Meyer v. State
| Decision Date | 22 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 21, 22, Sept. Term, 2015,21, 22, Sept. Term, 2015 |
| Citation | 445 Md. 648,128 A.3d 147 |
| Parties | Matthew David MEYER v. STATE of Maryland. State of Maryland v. Helen C. Rivera. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Nancy S. Forster (Forster & Johnson, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for appellant in No. 21, Sept. Term, 2015.
Todd W. Hesel, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for appellee in No. 21, Sept. Term, 2015.
Susannah E. Prucka, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner in No. 22, Sept. Term, 2015.
David E. Kindermann (Rockville, MD), on brief, for respondent in No. 22, Sept. Term, 2015.
Argued before BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, GLENN T. HARRELL, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
The issue before the Court is whether a trial court has the authority to restrict a defendant's driving privileges as a condition of probation. In Matthew David Meyer v. State of Maryland, the appellant, Matthew David Meyer ("Meyer"), appealed from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He alleged that the special condition of probation that he not operate a motor vehicle in Maryland during the probationary term constituted an illegal sentence. In State of Maryland v. Helen C. Rivera, the respondent, Helen C. Rivera ("Rivera"), was convicted of two counts of second-degree assault and one count of failing to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily injury. For each of the three counts, Rivera was sentenced to six months, suspended, and was placed on probation before judgment for the two assault counts. The trial judge placed Rivera on a two-year probationary term and, as a condition of probation, prohibited her from operating a motor vehicle. Rivera appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by imposing the no-driving condition of probation.1
The State of Maryland filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court in the case of Matthew David Meyer v. State of Maryland, 442 Md. 194, 112 A.3d 373 (2015), as well as the companion case, State of Maryland v. Helen C. Rivera. We granted certiorari in both cases and consolidate them in this opinion to address the common questions of law and fact:
Because we believe that the Sheppard case was wrongly decided, we need not answer the first question. Accordingly, we answer the second question in the affirmative and overrule our decision in Sheppard. In Meyer, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County denying the appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. In Rivera, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals holding that the no-driving condition of probation violated the separation of powers doctrine.
On or about the evening of October 23, 2002, Meyer turned eastbound on Mount Aetna Road in Washington County and began tailgating the vehicle in front of him. In order to pass the vehicle, Meyer sped up dramatically and crossed the double yellow line into the westbound lane. The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour. After passing the vehicle, Meyer continued to drive eastbound in the westbound lane at a minimum speed of 75 miles per hour and struck an oncoming Ford Ranger occupied by Gerald and Mary Dietrich. The collision caused the Dietrichs' truck, traveling at a speed of about 24 miles per hour, to flip over on its side, skid in the reverse direction, and roll onto its roof about 40 feet from the site of impact. During the collision, Mr. Dietrich was ejected from his truck. He was later transported to Washington County Hospital and pronounced dead. Mrs. Dietrich was trapped in the upside down truck and pronounced dead at the scene of the collision. Meyer was also trapped in his vehicle, but was successfully extracted and flown to Shock Trauma in Baltimore. He survived the collision. At the time of this incident, Meyer had already amassed a series of traffic violations,2 including an accident in May 2000 which left him paralyzed from the chest down. On November 19, 2003, Meyer pled nolo contendere3 in the Circuit Count for Washington County to two counts of manslaughter by motor vehicle4 ("vehicular manslaughter").5 As a result, the Circuit Court sentenced Meyer to a total of fourteen years of incarceration, seven of which were suspended, and imposed three years of unsupervised probation with a special condition. In pertinent part, Judge W. Kennedy Boone, III stated:
[Meyer] will not be allowed to operate a motor vehicle, and I can only order in [ ] the State of Maryland, [that he not] operate a motor vehicle, obviously during the time of his confinement, [and] during the time of any probation. Now that's always subject to show cause, or whatever, but I think that is appropriate. Everything he's done has been motor vehically [sic] related....
Meyer signed the Probation Order to indicate his consent to the condition that he "not be allowed to operate a motor vehicle in the State of Maryland."
On or about October 7, 2008, Meyer's probation commenced following his release from prison. During the probationary period, on April 20, 2010, Meyer obtained a driver's license from the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA"). About two months later, while still on probation, Meyer operated a motor vehicle traveling at a speed of 84 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour zone. The State Trooper who stopped the vehicle driven by Meyer issued him a citation for driving at an unreasonable speed. Again, on July 4, 2010, Meyer was stopped by a police officer for failing to use the headlamps while operating a motor vehicle. As a result of these traffic violations, Meyer was charged with violating the special condition of his earlier probation. At the violation of probation hearing on February 16, 2011, he admitted to driving in the State of Maryland and to the commission of the traffic violations. Meyer, however, moved to dismiss the action, asserting for the first time that the condition of probation prohibiting him from driving in the State of Maryland, even though imposed in 2003, agreed to by him, and effective upon his release from prison in 2008, was illegal. On March 7, 2011, Judge Boone issued an Opinion and Order in response to Meyer's motion to dismiss. The court determined that Meyer violated his probation based on his admission of operating a motor vehicle in the State of Maryland. Judge Boone explained his decision:
After Judge Boone retired, Judge Daniel P. Dwyer of the Circuit Court for Washington County conducted the sentencing hearing on the violation of probation. On May 18, 2011, Judge Dwyer sentenced Meyer to seven years of incarceration, three and a half years suspended, and placed him on two years of unsupervised probation with the condition that he obey all laws.6 At the sentencing hearing, Judge Dwyer explained in part:
Judge Boone knew about your driving record.... He knew that you severely injured yourself a couple years before this tragic event. You injured yourself further Mr. Meyer from what I've read. More traumatic brain injury in the same accident that took the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Dietrich.... While it wasn't an intentional killing, it was a wanton and willful disregard.... And I believe Judge Boone was trying to fashion a sentence not so much to punish Mr. Meyer but to protect the public which I think [is] our number one sacred duty as judges is [sic] to try to prevent harm to the citizens of our country....
Taking the above into consideration, Judge Dwyer fashioned a sentence that would "give Mr. Meyer every incentive not to operate a motor vehicle again."
Approximately three years later, on April 18, 2014, Meyer filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence under Maryland Rule 4–345(a).7 Judge Dwyer denied this motion after a hearing on June 24, 2014 and explained his decision:
I very much respect the Constitution, and I don't want to tread on the province of the Executive Branch, who under the Motor Vehicle Administration rules decides who gets to drive and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sabisch v. Moyer
...arise again in litigation." Stare Decisis , Black's Law Dictionary. "[S]tare decisis[, however,] is not absolute." Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 669, 128 A.3d 147, 159 (2015) (cleaned up). Under the two exceptions to "stare decisis , an appellate court may overrule a case that either was cle......
-
Md. Small MS4 Coal. v. Md. Dep't of the Env't
...reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Meyer v. State , 445 Md. 648, 669, 128 A.3d 147 (2015) (quoting State v. Waine , 444 Md. 692, 699–700, 122 A.3d 294 (2015) ) (internal quotations omitted). In State v. Stachowski ......
-
Twigg v. State
...Assembly. State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421, 2 A.3d 368 (2010). We begin with the plain meaning of the statute. Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 676, 128 A.3d 147 (2015). If the statutory language is unambiguous and consistent with the purpose of the statute, our review ceases and we apply the......
-
State v. Jones
...Courts recognize the power to decline to follow the doctrine when persuaded the prior decision is wrong. Meyer v. State , 445 Md. 648, 668–69, 128 A.3d 147, 159–60 (2015) ; Thompson v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc ., 443 Md. 47, 58, 115 A.3d 125, 131 (2015) ; Cure v. State , 421 Md. 300, 320–322, 2......