Meyers v. Arcata Union High School Dist.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1969
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Gregor MEYERS, a minor, by Christine Meyers, his guardian ad litem, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARCATA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public corporation, Michael Chetkovich,C. Leroy Starkey, Sara E. Earl, Stewart A. Fuller, Fred L. Graham, J. E.Pickett, Edwin L. Oliveira, and Ramon A. Fauria, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 24453.

Page 68

75 Cal.Rptr. 68

269 Cal.App.2d 549

Gregor MEYERS, a minor, by Christine Meyers, his guardian ad litem, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARCATA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public corporation, Michael Chetkovich,C. Leroy Starkey, Sara E. Earl, Stewart A. Fuller, Fred L. Graham, J. E.Pickett, Edwin L. Oliveira, and Ramon A. Fauria, Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 24453.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 10, 1969.

Hearing Denied April 9, 1969.

Mathews, Traverse & McKittrick, Eureka, for appellants.

Lawrence A. Truitt, Arcata, for respondent.

Marshall W. Krause, Paul N. Halvonik, San Francisco, amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (in support of the contentions of respondent).

RATTIGAN, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Gregor Meyers, a minor and a student at Arcata High School, was suspended from attendance because of the length of his hair. He brought this action in mandamus, through his mother as guardian ad litem and against the school authorities, to compel his reinstatment. Defendants appeal from the trial court's order directing issuance of a writ of mandate as prayed.

Defendants are the school district which maintains Arcata High School, the five elected members of the governing board of the district, the district superintendent, and the principal and the vice-principal of the school. Petitioner was 15 years old in 1966. In his petition, he alleged that on October 19, 1966, he was a 'student regularly attending * * * Arcata High School'; that Ramon A. Fauria, the school's vice-principal, suspended him on that date 'for not abiding by the school policy regarding personal appearance'; that the suspension was subsequently approved by the school district governing board; and that it was 'arbitrary and capricious.'

The trial court issued an alternative writ of mandate when the action was commenced. Defendants answered the petition. They admitted the fact of petitioner's suspension, but alleged in substance that he had been suspended because the length of his hair violated a 'regulation * * * with respect to student dress and appearance' which the governing board had duly adopted pursuant to its rulemaking power as set forth in section 10604 of the Education Code. The answer pleaded the text of the 'regulation,' which is hereinafter quoted in full. Defendants further alleged that 'extremes' in hair style of both boy and girl students are 'disruptive' of the educational function of a school, and that petitioner's hair style had this effect at Arcata High School. They also denied that petitioner was a 'student regularly * * * attending' the school, and raised issues concerning his non-residence in the Arcata Union High School District.

It was established at the trial that petitioner was suspended because the length of his hair violated that portion of the school's 'dress policy' which provided that 'extremes of hair styles are not acceptable.' The full text of the 'police' appeared in a 'Student Handbook' (and, apparently, in no other formal source). Petitioner had received a copy of the handbook as had all students. A copy was received in evidence at the trial. The 'dress policy,' as identified in the testimony of the district superintendent, is stated in the opening paragraphs of part V of the handbook. These paragraphs read as follows:

'V. SCHOOL POLICIES

'CAMPUS CLOTHES--Extremes of dress and personal appearance are not conducive to the well being of all. Simplicity, neatness, cleanliness, and good taste are the keynote for school dress. Excessive tightness in clothes as well as extremes in shirt tails and similarly, Extremes of hair styles are not acceptable.

'Girls shall wear skirts and blouses or sweaters or appropriate dresses. Girls (sic) clothes shall fit properly and be in current taste and style.

'Boys shall wear conventional slacks or jeans properly adjusted. Shirts shall be buttoned to within one button of the collar. Shirt tails with a square cut or with a soft curve designed for outside wear and in good taste are acceptable wear.

'Extremes in dress, in style, and in individual taste are to be avoided.' (Italics added.) ¹

The evidence at the trial did show that 'regulations' were enforced by the school principal 'and his delegated authority.' In practice, the principal's 'delegated authority' was the vice-principal, Mr. Fauria. Fauria testified that the school's physical education department acted as a screening group for him on the subject of student hair styles: 'They identify students with the extreme hair styles * * * they talk to the student first, they try to get their cooperation, and then they refer them to me when their efforts have failed.'

The physical education teacher who reported petitioner to the vice-principal was James Cady, who also testified. Cady said that five physical education teachers 'police more or less' students for long hair. He (Cady) had noted the length of petitioner's hair, spoke to him about it, and sent him to the vice-principal before the suspension occurred.

The defense witnesses were interrogated concerning the meaning of the words 'extremes of hair styles.' Mr. Fauria testified that he regarded 'extremes of hair styles' as meaning 'deviation from acceptable wear,' and that 'extremes' meant 'deviations' which were not acceptable to him. He considered that a bald-shaven head would be 'extreme' on the one hand, the hair of a boy who had never visited a barber would be 'extreme' on the other. Petitioner's hair, he said, was not within 'normal' range: 'it was much longer than the range of students at Arcata High School.' On the same subject, Cady testified that a boy's 'ears should be showing and * * * (if his hair is) down to the collar and starting to turn up or something like that, it is too long.'

The vice-principal also testified that 'extremes of hair styling' could interfere with the 'learning situation' at Arcata High School. He said that the type of haircut affected by petitioner is a 'focal point for conversation' and 'discussion' among students, and that 'long hair' is an issue which interferes with classroom decorum.

Robert Meeks, another teacher at Arcata High School (but not a physical education instructor), testified that the 'length of hair style' was a 'talked about item' among the students, and that they discussed it in class to the point where it interfered with the conduct of a class by distracting the students from their classroom work. He testified that they also talked about other subjects (such as athletics, cars and girls), and that discipline in such matters was always a problem in a secondary school.

Little, if any, of the foregoing evidence associated petitioner's hair (as distinguished from long hair as a general topic) with classroom distractions at the school. However, Fauria and Cady both testified that, during the 1965--1966 (i.e., the preceding) school year, some of the petitioner's fellow students ('vigilantes,' as counsel for the school authorities put it) took exception to the length of his hair, seized him, gave him a forcible haircut, and slightly injured him in the process.

Cady testified that on October 18, 1966, petitioner's hair was 'too long * * * beyond what we allowed.' He asked petitioner how much time he needed to have it cut. Petitioner was not cooperative, whereupon Cady sent him to the vice-principal. The latter suspended petitioner after a further conversation produced no results. The vice-principal then wrote a letter to petitioner's mother, stating in pertinent part that '(Y)our son, Gregor, has been suspended from school for not abiding by the school policy regarding personal appearance. In the opinion of school personnel, your son was in violation of this policy.'

So far as the trial record shows, Mr. Cady's standards of a male student hair style which was 'too long' (because, as he put it, the hair obscures the student's ears, or reaches his collar, or 'is starting to turn up') were not communicated to petitioner or to anyone else; an 'acceptable' hair style, in terms of maximum permissible length or by reference to his ears or his collar or other criteria, was not defined to petitioner or to his mother by anyone; and neither of them was told how much of a haircut would produce a style which was 'acceptable' as something other than 'extreme.' Two portrait photographs of petitioner each taken on the evening preceding his suspension, were received in evidence at the trial. ² Upon the foregoing evidence, the trial court found among other things that the school's 'rule' that "extremes of hair styles are not acceptable' is so vague and indefinite as to render said rule unconstitutional and unenforceable,' and that the rule 'was not properly enforceable against * * * (petitioner) due to its unconstitutionality.' The court made substantially the same statements as 'conclusions of law,' and thereupon entered the order from which defendants appeal.

Defendants first contend that the 'dress policy' at Arcata High School, to the effect that 'extremes of hair styles are not acceptable,' is a reasonable exercise of the governing board's rulemaking power in the area of student discipline, and that it is not constitutionally unenforceable by reason of its language. Because of its language, however, we hold against both contentions; we affirm the order requiring petitioner's reinstatement.

The California Legislature has the constitutional duty and power to maintain a system of free public education in this state. (Cal.Const. art. IX, §§ 1, 5.) By statute, the Legislature has delegated to local school district governing boards the authority to operate the public schools within their respective political jurisdictions (Ed.Code, § 921 ³), and to promulgate necessary rules and regulations controlling student conduct. (Id., § 10604. ⁴ ) Students are required to comply with such regulations (Id., § 10609 ⁵) under pain of suspension. (Id....