Meyer v. Stortenbecker
| Citation | 184 Iowa 441,165 N.W. 456 |
| Decision Date | 21 December 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 30867.,30867. |
| Parties | MEYER v. STORTENBECKER ET AL. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Pottawattamie County; O. D. Wheeler, Judge.
This is a suit in equity to set aside a deed from the mother of appellant to her brother, Fritz Stortenbecker--an attack upon a contract made the time the deed was, and as part of the same transaction--and to have treated as part of the estate of the mother, now deceased, the certain widow's allowance made the mother in the estate of her deceased husband, and of a sum paid her as her distributive share. The controversy involves whether the mother at the time of the transaction complained of was mentally competent to convey and contract; whether she was unduly influenced into making deed and contract; whether any valuable consideration passed to her; and whether the entire transaction be not void for being testamentary without having been effectuated by such a will as the statute requires. The petition of the appellant was dismissed, and she appeals. Affirmed.
Salinger, J., dissenting.H. L. Robertson and L. W. Schneider, both of Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Mayne & Green and Tinley, Mitchell & Pryor, all of Council Bluffs, for appellees.
[1] 1. There is a sharp controversy over where the burden of proof lies, it being the contention of the appellant that there was such confidential relation between the mother and the grantee son as that the burden was cast upon the latter to negative incompetency, undue influence, and want of consideration. We need not decide it because we are fully convinced that if this burden does lie where the appellant would have it that it has been fully met. As is usual in such disputes, the record is one of tremendous volume, and it would serve no useful purpose to fill the opinion with even an attempt of dealing with the testimony in detail. We have given that record the most careful consideration, and find--taking into consideration that this is a review de novo, and not a determinationof whether there is enough evidence to take a int to a jury--that: (1) The claim that the appellee entered into a conspiracy to defraud the appellant out of her just share in the estate of her mother is not sustained. We doubt whether, if there were the same state of facts made apparent in a suit at law, it would carry that question to a jury. (2) It is made apparent that there was no improper or undue influence.
We are in no doubt that had the trial judge found that the mother was mentally incompetent to enter into the transaction complained of, we would have been constrained to reverse such a finding. There is the rather usual exaggeration of things that happen in the life of all, and of matters usual with those who reach old age; an array of testimony that the mother had complained of headaches, had been sick in bed on some few occasions in all her long hard-working life. Some stress is laid on the fact that, though very frugal and thrifty for nearly all her life, that, at last, when she had an annual income of $640, she expended most of it, and bought some presents for her grandchildren, and committed other like extravagances. It is pointed out that the price paid for the land which she conveyed to the one son did not exceed $15,000, even if one allow the grantee as much of its proceeds as the mother allotted his brothers, and that the land was fairly worth about $23,000. It is further pointed out that the grantee received a large gift by means of the conveyance; that each of the three brothers was intended to receive $3,875 of the purchase price, while the plaintiff, the only daughter, was to receive but $500; and that these brothers were relatively, both in wealth and health, better situated than the daughter. The record makes clear that such differentiation does not in the least speak against perfect mental balance. The daughter was married to a man whom her family intensely disliked, and there was no disposition to make it possible for this husband to become enriched by what his wife might receive; she has lived away from home for many years. While she attempts some explanation of it, she practically never wrote to either father or mother. While she makes some explanation of that, she was not at the funeral of either. It does not appear that the mother was advised of these explanations. In his lifetime she sued her father for wages, and got a judgment against him. After his death, she instituted a contest upon his will, charged that he was insane; one trial went on to a disagreement, and thereafter a settlement was made by which the daughter received $6,500. The will of the father excluded this daughter. There is evidence that the mother entertained a fairly strong feeling concerning this attitude of the daughter to her father.
In addition, there is opinion testimony of medical men in answer to hypothetical questions constructed along familiar lines, in which it is announced, in answer to questions which fill pages of print, and in the fewest possible words, that this woman was of unsound mind. A familiar strain pervades this testimony. It rests, in part, upon what is not proven, or upon a grossly exaggerated version of the condition of the person pronounced insane. The conclusion rests in part upon matters that can have no logical bearing on mental condition, such as weight, living on a farm, having borne five children in course of a long lifetime. As is also quite usual, the opinions thus given, categorically, are frittered away. By way of illustrations, some of these witnesses say that having headaches and hardening of the arteries induced the witnesses to opine that senile dementia was present, but they admit, finally, that these elements may be and often are present without senile dementia, or impairment of the intellect. Time and again these witnesses make their opinion upon mental condition to depend upon the presence of this or the absence of that, only to say, finally, that this absence and presence is normal, and, in effect, that it furnishes no evidence of mental weakness. We may concede that this opinion testimony is some evidence, but, as said, we are not reviewing the verdict of a jury, but are weighing evidence. And we are of opinion that though this be evidence it is not weighty when all the evidence is considered, giving some consideration to the fact that the trial judge was not persuaded by it. When all is said and done, the great weight of the evidence is that this was the average hardworking, abstemious, clean-living, thrifty farmer's wife; that she was average in dress, speech, and conduct, and of the mental capacity normally found in those of her station, environment, and opportunities. Against all the opinions that she had less capacity than that, one single fact is outstanding which, to us, seems more controlling than all this strained machinery for making a case of insanity or mental weakness. She was a witness in the will contest of which we have spoken, a little over four years before the transaction in inquiry here. Notwithstanding some claims that she did not speak English, or did not speak it at all well, she testified in that proceeding, and in English. The record exhibits her testimony. No one can read it with an impartial mind without becoming convinced that she had at least the ordinary capacity of understanding business affairs, of reciprocal duties, and of the consequences of saying one thing rather than another. We are abidingly satisfied with the judgment of the trial court that the deed and contract may not be avoided for want of capacity, nor for undue influence.
[2] 1a. As to want of consideration, this is no contest by creditors. It is an attack upon a transfer made to one son with whom the mother was and for a long time had been living, who had become something of her staff and scrip in life, and in which she transferred what she no longer needed, providing by the transfer, too, what, in her judgment, she wished her other children to receive.
[3] 2. What has already been said is as well an argument for holding that the deed made from mother to son may not be set aside, and the land treated as belonging to the estate of the mother. It is, however, contended that, at all events, this deed was a mere instrument made with intent to have it take the place of a will; that equity should treat it as being a will, ineffective for want of the execution and attestation required by statute. The argument for this contention is that the deed disposed of all the property the mother owned, except a reservation of a life estate commuted for the promise to be paid a stated annual sum, just about sufficient for maintenance, and that the purchase price was to be distributed after the death of the grantor only. The test whether this instrument, though in form a deed, was in truth an ineffective will, is whether present title passed. Of course, a deed is not testamentary merely because a life estate or use for life is reserved. While the beneficial use is thus postponed, the present title passes. Any creditors of the grantee could subject this land to the debts of this son as soon as this deed was delivered, although he might not seize immediate possession. There is a manifest difference which we think the appellant is overlooking, between obtaining title only after a grantor has died, and not being bound to pay the purchase price until after that eventuality. If the grantor in a deed should elect to make a long-time investment of the purchase price, and take the note of the buyer, payable in 50 years, it would be fairly clear that payment would not be made in the life of the grantor, but that would, of course, have no tendency to prove that the land had been willed rather than sold. Cover v. Stem, 67 Md. 449, 10 Atl. 231, 1 Am. St. Rep. 406, citing Shep. Touch. 368; Hannon v. State, 9 Gill (Md.) 446;Carey v. Dennis, 13 Md. 1. Story, Prom. Notes, § 27, approves...
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