Meyers v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 02 January 1877
• Citation: 83 Pa. 131
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Meyers <I>versus</I> The Commonwealth.

83 Pa. 131

Meyers versus The Commonwealth.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 20, 1876.

January 2, 1877.

November 20th 1876.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ. WILLIAMS and MERCUR, JJ., absent

Error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1876, No 257.

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John Coyle and William Reardon, for plaintiff in error.—The main question raised by the specifications of error is what amount of evidence is required to establish the defence of insanity in Pennsylvania. We respectfully submit that this question is well settled in this state.

In the case of the Commonwealth v. Ortwein, 26 P. F. Smith 420, Stowe, J., affirmed by this court, says, "The law presumes sanity, but this presumption may be shaken or absolutely destroyed in some cases by the acts connected with and accompanying the commission of a crime. But before you acquit upon such ground, the evidence, whether arising out of such circumstances or from independent circumstances, must be sufficient to do more than merely raise a doubt as to the prisoner's insanity. It must be sufficient fairly and reasonably to satisfy you of the fact of such insanity. The law does not require proof to an extent to preclude a reasonable doubt of such insanity, but it should be such as to satisfy you from the preponderance of testimony that the prisoner was insane at the time of the killing. See also, Lynch v. The Commonwealth, 27 P. F. Smith 205; Brown v. The Commonwealth, 28 Id. 122.

If then the doctrine in Pennsylvania be, as we insist it is, that a defendant who relies upon the defence of insanity must prove it by the preponderance of testimony, the court below, in this case was certainly in error when they instructed the jury substantially, that where the defendant relies upon the defence of insanity, he must produce evidence to satisfy and convince the jury to an extent to preclude or shut out a reasonable doubt of his sanity; in other words, he must satisfy a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he is insane.

The following cases also sustain the same doctrine laid down in the case of Ortwein v. Commonwealth, supra; Commonwealth v. Eddy, 7 Gray 583; Loeffner v. The State, 10 Ohio St. 598; People v. McCann, 16 New York 58; Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Barr 264.

And we contend that under all the evidence in the case (even admitting that there was not sufficient proof of the defendant's insanity), that the defendant was not guilty of murder in the first degree, as there was an entire absence of motive or intent to take life.

E. A. Montooth, District Attorney, for the Commonwealth, contended that the prisoner was of sound mind, and elaborately presented the views referred to by the court below in their charge when narrating the circumstances upon which the Commonwealth relied for conviction.

Chief Justice AGNEW delivered the opinion of the court, January 2d 1877.

There is one error for which the sentence in this case must be reversed. It appears in several parts of the charge, leaving no doubt as to the meaning of the learned judge who presided at the trial. It must, therefore, have impressed the minds of the jurors. Without specifying each instance, it may be summed up in a single statement, that the judge instructed the jury, that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner was insane at the time the act was committed. This statement is too stringent and throws the prisoner upon a degree of proof beyond the legal measure of his defence. That measure is simply proof which is satisfactory — such as flows fairly from a preponderance of the evidence. It need not be beyond doubt. A reasonable doubt of the fact of insanity, on the other hand, is not sufficient to acquit upon a defence of insanity. This has been held in several cases: Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 26 P. F. Smith 414; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 27 Id. 205; Brown v. Commonwealth, 28 Id. 122. Sanity being the normal condition of men, and insanity a defence set up to an act which otherwise would be a crime, the burthen rests upon the prisoner of proving his abnormal condition. But the evidence of this need be only satisfactory — and the conclusion such as fairly results from the evidence. Where the evidence raises a balancing question, and the mind is brought to determine its preponderance, there may be a doubt still existing in the mind, yet the actual weight may be with the prisoner; and this proof should be considered satisfactory. In cases of conflicting evidence the preponderance must govern, there being no other rational means of decision. But if we say in such a case it must be satisfactory beyond a reasonable doubt, it is evident the expression implies more than a mere preponderance. It is difficult to define the precise difference between the two measures, yet we are conscious in our own minds that to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is a severer test of belief than to be satisfied that the preponderance falls on that side. Probably the true reason of the difficulty in defining the difference lies in the inability to define a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be an honest and conscientious difficulty in believing, one not merely subtle or ingenious — it must arise out of the evidence, and not be fanciful, or be conjured up to escape consequences. It must strike the mind with such force as to compel it to pause in yielding belief. These are characteristics, but do not define the measure of belief, which is beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge stated well all these characteristics, and yet in conclusion said, by way of illustration of his...