Meyers v. Chris-Craft Corp.

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KELLY; DETHMERS
• Citation: Meyers v. Chris-Craft Corp., 153 N.W.2d 657, 379 Mich. 552 (Mich. 1967)
• Decision Date: 06 November 1967
• Docket Number: No. 11,CHRIS-CRAFT,11
• Parties: John G. MEYERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.CORPORATION and Home Indemnity Company, Defendants and Appellees.

Page 657

153 N.W.2d 657

379 Mich. 552

John G. MEYERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHRIS-CRAFT CORPORATION and Home Indemnity Company Defendants and Appellees.

No. 11.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 6, 1967.

Rothe, Marston, Mazey, Sachs & O'Connell, Detroit, for appellant.

Lacey & Jones, by E. R. Whinham, Jr., Detroit, for appellees.

Before the Entire Bench.

KELLY, Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant was employed by defendant Chris-Craft Corporation for more than 25 years. Plaintiff received a severe electric shock while operating an electric drill. He was driven to a physician's office where he collapsed and from there was taken by ambulance to the Port Huron Mercy Hospital, where he was hospitalized for three weeks.

After convalescing at home for four months, plaintiff returned to work but his heart condition made it impossible for him to continue such employment.

The hearing referee granted plaintiff compensation, finding a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Defendants appealed on the ground that (1) plaintiff did not establish that his disability following myocardial infarction is causally related to his employment, and (2) plaintiff did not meet the requirements as to notice and claim.

Two members of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, with two members concurring in the result only, held that the requisite of notice and claim had not been met and that a review and determination of causal connection between injury and disability would serve no purpose.

The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal because of a 'lack of meritorious grounds for granting game.'

We quote the following from the Appeal Board's opinion on review:

'Plaintiff relies entirely on his testimony quoted as follows to meet the pre-requisites of notice and claim:

"Q. All right. Now, did you in some manner inform your employer that you wouldn't be in the following day?

"A. Absolutely. My 'missus' went down and told the personnel manager--

"Mr. Felker. I will object.

"A. Beg your pardon?

"Mr. Fried: Wait a minute. Will you say for the purpose of notice and claim that she is his agent?

"The Referee: Yes.

"Q. (By Mr. Fried): Go ahead, sir.

"The Referee: Your wife did what?

"A. She went down and notified the personnel manager that I had been injured there at Chris-Craft.

"Mr. Felker: I am going to object, your Honor.

"The Referee: And did you tell her the same story you told us?

"A. Absolutely. I told my 'Missus' that I had that jolt, and she went right down and told them, so they would be positive that something happened to me there because I couldn't tell the doctor right off the bat until I come to over there is good shape.'

'The most elementary knowledge of evidence requires the above-quoted testimony to fall within the realm of hear-say and thus incompetent and objectionable.'

Defendants' cross-examination of plaintiff follows in part:

'Q. All right. Now, Mr. Dinsmore is the person you stated on direct examination that your wife talked to?

'A. That's right, but he's not there any more.

'Q. She told you she talked to him?

'A. Absolutely.

'Q. All right. Mr. Dinsmore is no longer with Chris-Craft?

'A. That's right.

'Q. Is he living?

'A. At least the last I heard of him he's still alive.

'Q. Where does he live, do you know?

'A. Marine City. At least that's where I knew him last.

'Q. You don't know if he's down in Florida?

'A. I couldn't tell you.'

The requirement that a party objecting to the admission of evidence should make known the reason for the objection has been well established in this State since 1859, when this Court in Howard v. Little (1859), 7 Mich. 468, 470, stated:

'It is the duty of a party objecting to the admission of evidence, to sate the ground of his objection with perspicuity, that the court and the opposing party may not be misled by it.'

In Adams v. Novo Engine Co. (1933), 264 Mich. 292, p. 297, 249 N.W. 859, p. 860, this Court in denying appellant's claim that testimony introduced in a workmen's compensation case was incompetent, stated:

'Regardless of the merits of the objection now asserted in appellants' brief, it was not fairly presented at the hearing, and cannot be sustained in this court. To hold otherwise would afford the means of tricking a party litigant into relying upon the record made at the hearing, where it might have been amplified'. Quoting appellant:

'Plaintiff's testimony as to notice was correctly admitted because the purpose of such testimony was not to vouch for the veracity of said statements but only to show that such statements were made.'

'The testimony in question was admissible and competent. Certainly its incompetency was not so clear as to allow for a general objection by attorney for the defendant. This case seems to indicate the very reason specific objections are necessary. The trial judge must have taken the objection of defendant's attorney to be merely preliminary because the record is clear that he never even made a ruling on the objection. Moreover the attorney for the defendant never insisted on a ruling. Furthermore, it is obvious plaintiff's attorney was in doubt as to the nature of defendant's objection as is noted by...