boards held together with rope. The bridge flooring was made up of pieces of broken board held together by some kind of cord. The railings consisted of tree branches which were approximately three inches in diameter. The bark was worn off and looked deteriorated by weather. Douglas had noticed the condition of the bridge before the accident and had observed that the ends of the railings were rotted. There were no angular supports on the bridge on April 6th, but apparently George Marshall, the Director of Environmental Health and Safety at Stony Brook, testified for the State. He first became aware of the footbridge and the path leading to it in July, 1976, when he examined the accident scene. He knew of other unpaved paths which were used by students, but said that he had not been aware of the path where the incident occurred, and therefore never recommended that signs be posted against using it. He claimed that his jurisdiction extended only to the paved paths on campus.

such supports were placed there at a later time. ²

To Mr. Marshall's knowledge, the bridge was not built by the State, but he said that it could have been built by someone in the maintenance department with Boy Scout experience. The witness was qualified as an expert on bridges and testified that there is a code applying to their construction. The railings on the bridge in question did not conform to safety standards prescribed by the code. Marshall made a report on the condition which he found in July of 1976 in which he recommended either that the bridge be torn down, or that a substantial bridge be constructed with paving and lighting.

Upon rebuttal, both sides placed in evidence certain excerpts of an examination before trial of Ronald W. Siegel, Assistant to the Vice President of Stony Brook. Siegel was familiar with the footbridge and thought that it had been there for more than two years. He did not know exactly when the bridge was constructed. When asked what his responsibility for the bridge was, he said that it was difficult to answer, since he also claimed that he did not maintain wooded areas. The State's defense was thus predicated on the purported ignorance and/or lack of responsibility of these Stony Brook officials.

LIABILITY

Claimants seek to fasten liability on the State by virtue of its status as the owner of the premises. The State denies responsibility for claimant's injuries on the theory that it did not construct or maintain the bridge, and additionally, that it did not have notice of the defective condition.

The duty of care, which the owner of land owes to persons coming upon it, was set forth in Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., 152 U.S.App.D.C. 86, 89, 469 F.2d 97, 100 as follows:

" * * * A landowner must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk."

The Court need not determine claimant's status as invitee, licensee or trespasser. There is now a single standard of care, determined by the likelihood of claimant's presence at the particular time and place of the injury, and the foreseeability of harm. (Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 (1976).)

The footbridge from which Douglas Meyer fell was a dangerous instrumentality. It posed a foreseeable risk of harm to persons travelling over it. The bridge was a crude, makeshift structure to begin with, and had become even more dangerous by virtue of its deterioration. The State's witness, Mr. Marshall, testified explicitly that it did not conform to recognized standards of safety.

Concerning the likelihood of claimant's presence on the bridge, it appears from a map of the Stony Brook campus which was placed in evidence, that the campus contains numerous areas which have been left more or less in their natural state. The various facilities and buildings are connected by paved walkways and roads and there was testimony in the case that Douglas Meyer could have reached his destination by using these roads. He chose instead to take an alternate route through the woods. This "The State should have known of the propensities of students and others to take short cuts and that they do not always follow a prescribed path to a particular destination. (Mayer v. Temple Props., 307 N.Y. 559, 563, 122 N.E.2d 909, 912.)"

was an entirely foreseeable circumstance. As the Court stated in Fitzsimmons v. State of New York at Stonybrook, 42 A.D.2d 636, 637, 345 N.Y.S.2d 171, 174, affd 34 N.Y.2d 739, 357 N.Y.S.2d 498, 313 N.E.2d 790:

Indeed, the State's witness, Mr. Marshall, testified that he was aware of other unpaved paths used by students from one part of the university to another. The foreseeability that students would use these paths gave rise to a duty to use reasonable care with regard to all of them. At the very least, the State should have conducted an inspection of this wooded area. The existence and condition of the bridge would have been disclosed by such a procedure. (See Schanberg v. State of New York, 53 Misc.2d 116, 118, 277 N.Y.S.2d 794, 796-797, revd on other grounds 30 A.D.2d 712, 291 N.Y.S.2d 35.) The State's purported ignorance of the condition, far from being a defense to the action, constituted a breach of its duty of care. Where there is a failure to inspect, constructive notice need not be proved. (Serbalik v. State of New York, 204 Misc. 2, 123 N.Y.S.2d 212, affd 283 App.Div. 1136, 131 N.Y.S.2d 550.) It also appears that Mr. Siegel, the Assistant to the Vice President of Stony Brook, was aware of the existence of the bridge and stated that he thought it had existed for more than two years. His knowledge of the bridge, and its obviously dangerous condition, provided ample notice to the State. (Miner v. State of New York, 196 Misc. 752, 92 N.Y.S.2d 562, affd 277 App.Div. 921, 98 N.Y.S.2d 462; Camuglia v. State of New York, 197 Misc. 180, 94 N.Y.S.2d 579.)

The defendant contends however that it would be unreasonable and unduly burdensome to require the State University to take steps to prevent accidents from occurring in the "natural areas of the campus", relying upon the following language from Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 442, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 59, 354 N.E.2d 794, 798:

"In this connection it is important to note that the elimination of the immunity conferred by prior law should not pose an unreasonable burden on the use of the property since all that is now required is the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances (Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868, supra ). The defendant can always show that it would have been unduly burdensome to have done more (See 2 Harper and James, Torts, p. 1437)."

The State is clearly not an insurer against accidents resulting from the natural character of an area such as a park. (See Schumm v. State of New York, 12 A.D.2d 682, 207 N.Y.S.2d 838.) However, the bridge in this case was not a natural phenomenon. It would not have been unduly burdensome to either keep it in repair or tear it down. Indeed, the State's witness, Mr. Marshall, made precisely those recommendations in his report.

The Court therefore concludes that the State was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of Douglas Meyer's injury. Accordingly, the State is liable for that portion of his injuries as will be indicated below.

CULPABLE CONDUCT BY CLAIMANT

Since this cause of action accrued after September 1, 1975, the provisions of Article 14-A of the Civil Practice Law and Rules are applicable to this claim (CPLR 1413). The doctrine of comparative negligence is embodied in CPLR 1411 which provides as follows:

"In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or...