Meyers v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey
| Decision Date | 20 May 1907 |
| Docket Number | 282 |
| Citation | 67 A. 620,218 Pa. 305 |
| Parties | Meyers, Appellant, v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 15, 1907
Appeal, No. 282, Jan. T., 1906, by plaintiff, from order of C.P. Luzerne Co., Feb. T., 1900, No. 68, refusing to take off nonsuit in case of Joseph Meyers by his next friend and mother, Josephine Meyers, v. the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey. Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before WHEATON, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Error assigned was refusal to take off nonsuit.
The judgment is reversed with a procedendo.
James H. Shea and Edward A. Lynch, with them Joseph F. Shea, for appellant.
A. H McClintock, with him Arthur Hillman and Henry W. Palmer, for appellee.
Before MITCHELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER and ELKIN, JJ.
The trial judge in this case, while conceding the negligence of the defendant company, in failing to sound a bell or blow a whistle or give any warning when approaching a crossing after night, was unable to see that the negligence alleged could have been the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. We cannot understand why he should have had any difficulty upon this point. There is evidence to show that the crossing was a dangerous one by reason of obstructions preventing a view of the track and trains running upon it, and that at the time of the injury here complained of the engine approached this crossing after night, running backward, without giving warning in any way of its approach. The plaintiff, a boy thirteen and a half years of age, was coasting upon the public highway, and was struck at the crossing. It seems from the evidence that there was a considerable stretch of level ground to be crossed before the track was reached, and it is a fair inference for the jury that the boy might have stopped his sled, or turned it to one side, before reaching the track, had any warning of the approach of the train been given. The failure of the defendant to give this warning was something from which injury or accident might naturally and reasonably have been anticipated under the circumstances. The crossing was one which was ordinarily protected by a watchman and safety gates. Neither of these precautions was in use at the time of the accident, and it was, therefore, all the more imperative that some warning should...
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