Meyer v. United States
| Decision Date | 15 March 1919 |
| Docket Number | 2413.,2411 |
| Citation | 258 F. 212 |
| Parties | MEYER v. UNITED STATES. v. SAME. SCHLOSS v. SAME. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Rehearing Denied May 6, 1919.
Benjamin C. Bachrach and James H. Wilkerson, both of Chicago, Ill for plaintiffs in error.
Charles F. Clyne and John H. Lally, both of Chicago, Ill., for the United States.
Before BAKER, ALSCHULER, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs in error were convicted of conspiracy to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy.
Assignments of error challenge the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of evidence, the district attorney's argument to the jury, and the court's charge.
The indictment charged that plaintiffs in error expected that an involuntary petition in bankruptcy would be filed against them, and that adjudication of bankruptcy and appointment of a trustee would follow; that in anticipation of such proceedings they conspired to conceal from said trustee certain property which should belong at the time of such concealment to the bankruptcy estate, including, among many items, a certain check signed by one Morton Hill for $532.64 and that in pursuance and in furtherance of said conspiracy they turned over to one May ******* a certain check signed by one Morton Hill for $532.64.
One line of objections is based on the failure of the indictment to charge that the conspiracy included an intention on the part of plaintiffs in error to be thrown into bankruptcy and have a trustee appointed, or to charge that at the time of the conspiracy proceedings were pending and that a trustee had been appointed. These objections proceed on the erroneous theory that insolvent debtors cannot properly be convicted of a conspiracy to hide their property, so that their creditors cannot reach it through bankruptcy proceedings which the debtors are expecting to be instituted.
Another contention is that the indictment does not show that the overt act was done to effect the object of the conspiracy. Invoking the rule that inferences are to be taken against the pleader, plaintiffs in error insist that we shall infer that they lawfully turned over the Morton Hill check to May *******. But the rule does not extend to imagining inferences that are contrary to the fair common-sense reading of the averments. The conspiracy is fully and clearly stated. It included the purpose to conceal the Morton Hill check, 'which should belong at the time of such concealment to the bankruptcy estate. ' In charging the overt act the pleader averred that in furtherance of said conspiracy the plaintiffs in error turned over the Morton Hill check to May *******. This averment, taken in connection with the statement of the nature and scope of the conspiracy, makes it impossible to infer that the check was not the property of the bankrupts after it was turned over to May *******. And it is obvious that putting one's property in the possession of another may be an effective step towards concealing it from creditors. Many other overt acts are alleged, but the objection to them is precisely the same.
The evidence abundantly sustains the verdict. Among other things, the bankrupts shipped goods out of the state on pretended sales after the bankruptcy court had entered a restraining order against them. As to the formation of the conspiracy, though the evidence, as usual, is wholly circumstantial, it fully warrants the jury's finding.
Schloss and ******* were partners in a mercantile business. Meyer was their credit man. Over their objection evidence was admitted of statements of the business condition of Schloss & ******* made by them a month before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. These property statements had no bearing on the question of conspiracy. In fact they were made before any conspiracy was formed; but, in connection with the proof of the relatively small amount of property found by the receiver and the trustee, they were material circumstances in relation to the concealing of the firm's assets. Against Schloss and ******* they were admissible as declarations; and the court's charge to the jury excluded this evidence from operating against Meyer.
Certain telegrams purporting to be signed by Schloss & *******, and...
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