Meyer v. Walls
| Decision Date | 05 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 271PA96,No. 3,3,271PA96 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Patricia M. MEYER, Administratrix for the Estate of Clearman I. Frisbee, v. Jo Ann WALLS, individually and in her Official Capacity as License Holder and Administrator of Community Care of Haywood,; George Andrew Brown, III, individually and as George Andrew Brown d/b/a A & B Excavating, Inc.; A & B Excavating, Inc.; County of Buncombe, Buncombe County Department of Social Services; Calvin E. Underwood, Jr., Individually and in his Official Capacity as Director of the Buncombe County Department of Social Services; Kay Barrow, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Supervisor at the Buncombe County Department of Social Services; Mackey Miller, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as a Social Worker at the Buncombe County Department of Social Services. |
Hyler & Lopez, PA by George B. Hyler, Jr., and Robert J. Lopez, Asheville, for plaintiff-appellee.
Charlotte A. Wade, Asheville, for defendant-appellants Buncombe County DSS, Underwood, Miller, and Barrow.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by D. Sigsbee Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for the State, amicus curiae.
James B. Blackburn and Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C. by Robert H. Sasser, III, Raleigh, on behalf of The North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, amicus curiae.
On 9 February 1992, decedent Clearman I. Frisbee committed suicide by placing an explosive blasting cap in his mouth and detonating it with a battery. More than two years prior to Mr. Frisbee's death, the Buncombe County Department of Social Services ("DSS" or "Buncombe County DSS") petitioned the Buncombe County Clerk of Superior Court to declare Mr. Frisbee legally incompetent because his multiple medical and psychological problems rendered him "unable to manage his own affairs." On 28 November 1989, Mr. Frisbee was adjudicated legally incompetent, and defendant DSS was appointed as Mr. Frisbee's legal guardian. While under DSS' care, Mr. Frisbee was placed in and removed from several community care facilities because of his behavior. On 11 February 1991, Mr. Frisbee was admitted to Community Care of Haywood No. 3 ("Community Care # 3") by defendant Jo Ann Walls, the administrator of Community Care # 3. At that time, defendant Mackey Miller was the DSS social worker handling Mr. Frisbee's case, defendant Calvin E. Underwood was the director of the Buncombe County DSS, and defendant Kay Barrow was the supervisor of the Adult Protective Services Unit at the Buncombe County DSS. Because of their respective positions with DSS, both defendants Underwood and Barrow had general guardianship authority over Mr. Frisbee.
On 9 November 1993, plaintiff Patricia M. Meyer, as administratrix for the estate of Clearman I. Frisbee, filed a wrongful death action alleging that Mr. Frisbee's death was proximately caused by the negligence of the named defendants. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that defendants Underwood, Barrow, and Miller, individually and in their official capacities as agents of defendant Buncombe County DSS, (1) failed to make proper provisions for Mr. Frisbee's care, comfort, and maintenance; (2) failed to act in his best interest; and (3) failed to adequately respond to information provided by family members regarding Mr. Frisbee's condition and conditions at Community Care # 3. Plaintiff also asserted multiple negligence claims against defendant Buncombe County DSS. Defendants Underwood, Barrow, Miller, and Buncombe County DSS filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). After a hearing, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's claim against defendant Buncombe County DSS for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that exclusive jurisdiction over the claim against DSS is in the Industrial Commission, and dismissed plaintiff's claim against defendants Underwood, Barrow, and Miller for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This appeal pertains solely to these motions to dismiss filed by defendants Underwood, Barrow, Miller, and DSS.
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held: (1) jurisdiction depends on the statutory authority for waiver of immunity, the jurisdictional provisions of N.C.G.S. § 153A-435(b) control over those of N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) where there is a conflict, and a remand is necessary for a determination as to whether the amount of insurance coverage exceeded the $100,000 cap on recovery under the Tort Claims Act; (2) a suit against Underwood in his official capacity must proceed in the same forum as a suit against DSS and must therefore be remanded along with the suit against DSS; (3) the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim against Underwood in his individual capacity for mere negligence in the performance of his duties and improperly dismissed the claim against Underwood in his individual capacity for allegations of willful and wanton conduct; and (4) the trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff's claims against Barrow and Miller in their individual capacities for mere negligence. We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision as it pertains to the claim against DSS because we hold that since DSS is not a state agency, the Tort Claims Act does not apply to the claim against DSS, and we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision as it pertains to the claims against Underwood, Barrow, and Miller in their official and individual capacities.
The trial court dismissed the claim against DSS based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the action must be brought in the Industrial Commission. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that jurisdiction depends on the statutory authority for waiver of immunity, that the jurisdictional provisions of N.C.G.S. § 153A-435(b) control over those of N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) where there is a conflict, and that a remand is necessary for a determination as to whether the amount of insurance coverage exceeded the $100,000 cap on recovery under the Tort Claims Act. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the law governing this issue.
The issue before us is whether jurisdiction for the suit against DSS lies before the Industrial Commission pursuant to the Tort Claims Act or before the Superior Court as originally filed by plaintiff. We conclude that jurisdiction resides in the Superior Court. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State is immune from suit absent waiver of immunity. E.g., Gammons v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 344 N.C. 51, 54, 472 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1996). Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a county is immune from suit for the negligence of its employees in the exercise of governmental functions absent waiver of immunity. E.g., State ex rel. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 80, 81 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1954). An action against a commission or board created by statute as an agency of the State where the interest or rights of the State are directly affected is in fact an action against the State. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Powell, 217 N.C. 495, 8 S.E.2d 619 (1940). Likewise, an action against a county agency which directly affects the rights of the county is in fact an action against the county.
N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) of the Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of immunity for negligence claims against all departments, institutions, and agencies of the State. N.C.G.S. § 153A-435 provides that a county's governmental immunity may be waived by the purchase of liability insurance. "Waiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed." Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 537-38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983). We hold that because Buncombe County DSS is not a state agency, the Tort Claims Act does not apply.
The Tort Claims Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.
N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
This Court has held that the Tort Claims Act does not confer jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission over a claim against an employee of a state agency. We addressed this issue in Wirth v. Bracey, 258 N.C. 505, 507-08, 128 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1963):
The only claim authorized by the Tort Claims Act is a claim against the State agency. True, recovery, if any, must be based upon the actionable negligence of an employee of such agency while acting within the scope of his employment. However, recovery, if any, against the alleged negligent employee must be by common law action.
Likewise, the Tort Claims Act does not confer jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission over a claim against a county department that is an alleged involuntary servant or agent of the State. See Turner v. Gastonia City Bd. of Educ., 250 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959). In Turner v. Board of Education, the plaintiff sued the Gastonia City Board of Education in the Industrial Commission based on the negligence of an employee of the City Board. This Court held that because the City Board was not a state agency, the Tort Claims Act did not constitute a waiver of immunity as to the City Board.
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